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Abstract 
The six studies presented in this thesis investigated the extent to which people 
compare to others when making a range of health-related judgements and decisions and 
aimed to identify the cognitive mechanisms used in this comparison process. A key 
question was whether biases found in specific judgements and decisions, such as deciding 
to seek help when it is not needed or not seeking help when it is needed, could be 
explained by social comparison effects. It was found that participants compared to others 
using rank-based strategies when making judgements and decisions about mental and 
physical health symptoms and when judging their health in general (Study 1, 2 and 4). 
Social comparison effects were generally small to medium in size (average Cohen’s f2 = 
0.09, range = 0.01-0.39). Health-related help-seeking accuracy was associated with how 
participants believed their experience of symptoms compared to that of others. 
Participants were four times more likely to seek help when it was not needed if they 
believed that they experienced symptoms more frequently than others, and two to three 
times more likely not to seek help when it was needed if they believed that they 
experienced symptoms less frequently than others (Study 1). However, participants’ beliefs 
about how their sleep compared to that of others had little influence on their sleep-related 
judgement and decision-making (Study 3). There was no evidence that participants’ beliefs 
about how much support they received relative to others was associated with perceptions 
of this support (Study 5 and 6). The findings have implications for the development of both 
interventions that may improve accuracy in health help-seeking decisions and social norms-
based interventions, the measurement of comparison effects, self-rated health and social 
support, social comparison theory, and models of symptom appraisal and health-related 
help-seeking.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Overview 
Why do people make inaccurate judgements about their health? Why do people seek 
help for health problems when they do not need to or fail to seek help when they do? Why 
do people worry unnecessarily about their sleep? Why do people’s perceptions of their 
social support not accurately reflect the amount of support they receive? The studies 
reported in this thesis attempt to resolve all of these questions with a single answer. When 
making judgements about their general health, their symptoms, their sleep, and their social 
support, and when making decisions about whether to seek help for health problems, 
people do not base their judgements and decisions on their absolute experiences alone, 
but on how these experiences compare to others. As will be explained, the use of social 
comparison for self-evaluation is ubiquitous in everyday life but can lead to inaccurate 
judgement and decision making if judgements and decisions are largely based on beliefs 
about how one compares to others. Such inaccuracy occurs when the distribution of 
experiences within the comparison sample is not representative of the actual distribution 
of the experience being judged.  
For example, when judging how severe a cold is, it is hypothesised that people will 
take into consideration how their absolute experience of the symptoms (such as how long 
they have lasted for, the intensity of the symptoms, the number of symptoms they are 
experiencing) compares to other people’s experiences of cold symptoms. If, for example, a 
person compares on the dimension of symptom duration and they have experienced cold 
symptoms for 7 days but the people that they are comparing to only experienced such 
symptoms for a few days before they felt better, they may be inclined to think their 
experience is “severe” when actually it is not (in fact the majority of people in the general 
population experience a cold for 7-10 days). This may have a knock-on effect to help-
16 
 
seeking behaviours; for example, the above person may decide to go to the doctor about 
their cold after making the (inaccurate) judgement that their cold is “severe”. 
The studies aim not only to examine whether such judgements are relative in nature 
but also to determine precisely how people compare to others (if they do). Cognitive 
models of judgement are applied to the domains of health, sleep, and social support for the 
first time in an attempt to understand the exact mechanisms underlying comparisons – a 
topic which has previously received little attention in the social comparison literature. 
In understanding how people compare to others when making judgements about 
themselves, one can understand how people may make inaccurate judgements when 
comparison samples are not representative of the actual state of the world and also how 
such inaccurate judgements may be corrected. Correcting misperceptions about the self 
through correcting beliefs about others is the focus of norm recalibration interventions and 
the main implications of the research findings reported in this thesis lie in informing such 
intervention and information campaigns. This is explained in detail in the implications 
section of this Introduction. The research findings also have implications for the 
measurement of constructs such as social support and self-rated health. These and other 
implications relating to each domain studied are described in detail in the discussion 
sections of each chapter and in the General Discussion (Chapter 7). 
The rest of this introduction takes the following format. First, a brief overview of 
social comparison and an explanation of how the current studies fit within this literature 
are given. Detailed reviews of the literature on each topic covered (i.e., physical and mental 
health help-seeking, general health, sleep and social support judgements), along with 
descriptions of how the current studies fit within their respective literature areas, are given 
at the start of each chapter. The summary on social comparison is followed by an overview 
of the cognitive models that will be tested in the studies.  A summary of the main 
17 
 
motivation for and potential implications of the studies is then given followed by an outline 
of the thesis. 
Social Comparison  
“The human mind is a remarkable comparison processor. Whenever information is 
perceived, processed, or evaluated, it seems this information is compared to a salient 
context, norm, or standard.” (Mussweiler & Epstude, 2009, p. 1) 
 
We learn to compare stimuli at a very early age (Gentner & Medina, 1998; Gentner & 
Rattermann, 1991) and our use of comparison is pervasive in our everyday lives. As the 
quote above suggests, it has been proposed that when any kind of stimulus is processed, a 
frame of reference is evoked to which the stimulus is then compared (e.g., Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986). The use of comparison has been studied across many different areas in 
psychology and the idea that we compare to other people in order to evaluate ourselves 
and our behaviours has long been researched in the social literature (e.g., social 
comparison theory: Festinger, 1954; reference group theory: Hyman, 1942, Merton & Kitt, 
1950; norm theory: Kahneman & Miller, 1986; relative deprivation theory: Runciman, 
1966). This research, particularly work on social comparison theory, has highlighted the 
important role that social comparisons play in making judgements about ourselves and 
others and this research is briefly reviewed now. 
Social Comparison Theory 
Since Leon Festinger outlined the first systematic theory of social comparison in 
1954, there has been much research on the reasons for social comparison, the choice of 
comparison target/direction of comparison and the affective and cognitive outcomes of 
comparison (for a detailed review of the history of social comparison theory see Suls & 
Wheeler, 2000). Traditional social comparison research has concentrated on investigating 
these questions in the context of the facilitation of three goals: self-assessment, self-
18 
 
enhancement, and self-improvement (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wills, 
1981; Wood, 1989).  
Festinger (1954) proposed that the goal of social comparison was self-evaluation of 
opinion and ability. He hypothesised that people have an innate desire to hold accurate 
assessments of their own and other people’s opinions and abilities as such assessments are 
needed if an individual is to function effectively in their environment. When the preferred 
objective or physical standard is unavailable for evaluation, rather than facing uncertainty, 
people assess their own standing on a particular dimension by comparing to other people’s 
standing on that dimension. In further development of the model, Schachter and Singer 
(1962) extended the use of social comparison in self-assessment to any situation under 
uncertainty or threat and not just the evaluation of opinions and abilities.  
People also purposefully engage in social comparison in order to create, maintain, or 
confirm a positive self-image. To this end, they may make downward comparisons to 
people who are worse off than themselves using a contrastive process (Wills, 1981) or 
upward comparisons to those that are better but similar to them using an assimilation 
process (Wheeler, 1966; Collins, 1996). In both cases, social comparisons lead to increased 
self-esteem and positive affect. There is also research to suggest that, when self-esteem is 
threatened (particularly that of people from stigmatised groups), people make lateral, 
within-group comparisons. This is to avoid the loss of self-esteem that may result from 
comparing to others who may be worse off on a particular dimension but could be 
perceived as being better off in general because they belong to a more advantaged group 
(Crocker & Major, 1989; Major, 1994). 
Finally, people compare to others for inspiration and/or motivation to improve 
themselves (Collins, 1996; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Taylor & Lobel, 1989). This occurs 
through a process of upwards comparison but only under certain conditions; the person 
comparing must have high self-esteem and must be comparing to others that are not seen 
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as competitors and whose success is perceived to be attainable (e.g., Taylor & Lobel, 1989). 
Of these three goals, the studies outlined in this thesis are concerned with the use of social 
comparison for self-assessment and the rest of this overview will focus on the research 
relating to this goal. 
Comparison Sample Selection for Self-Assessment 
Research on who people compare to when making social comparisons has suggested 
that comparison samples are selected based on the goals and motives of the comparison 
(see Biernat & Billings, 2001 or Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2010 for a review). There is a 
general consensus that, when the goal is self-assessment, people compare to similar others 
(e.g., Festinger, 1954; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Suls, Gastorf, & Lawhom, 1978; Taylor, 
Neter, & Wayment, 1995; Wheeler, 1966). Accounts developed within traditional social 
comparison theory suggest that comparison sample selection is a complex and effortful 
process. For example, in the case of self-assessment, Goethals and Darley (1977) propose 
that people select others who are similar not only on the dimension that is being assessed 
but on attributes that may also influence one’s standing on that dimension. This means 
that people have to first decide which attributes are relevant to the dimension being 
assessed and then construct a comparison sample of people who are similar on each of 
these attributes as well as on the dimension on which they are actually making the 
comparison (Goethals & Darley, 1997; Wood, 1989). Zanna, Goethals, and Hill (1975) give 
the example of a swimmer evaluating their speed. In order to do this the swimmer would 
consider the speed of other swimmers (the dimension being assessed) and dimensions that 
are related to swimming speed such as age, experience, and practice, and compare to 
people who are similar on all of these dimensions.  
However, there is evidence to suggest that comparison processes can be performed 
effectively under cognitive load (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995) and that social 
comparisons can occur spontaneously with the mere presence of others being enough to 
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influence self-assessment and behaviour (Morse & Gergen, 1970; Seta, 1982). These 
findings suggest that social comparison occurs with much less effort that originally thought 
and, in some cases, may even occur automatically as some studies have demonstrated how 
self-assessments have been affected by subliminal presentations of comparison targets 
(Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that social 
comparison occurs whether objective standards are available or not (Klein, 1997). This has 
led to the suggestion that social comparison can be seen as a self-judgement heuristic (e.g., 
Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2010).  
Social Comparison as a Heuristic 
Mussweiler and colleagues have shown how comparative information processing can 
be quick and efficient (Mussweiler & Epstude, 2009) and can reduce uncertainty in 
judgements (Mussweiler & Posten, 2012). They propose that these are the reasons why 
comparisons are used so ubiquitously – i.e., they are being used as a heuristic. Mussweiler 
and Epstude (2009) argue that using objective standards to judge targets requires a lot of 
cognitive capacity as it may involve searching for information that is often difficult to 
obtain. They suggest that comparative information processing is more efficient than non-
comparative processes because it 1) limits the search for knowledge about the target 
(information focus) and 2) substitutes knowledge about the target that is difficult to obtain 
or unavailable with easily accessible knowledge about similar previously encountered 
targets (information transfer). In a series of experiments, Mussweiler and Epstude (2009) 
showed that participants primed to think comparatively looked at fewer pieces of 
information about a target they were judging, showed evidence of information transfer 
about a similar, known target to a new, unfamiliar target they were judging, and made 
quicker judgements than control participants who were not primed. Mussweiler and 
Posten (2012) added to these findings by showing, in three experiments, how participants 
primed to think comparatively felt more certain about subsequent judgements than 
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controls. Although the targets being judged in both of these studies were not social ones, 
the authors conclude that it is likely that the same processes are involved with self-
judgement through social comparison. 
Underlying Mechanisms of Social Comparison 
Whether people compare automatically, use social comparison to make quick self-
judgements, or spend time constructing comparison groups in order to make self-
assessments that are as accurate as possible, the underlying mechanisms of the 
comparison process (i.e., how people actually compare to others) have received little 
attention in the literature to date. Investigation of social comparison processes has largely 
focused on how the comparison leads to assimilation or contrast with others and the 
cognitive and affective outcomes of this (e.g., Markman & McMullen, 2003; Mussweiler, 
2003). However, models of these processes do not explain what actually happens when the 
comparison is taking place.  
The studies outlined in this thesis aim to investigate precisely this by applying 
cognitive models of judgement to a range of social comparisons. It is hypothesised that, 
when making self-judgements, people will construct a comparison sample (from memory 
and/or the immediate context) and then, through a series of binary, ordinal comparisons, 
calculate their rank within this sample and use their ranking as the basis for the judgement. 
For example, when judging the severity of a symptom a person might bring to mind a 
comparison sample of five other people they know who have also experienced the 
symptom. They will then judge how the severity of their experience of the symptom 
compares to the severity of other people’s experiences. If, for example, they believe that 
four out of the five people had a less severe experience than they did then they are likely to 
conclude that their experience is quite severe as their experience ranks high within their 
comparison sample – second out of six. If, however, they believe that four out of the five 
people had a more severe experience of the symptom than they did then they are likely to 
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conclude that their experience was not that severe as the majority of others were worse off 
than them (i.e., the rank fifth out of six). This account is proposed by the decision by 
sampling model (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) and is explained, along with other 
competing models of relative judgement, in the next section. 
Cognitive Models of Judgement 
Throughout the studies in this thesis, I apply two competing models of relative 
judgement – decision by sampling (DbS) and adaptation level theory (ALT: Helson, 1947, 
1948) – to self-judgements in the domains of health, sleep, and social support in order to 
investigate the extent to which, and how, people compare to others when making these 
judgements. These models are explained in the sections below, which give a brief overview 
of the history of relative models of judgement. 
Adaptation Level Theory 
ALT was originally developed to account for context effects in psychophysical 
judgements. Helson (1948) showed that participants did not judge the heaviness of a 
weight in absolute terms – their judgement of a target weight was influenced by the 
heaviness of a weight that they had held before judging the target (an anchor). Participants 
judged the target to be heavier when it was lifted after lifting an anchor weight that was 
lighter than the target than when they lifted it after lifting an anchor weight that was 
heavier than the target.  
ALT proposes that when a target item is judged it is evaluated in comparison to 
previously encountered similar and contextually salient items. It is suggested that people 
have internalised reference levels (‘adaptation levels’) to which relevant new items are 
compared and that these reference levels are formed from past experience of similar and 
contextually salient items. This means that adaptation levels are constantly evolving with 
experience and are therefore different for everyone. In its simplest and commonly used 
form, ALT states that the judgement of new items in relation to the adaptation level 
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involves a comparison of the new item to the average of relevant previously encountered 
items. Helson’s basic equation for the adaptation level (AL) is: 
AL = K(MpAqRr)       (1) 
where K is an empirical constant, M is the geometric mean of previously encountered, 
similar items, A is the anchor item (if applicable), R refers to residual stimuli (later deemed 
irrelevant: Helson, 1964), and p, q, and r are constant weighting coefficients which sum to 
the value of 1 and are determined empirically.  
  ALT has been surpassed by rank and range-based models (described next) after 
theoretical and empirical limitations were uncovered (e.g., Birnbaum, 1974; Parducci, 1963; 
1965; Sarris, 1967; 1971). However, it is still widely assumed in social psychology that we 
compare to the average of a comparison sample. For example, empirical studies testing 
predictors and consequences of social comparison often ask participants to evaluate 
themselves relative to an ‘average’ target. This method has been used often in health 
research, for example, in studies where patients have been asked how they think they 
compare to the ‘average’ patient with the same illness (see Arigo, Suls, & Smyth, 2014, for 
a review of such studies). Furthermore, studies implementing social norm-based 
interventions tend to give people information about how their behaviour compares to the 
average of the comparison group in an attempt to adjust their behaviour in line with this 
average. For example, in order to try to reduce energy consumption, Schultz, Nolan, 
Cialdini, Goldstein, and Griskevicius (2007) provided households with information about 
the amount of energy consumed by their household and the average amount of energy 
consumed by households in the neighbourhood. Similarly, in an attempt to increase 
participation in food waste recycling, Nomura, John, and Cotterill (2011) provided 
households with information about the percentage of households in their street that 
participated in food waste recycling and the average participation rate for the geographical 
area. As it is so often assumed that when people are asked to compare to others they 
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compare to the average, this assumption is formerly tested in the studies reported in this 
thesis through the application of ALT. This is done by investigating whether the difference 
between a person’s experience and what they believe the average experience of others in 
the comparison sample to be predicts associated outcome measures. This is referred to as 
the participant’s ‘distance from the average’.  
Range-Frequency Theory 
Range-frequency theory (RFT: Parducci, 1965; 1995) was developed to account for 
findings that suggested that ALT could not adequately explain category judgement. For 
example, Parducci (1965) showed that participants sometimes made very different 
judgements about items when the adaptation level was held constant and made the same 
judgements about items when it was not. For example, in a series of studies, Parducci 
(1963, 1965) presented participants with 9 different sized squares multiple times in a block 
of 45 presentations. Participants were shown the whole block of presentations once and 
were then shown it again and asked to judge the size of each square on a scale from 1 = 
“very small” to 6 = “very large”. Using a between-subjects design, Parducci changed the 
number of times each of the nine squares was presented in the block across groups of 
participants to manipulate the average size of all the squares presented (i.e., the 
adaptation level). He found that participants sometimes judged squares that were the 
same difference in size from the average square size of the block as being different in size. 
He also found that participants sometimes judged squares that did not have the same size 
difference compared to the average square size as being the same in size. This would not 
be expected if the participants were judging the size of each square by comparing it to the 
average size of all the squares in the set as ALT proposes. 
Parducci (1965) proposed that people are influenced by the whole distribution of 
contextual items and not just the mean of these items. When a target (e.g., a person: xi) is 
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evaluated within a context (e.g., a sample of people: x1, x2,…, xn) the resulting judgment (Ji) 
is based on a compromise between two principles: range (Ri) and frequency (Fi). 
Ji = wRi + (1 - w)Fi      (2) 
When the comparison sample is ordered on the dimension being judged [x1, x2,…, 
xi,…, xn] Ri is the target’s position in relation to the highest and lowest people in the sample: 
    Ri = xi - x1       
            xn - x1        (3) 
Fi is the target’s relative ranked position within the ordered sample: 
    Fi = i – 1       
               n – 1      (4) 
and w is a weighting constant (between 0 and 1) that reflects the influence of the two 
principles on the judgement. 
RFT gained much empirical support not only in psychophysics where it originated 
(Parducci, 1963; Parducci & Perrett, 1971; Riskey, Parducci & Beauchamp, 1979) but in 
other, diverse domains and can account for context effects in judgements of body image 
(Wedell, Santoyo, & Pettibone, 2005), emotion (Rusell & Fehr, 1987), facial attractiveness 
(Wedell, Parducci, & Geiselmen, 1987), happiness (Wedell & Parducci, 1988; Smith, Diener, 
& Wedell, 1989), morality (Parducci, 1968), prices (Niedrich, Sharma, & Wedell, 2001), and 
psychopathology (Wedell, Parducci, & Lane, 1990). Many of these cases involve social 
comparison. 
Decision by Sampling 
DbS proposes that judgements of a target within a context depend solely on the 
target’s relative ranked position within the context. It offers a process-level account of the 
frequency principle of RFT outlined in equation 4 above. Applied to self-judgements using 
social comparison, the model proposes that people will bring to mind a sample of others 
and will base their judgement about themselves on where they rank amongst these others 
on the dimension that is being judged. The model suggests a very undemanding 
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comparison procedure in which only two simple cognitive processes are used - ordinal 
comparison and frequency accumulation. A person’s rank within their sample is their 
subjective self-evaluation and this is calculated by making a number of binary, ordinal 
comparisons to ascertain whether one is “better than”, “equal to”, or  “worse than” each 
person within the sample and by keeping track of the number of comparison outcomes 
that either favour or do not favour oneself. The model therefore assumes that comparisons 
are ordinal in nature - consistent with research suggesting that people are better at 
discriminating between stimuli than they are at evaluating their magnitude (Miller, 1956; 
Stewart, Brown & Chater, 2005). It also assumes that people are able to encode, 
manipulate, and recall frequencies with relative ease - long assumed in humans and 
animals (see Sedlmeier & Betsch, 2002, for a review). Consistent with information sampling 
models of judgement (e.g., Fiedler, 2000; Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007), comparison 
samples may be constructed from memory and/or the immediate context. 
The model’s simplicity lends itself to the idea that people may use social comparison 
as a heuristic to judge themselves but at the same time the model is also able to account 
for traditional views that comparison is a more effortful process whereby comparison 
samples are carefully constructed based on a number of different attributes. For example, 
people may make quick self-judgements if they are limited in time, capacity, or motivation 
by comparing to others that are easily retrieved from memory. Corcoran and Mussweiler 
(2010) refer to such people as “routine standards” and present evidence of their use. Or, 
they may base self-judgements on how they compare to retrieved implicit norms that they 
hold such as their beliefs about the distribution of the dimension that is being judged (for 
example, symptom severity) within the general population (Alicke, 1985; Krueger & 
Clement, 1994; Suls, 1986; Weinstein, 1980). On the other hand, when accuracy is 
important, time can be spent constructing the best comparison sample to compare to but 
the comparison process remains the same. 
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Considerable empirical support for the DbS model exists including evidence from a 
number of studies that have applied the model to social comparisons and have shown how 
an individual’s rank within a comparison sample on a specific dimension predicts outcomes 
related to that dimension. These include attitudes towards the riskiness of alcohol 
consumption (Wood, Brown, & Maltby, 2012), concerns about indebtedness (Aldrovandi, 
Wood, Maltby, & Brown, 2015), judgements of the severity of crimes and punishments 
(Aldrovandi, Wood, & Brown, 2014), mental distress (Wood, Boyce, Moore, & Brown, 
2012), perceptions of the health benefits of exercise (Maltby, Wood, Vlaev, Taylor, & 
Brown, 2012), student satisfaction (Brown, Wood, Ogden, & Maltby, 2015), and whether 
people think they have a mental health disorder (Melrose, Brown, & Wood, 2013). These 
studies utilised a novel methodology (explained in Chapter 2) that elicited participant’s 
beliefs about the distribution of the dimension of interest (e.g., alcohol consumption, 
symptom severity, etc.) in a specified comparison sample (e.g., the general population). 
Previous research testing ALT and RFT has made assumptions that participants’ beliefs 
about such distributions are correct. However, investigation into individual differences in 
participants’ beliefs about others carried out in these studies has shown that this is often 
not the case. This will be further investigated in the current studies. 
RFT vs DbS 
 The DbS model is used to investigate comparison effects over the RFT model for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, RFT only gives a descriptive account of rank and range effects 
whereas DbS offers a process-level account of rank effects. Therefore, as one of the main 
aims of the studies is to identify the processes underlying social comparisons, DbS is the 
more relevant model to use.  
 Secondly, although DbS does not predict effects of the range of a contextual 
distribution as RFT does, despite such effects often being observed; there is evidence to 
suggest that a purely rank-based approach such as DbS can account for these apparent 
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range effects. RFT has been tested mainly through presentation and manipulation of 
experimentally designed contexts for judgement in the laboratory. Testing of DbS on the 
other hand has focused more on remembered than experimentally constructed contexts; 
more reflective of actual, real-world judgement and decision-making (see references in the 
section above). This testing has shown that rank effects are present when participants use 
contexts retrieved from memory to make judgements and decisions, just as when 
experimental contexts were used when testing RFT. However, apparent range effects seen 
during RFT testing may actually be artefacts of using experimentally constructed 
distributions. In real-world judgement and decision-making, it would appear that range 
effects can be accounted for by a rank-based model when the distinctiveness of items in 
the context is considered. Based on the SIMPLE model of memory (Brown, Neath, & Chater, 
2007), Brown and Matthews (2011) propose that when people construct a comparison 
sample of items by retrieving them from memory, the likelihood of a particular item being 
retrieved and therefore included is somewhat dependent on the items’ discriminability, 
i.e., how distinctive it is relative to other relevant items. This means that when there are 
groups of many similar items that could be retrieved, the likelihood of them being so 
decreases, meaning that, overall, these items contribute less to the judgement being made. 
Brown and Matthews (2011) showed that there was no difference in the fit of a rank-based 
model that took into account the probability of items being included in the comparison 
sample based on their discriminability (which they refer to as the DbS-SIMPLE model) and 
the RFT model. They suggest that RFT should not be used over DbS in investigations of 
contexts effects just because it incorporates both range and rank effects (see also Brown et 
al., 2015, for an alternative account of how apparent range effects may reflect rank-based 
processes). 
Finally, the studies reported in this thesis aimed to investigate how participant’s 
beliefs about the world affected judgements and decisions they made about themselves. 
29 
 
This means that the context for judgement was not experimentally manipulated; it was 
retrieved by each participant. Therefore, DbS is again the more relevant model to use to 
investigate these kinds of context effects because, as previously mentioned, it focuses on 
comparison contexts retrieved from memory.  
Given all of the above, there is little reason to test the RFT model over the DbS 
model in the current studies. Therefore, DbS and ALT accounts of judgements are 
compared directly in each study in order to investigate 1) the extent to which various 
judgements are made using social comparison and 2) precisely how people compare to 
others, i.e., whether they use rank-based strategies or their distance from the mean of the 
comparison sample. It is hypothesised that, when comparing to others to make judgements 
about themselves, people will do so using rank-based strategies (consistent with DbS). 
Understanding precisely how people make judgements about themselves through social 
comparison is useful for the development of interventions that aim to correct inaccurate 
self-judgements (and ultimately change behaviour) through correcting inaccurate beliefs 
about others. This will be discussed next. 
Main Research Implications 
Research has shown that the use of social comparison in self-assessment can lead to 
inaccurate judgements being made; these judgements may in turn affect behaviour and 
have adverse consequences. The classic example is alcohol consumption in university 
students. Students who drink a lot of alcohol typically perceive that their consumption is 
more ‘normal’ than it really is because they incorrectly believe that their peers are drinking 
more than they are. They overestimate consumption in others, which makes their 
consumption seem less extreme than it is (McAlaney & McMahon, 2007; Perkins, 2007; 
Perkins & Wechsler, 1996). Students come to incorrect judgements about themselves 
because they compare to others to make the judgement and their beliefs about others are 
incorrect.  
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Interventions have been developed with the aim of changing behaviour by changing 
people’s perceptions of themselves through correcting their misperceptions of others. 
These norm recalibration interventions typically involve giving people information about 
descriptive social norms (how others usually behave) in one of two ways: through social 
marketing of the normative information using mass communication methods such as 
posters and flyers, or by using personalised feedback which provides information about 
how the individual’s behaviour compares to the actual norm. These interventions have 
been found to be somewhat successful in changing a variety of behaviours, for example, 
decreasing alcohol (e.g., Agostinelli, Brown, & Miller, 1995) and energy consumption (e.g., 
Dolan & Metcalf, 2013; Schultz et al., 2007) and increasing recycling participation (Schultz, 
1999; Nomura et al., 2011) and the amount of material recycled (Schultz, 1999). 
However, these interventions tend to supply people with information about how 
they compare to the average of the comparison sample. They assume (without actually 
testing) that people compare their behaviour to the group average and that they are likely 
to modify their behaviour in line with this average (e.g., Dolan & Metcalf, 2013; Harries, 
Rettie, Studley, Burchell, & Chambers, 2013; Nomura et al., 2011; Schultz, 1999; Schultz et 
al., 2007). However, recent research directly comparing DbS and ALT has shown that when 
health-related judgements are made through a comparison to others they are made not 
through a comparison to the group average but through a comparison based on the 
individual’s rank within the group. For example, Wood, Brown et al. (2012) showed how 
the rank of an individual’s alcohol consumption amongst that of others predicted 
judgements relating to the risks of developing alcohol-related disorders. In this study, no 
evidence was found that individuals compared their drinking to that of the average of 
others in the comparison group in order to make the judgements. Similarly, Melrose et al. 
(2013) showed how participants’ judgements of whether or not they thought they had 
depression or an anxiety disorder were predicted by where the occurrence of their 
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symptoms of these disorders ranked amongst others. These judgements were not 
predicted by the distance of participants’ experiences of the symptoms from the average 
experience of the comparison group.  
It is therefore possible that norm-based interventions and education campaigns may 
be more effective when rank-based information, rather than information on how people 
differ from the average, is supplied. The studies in this thesis therefore examine the nature 
of the social comparison process in detail. Furthermore, they are all carried out in areas 
where there is expected to be discordance between subjective and objective experiences 
that may lead to inaccurate social comparisons and hence may be targeted effectively by 
norm recalibration interventions. The extent to which people differ in their beliefs about 
the distribution of absolute experiences (such as symptom occurrence) in a comparison 
sample that is common to all participants (the general population) is explored throughout 
the thesis in an attempt to identify areas where inaccurate social comparisons may be 
particularly prevalent and therefore useful targets for such interventions. 
Thesis Outline 
This thesis is structured in the following way. First an outline of general procedures 
used in all of the studies is given in the next chapter (Chapter 2; on methodology). This 
chapter includes overviews of participant recruitment, procedures followed by participants, 
construction of questionnaires, methods used to investigate social comparison and 
compare ALT and DbS accounts, and data analysis. The four chapters that follow (Chapters 
3-6) outline the six studies completed during my PhD. These each begin with a review of 
the literature relevant to each topic (physical and mental health help-seeking, sleep, 
general health, and social support) and an explanation of how the current studies fit within 
this literature. The studies are then explained, results provided and the implications of the 
findings are discussed in relation to each specific domain. General conclusions and 
implications are discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of how participants were recruited and compensated 
for all of the studies outlined in this thesis, the methods used to investigate whether and 
how people compare to others when making specific judgements and the general 
procedures used in all of the studies. There are six studies reported in this thesis that are 
fully explained in the forthcoming chapters. For the purpose of this chapter, the studies are 
referred to by name only and often in the order that they were undertaken which differs 
from the order in which they are presented in this thesis. The studies are listed below in 
the order they were completed along with their corresponding thesis chapter. 
1. Social Support: Study 1 – Chapter 6 
2. Social Support: Study 2 – Chapter 6 
3. General Health – Chapter 5 
4. Mental Health – Chapter 3 
5. Physical Health – Chapter 3 
6. Sleep – Chapter 4 
Participants 
Sample Size Calculations 
The aim of the two social support studies was to investigate whether perceptions of 
support (such as satisfaction with received support) were better predicted by how an 
individual thinks the amount of support they receive compares to that received by others 
(i.e., whether they get more or less support than others) than simply by the actual amount 
of support that they receive. It was hypothesised that the relationship between received 
support and perceptions of support would be weaker than the relationship between how 
the received support compares to others and perceptions of support and sample size 
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calculations for these studies were based on detecting the weaker relationship. A previous 
meta-analysis identified the average correlation between received support and perceptions 
of support to be r = .35, indicating a medium sized effect (Cohen, 1988). Sample size 
calculations suggested that at least 49 participants would be needed to have an 80% 
chance of detecting a correlation of .35, and that, for multiple regressions with 5 predictor 
variables, at least 91 participants would be needed to have an 80% chance of detecting a 
medium sized effect. In Study 1, 198 participants were recruited and in Study 2 there were 
202 participants. High numbers of participants were recruited to allow for any exclusions 
due to difficulties understanding the methodology used (please see the section below 
entitled ‘measuring how an individual compares to others’ for more details of this). The 
minimum number of participants included in the analyses across the studies was 128. 
The remaining studies were slightly different in that their main aim was to 
investigate whether individuals compare to others when making specific health-related 
judgements and, if so, the extent to which they do so and how. Previous work investigating 
the effects of social comparison on health-related judgements that used a similar 
methodology to the present studies (Melrose et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2012) was used as a 
guide to calculating sample sizes for these studies. Both previous studies suggested that the 
kinds of social comparison effects that the current studies are investigating might be small. 
For example, Melrose et al. (2013) report that the relative rank of participants’ experiences 
of depression and anxiety symptoms within the general population accounted for 6.2% and 
4.3% of the variance in their judgements of whether they thought they had depression or 
anxiety respectively. These figures correspond to Cohen's f2 values of 0.066 and 0.045 
respectively; values of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 indicate small, medium, and large effects 
respectively. Sample size calculations for these studies were based on the anticipated main 
analyses (multiple regression with five predictor variables) and suggested that at least 643 
participants would be needed to have an 80% chance of detecting a small sized effect. This 
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sample size was obtained for three out of the four studies: general health: N = 643, mental 
health: N = 643, and sleep: N = 656, but due to difficulties in collecting data for the physical 
health study (see below), a sample size of only 543 participants was collected for that 
study. This is still a large enough sample size to have a 75% chance of detecting a small 
effect in a regression analysis with 4 predictor variables, which was enough to test the main 
hypotheses (see Chapter 3). A different methodology was utilised in these studies which 
meant that recruiting higher numbers of participants to allow for exclusions was not 
required (again, please see the section below entitled ‘measuring how an individual 
compares to others’ for more details of this). 
Recruitment 
Due to the large numbers of participants needed, participants were recruited using 
two online crowdsourcing platforms: Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and CrowdFlower. 
On both these platforms, created tasks (in the case of all the studies in this thesis this was 
to complete a questionnaire) are made available to “workers” – people who sign up to the 
platform in order to complete tasks in exchange for money or Amazon vouchers in the case 
of MTurk. It is possible to set eligibility criteria on both platforms so that specific people 
can be targeted, for example, those living in a certain country, those above a certain age or 
those classified as “high quality” workers. There has been much research on the use of 
MTurk workers in psychological studies (reviewed briefly below) and this platform was 
chosen in preference to other crowdsourcing websites for this reason. However, due to the 
U.S. Patriot Act it is not possible to post tasks on MTurk unless you are a U.S. citizen and so 
an intermediary company, CrowdFlower, was used to create and post tasks on MTurk.  
This worked well for the first three studies (social support 1 and 2 and general 
health) but then CrowdFlower stopped posting tasks on MTurk and started using different 
crowdsourcing channels. As no other way of accessing MTurk workers was available at that 
time, the next two studies to be carried out (mental health and physical health) were run 
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on CrowdFlower through these channels. There were no problems collecting the mental 
health study data1, however, after this study was completed, CrowdFlower changed their 
practices and increased the number of crowdsourcing channels that they used substantially 
to over 100. When data collection for the physical health study started it quickly became 
apparent that these changes had resulted in a distinct reduction in the quality of 
participants. Many people rushed through the survey to get the payment code at the end 
and then used the code multiple times from different accounts (it was not possible to 
supply each participant with a unique payment code) in order to receive several payments. 
These problems had not been encountered in any of the other studies. The changes in 
practice meant that it was also possible for people to take the survey multiple times 
(despite blocking of multiple responses from the same IP address). This meant that it took 
much longer (over 3 months) to collect the data, as many participants had to be excluded. 
Fortunately, during this time, another company (MTurk Data) was found to run the final 
study (sleep) on MTurk and no problems were encountered during data collection for this 
study. 
 Research has shown that MTurk workers produce high quality data in psychological 
experiments (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and reliable data in the area of 
judgment and decision making specifically (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). MTurk 
workers differ somewhat from the U.S. general population in their demographic 
characteristics. They are young – on average in their thirties, overeducated, 
underemployed and under-representative of Blacks and Hispanics whilst over-
representative of Asians (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Paolacci et al., 2010; Shapiro, 
Chandler, & Mueller, 2013). Despite this, they are more representative of the U.S. 
population than the university undergraduates typically used in psychological research as 
                                                          
1 Although it took quite a bit longer to collect the data; a month as opposed to a few days to a week 
for the first three studies. 
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well as other internet samples in general (Paolacci et al., 2010). There is also evidence to 
suggest that MTurk workers are more attentive to instructions and questions in online 
surveys than university undergraduates (Hauser & Schwarz, 2015) and that they are 
truthful when providing self-report information (Rand, 2012).  
 Participants were paid $0.75 to $1.50 for completing questionnaires in the studies 
outlined in this thesis (which never took longer than 15-20 minutes to complete). This is 
above the average MTurk payment of around $1.40 per hour (Horton & Chilton, 2010). 
Compensation amount has been shown to have no effect on data quality in tasks that 
require subjective responses such as those that participants completed in the thesis studies 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Marge, Banerjee, & Rudnicky, 2010; Mason & Watts, 2009). 
 When tasks were posted on MTurk or CrowdFlower, they all had the same general 
instructions that were tailored to the theme of the questionnaire. These instructions 
contained a short overview of the task, for example: “You will be asked to complete a 15 
minute online questionnaire about your health and the health of others. Please answer all 
questions; you may only complete the study once. You will receive $0.75 for your 
participation. Thank you for your honest answers in this task.” followed by the process that 
the participant needed to follow in order to complete the survey and be paid. Tasks were 
typically titled “Questionnaire on [topic] for the University of Warwick, UK”. 
Questionnaire Design and General Procedure 
 As previously mentioned, in all of the studies data were collected using 
questionnaires. For the first two studies (social support 1 and 2) questionnaires were 
designed and hosted using Survey Gizmo and for the remaining studies Qualtrics was used 
as it offered more sophisticated question options (such as slider scales) and was able to 
randomise the presentation of question blocks for more effective counterbalancing. When 
participants clicked on the link to start the survey they first saw an instruction page that 
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contained the same instructions for each study but tailored to the topic of the 
questionnaire. For example: 
“Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study which is investigating people's opinions 
about their general health and the health of others. 
 
This study is being conducted by Karen Melrose (k.l.melrose@warwick.ac.uk), a PhD 
student in the Department of Psychology at the University of Warwick, UK, as part of her 
doctoral thesis. Should you have any complaints related to this study please contact the 
University of Warwick's complaints committee (details can be found at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/rss/researchgovernance_ethics/complaints_procedur
e). 
 
All data collected are confidential and data will primarily be used for the thesis and possibly 
in a research publication. 
 
You will be asked to answer a series of questions that should take around 15 minutes to 
complete. 
 
Please read the questions carefully and note that there are no right or wrong answers - we 
are simply interested in your thoughts. 
 
Please complete the survey in one session and answer all questions. 
 
You have the right to withdraw from this study at any time by closing the browser window 
and are under no obligation to continue with the study once you have started. 
 
Please click on the 'next' button to give your consent to take part in this study and to start 
the survey.” 
 
Participants then completed the survey questions (outlined in each chapter) and at 
the end of the survey always saw a debrief screen which contained a code for payment, a 
brief explanation of the study and the investigator’s e-mail address in case the participants 
wanted any further information. 
Measuring How an Individual Compares to Others 
 As outlined in Chapter 1, one of the central hypotheses that are being tested 
throughout this thesis is that, when comparing to others in order to make judgements, 
people use rank-based strategies rather than comparing to the average of their comparison 
sample.  
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Standard Methodologies 
 Previous studies (e.g., Aldrovandi et al., 2013; 2014; Maltby et al., 2012; Melrose et 
al., 2013; Wood et al., 2012) have tested the above hypothesis in different contexts using a 
method referred to here as the ‘distribution elicitation’ method. Using this method 
participants are asked about their experience of the topic of interest, for example, in the 
case of Wood et al. (2012), how much alcohol they drink, and are also asked 11 questions 
eliciting what they believe to be the distribution of alcohol consumption amongst other 
people in a given comparison group (often the general population). These questions 
typically take the following form (this example taken from Wood et al., 2012): “The top x% 
of the UK adult population consume more than ____ units of alcohol per week on 
average?”, where x typically takes values of 1, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 99 and 
participants are asked to fill in the blank. Answers to these questions are then used to 
estimate each participant’s normal cumulative distribution function of their experience 
(e.g., alcohol consumption) within the general adult population. From this, the relative 
ranked position of a participant’s experience within their elicited distribution can be 
calculated along with the distance of their experience from the mean of the distribution. 
There are however two problems with using this methodology. The first is that participants 
often find the distribution elicitation questions hard to understand and this results in many 
participants (typically around 30%) having to be excluded from the study. The most 
common reason for exclusion is that participants answer the questions with values going 
from low to high instead of high to low. For example, using the task outlined above, the top 
1% of the population means the 1% of the population who drink the most so, naturally, the 
answer to this question should be the highest value of alcohol units answered. The values 
that participants give to subsequent questions should then decrease as the percentile 
increases – the top 20% of drinkers drink less than the top 1% but more than the top 30% 
etc. Quite often participants misinterpret the question, start low and then increase their 
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answers through the question set. In previous studies appropriate responding has been 
tested by calculating Kendall nonparametric correlation coefficients for each participant to 
evaluate the ranked correlation between their responses to the first question (should be 
high) to their last (should be low) and the values 11 to 1. Participants are then excluded if τ 
< .80. The second problem is that, although based on participants’ beliefs about the world, 
this method is an indirect way of measuring participants’ beliefs about how they compare 
to others.  
New Methodology 
 Therefore, during the course of my PhD, I decided to develop a new, direct method 
of measuring how a person believes they rank in comparison to others and how much they 
differ from the average of the comparison group. The new method involves directly asking 
participants 1) where they think they rank in comparison to others and 2) what they think 
the average experience of others is. Each participant’s answer to the latter question is then 
subtracted from their own experience (always asked about) to give a measure of how much 
they believe they differ from this average. For example, in the sleep study participants 
were asked: “Out of 100 people, how many do you think have had more hours of actual 
sleep than you, on average, over the last 90 nights?” (rank measure) and: “What do you 
think the average number of hours of sleep that people had each night over the last 90 
nights was?” (average measure). In this task, participants were asked to consider ‘people’ 
to be adults of about their age in the U.S. general population. As an aside, the general 
population is used as the comparison group in all of the studies (apart from general health 
when the focus of the study was to investigate what comparison groups people use) 
because it is a comparison group that is the same for all participants thus allowing for 
differences in beliefs about others to be investigated. In some studies participants were 
asked to think about people about their age in the general population and this was 
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because, in these instances, age-related differences in the topic that participants were 
being asked about, for example sleep and physical health, have been shown to exist. 
 The new rank and average measures were used in the mental health, physical health, 
general health, and sleep studies (the distribution elicitation method was used in both 
social support studies) and their inception was largely due to the design of these studies. As 
explained earlier, the size of the sample required for each of these studies was 
considerably greater than the sample required for the social support studies. With the new 
measures, all participants could be included in the analysis, which meant that no extra 
participants would need to be recruited to allow for inevitable exclusions due to inaccuracy 
in answering the distribution elicitation questions. This was useful as, due to financial 
constraints, it would not have been possible to carry out all of the studies if an extra 200 
people per study had to be recruited, based on typical exclusion rates of around 30%. More 
importantly, use of the new measure meant that multiple independent variables could be 
measured with relative ease to the participants as they only had to answer one rank and 
one average question for each variable as opposed to a set of eleven questions. This 
allowed for a more thorough investigation of effects in the general health, physical health, 
and sleep studies. For example, in the general health study it was possible to ask 
participants about how they thought they compared to people in nine different comparison 
groups. In the physical health study, participants were asked about four symptoms they 
had experienced, and, in the sleep study, they were asked about five aspects of their sleep. 
This would not have been possible using the distribution elicitation method without making 
the questionnaire somewhat long and tedious. Therefore, for these three studies only the 
direct methodology was used in order to keep the questionnaires as short as possible in 
order to encourage participant engagement.  
 With regards to the mental health study, participants were only asked about their 
experience of two symptoms and so it was possible to include both methodologies (the 
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indirect distribution elicitation questions and the two new, direct rank and average 
measures) in the questionnaire in order to compare them, without the resulting 
experiment being too long. Correlations between participants’ two different rank and 
distance from the average values resulting from the two different methodologies indicated 
good construct validity: Depression rank variables: r = .843, anxiety rank variables: r = .814, 
depression distance from the average variables: r = .748, and anxiety distance from the 
average variables: r = .748, all p values < .001.  
Data Analysis 
All studies utilised a correlational design and therefore correlation and regression 
analyses were used to test relationships between variables. Where group differences were 
investigated, chi-square, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and t-tests were also used. All 
analysis was conducted using SPSS. 
Data Screening 
Prior to analysis, data were screened for outliers using scatterplots. As all of the 
questions in the survey were mandatory, (participants were informed of this before they 
took part) there was never any missing data. The design of the survey meant that outliers 
could be controlled for to some extent in the majority of the studies by setting limits on the 
possible answers the participants could give. This was only ever done when there were 
natural limits, for example, when asking on how many of the last 90 days the participants 
felt tired during the day there is a natural maximum answer of 90. However, when asking 
about how many times a person has received support in the last month there is no natural 
limit so these questions were left without any answering bounds. In the studies where 
outliers were removed (physical health and sleep), how this was dealt with is explained in 
the relevant chapters. Assumption testing (e.g., linearity, normality, etc.) for the statistical 
test being used in the analysis was carried out after the initial data screening.   
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Hypothesis Testing 
As previously mentioned, correlation and regression analyses were used 
predominantly throughout this thesis. Correlations were mainly undertaken to check for 
collinearity between independent variables before carrying out the regression analyses. 
Where correlations between independent and dependent variables are investigated and 
reported, Spearman’s correlation coefficients are reported for correlations between 
continuous independent variables and ordinal dependent variables and Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients are reported for correlations between continuous independent and 
dependent variables. 
Regression analyses were tailored to the dependent variable and therefore binary 
logistic, ordinal logistic and multiple linear (ordinary least squares) regressions were used 
to investigate how well dependent variables were predicted by the independent variables. 
When conducting ordinal regression, the polytomous universal model (PLUM) and the link 
function that provided the best fit of the full model compared to the intercept-only model 
(i.e., the one that produced the biggest difference between the two -2 log likelihood 
values) was used. Regressions were always performed using the enter method. For 
consistency, bootstrapped confidence intervals, standard errors, and significance values of 
each predictor are reported throughout although assumptions of homoscedasticity and/or 
normally distributed residuals were violated only in some cases. 
The main analysis described in each chapter involves testing the central hypotheses 
outlined in Chapter 1 - that people compare to others when making specific judgements 
and that they do so using rank-based strategies. This is primarily examined through 
regression analyses. Regression models reported always contain age and gender as 
covariates as, in the majority of cases, changes in the outcome variable across ages and 
genders have been shown and so these are controlled for in the model. Gender is always 
input as females = 0 and males = 1. The participant’s absolute experience of the construct 
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being tested (e.g., days they have experienced a symptom, number of hours of sleep they 
have had) is also always included in the model as it is hypothesised that this will always 
have a bearing on the judgement being made. In many cases, previous research has 
assumed that judgements are made based on a person’s absolute experience and one of 
the central arguments here is that people do not base judgements on their absolute 
experience alone but on how this experience compares to other people’s experiences. 
Therefore, it is useful to be able to compare the effect size of absolute and comparison 
variables in the model. For linear regression models this was done by plotting standardised 
beta coefficients and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals (estimated via bias 
corrected bootstrap, 1000 re-samples) to determine whether the confidence intervals 
overlapped by less than 50% thus indicating a significant difference between the two beta 
weights (Cumming, 2009). Menard (2004; 2011) notes that, unlike in ordinary least squares 
regression, there is no single, widely accepted definition for a standardised coefficient in 
logistic regression and standardised coefficients are not computed by most statistical 
software. Menard (2004; 2011) outlines six different methodologies for calculating 
standardised logistic regression coefficients that can be used to ascertain the rank order of 
the importance of each predictor in the model but not significant differences between 
coefficients. Therefore, for the binary regressions one of these methods (multiplying the 
unstandardized coefficient of each predictor by the sample standard deviation of that 
predictor: Agresti, 1996; Menard, 1995) has been used to calculate semi-standardised 
coefficients which are reported in the relevant results tables and are used solely to 
understand the hierarchy of the importance of predictors in the models. When ordinal 
regressions are reported in the thesis, the same analysis is also reported using multiple 
linear regression to assess the strength of predictors in the model. 
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As it is hypothesised that people will either use rank-based comparison processes or 
will compare to the average of the comparison group when making judgements, the 
following regression models are presented in each chapter:  
 Step 1: includes age, gender and the absolute experience,  
 Step 2a: includes age, gender, the absolute experience and the rank of this experience 
within a comparison sample,  
 Step 2b: includes age, gender, the absolute experience and the distance of this 
experience from the average experience of the comparison sample2.  
Evidence for the use of either rank or average-based social comparison is obtained 
from the variable’s performance in the model and from comparing the fit of the step 2a 
and 2b models (non-nested models). For multiple linear regression models, this is done 
using Hotelling’s t-tests to ascertain whether the correlations between the predicted and 
actual values of the outcome variable across the two models differ significantly. For binary 
and ordinal regression models, this can be done by calculating Akaike’s information 
criterion (AIC) and/or Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for both models and assessing 
the difference between them – lower values indicate a better fit. AIC and BIC are calculated 
using the equations below: 
BIC = -2 ln L + k ln N       (5) 
    AIC = -2 ln L + 2k       (6) 
Where L is the likelihood of the model given the data, k is the number of parameters (or, in 
this case, predictors) in the model and N is the sample size. However, as the step 2a and 2b 
models always have the same number of predictors (4) and the same sample size, the 
difference in AIC and BIC values for the models always equates to the difference in -2 log-
                                                          
2 Models which included all five independent variables (age, gender, absolute experience, rank and 
distance from the average) were also formulated. These are not presented in the thesis as it is 
assumed that people either use rank-based strategies or compare to the average, not both. The 
pattern of results seen did not differ between the two methods. 
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likelihood values. Therefore, the difference in -2 log-likelihood values is used to assess 
which model fits the data better. Differences in AICs and BICs are interpreted similarly; for 
both criteria a difference of less than or equal to two indicates hardly any difference 
between the fit of the models and a difference greater than ten indicates “very strong” 
evidence against the model with the higher AIC or BIC value (Burnham & Anderson, 2004; 
Kass & Raftery, 1995). Between these values, support against the model with the higher AIC 
or BIC value increases. BIC cut off points of differences between two and six indicating 
“positive support” against and differences between 6 and 10 indicating “strong support” 
against the model with the higher BIC (Kass & Raftery, 1995) are used to interpret the 
differences between the -2 log-likelihood values of the step 2a and 2b models. 
 Mediation analyses are used in Chapters 3 and 4 to test for indirect associations 
between social comparison and help-seeking behaviours that may be present based on 
previous findings. Indirect effects were tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 
1000 samples using the PROCESS custom dialog box for SPSS (Hayes, 2012). PROCESS also 
calculates the direct effects between the independent variable and mediator and the 
outcome variable and mediator. 
 Due to the large number of regression analyses undertaken for each of the chapters, 
the written account of the findings reported in each results section focuses only on the 
evidence for or against the core hypotheses presented. Full details of all of the statistics 
calculated are presented in tables. Although a large number of tests were undertaken in 
each of the studies reported, these were all pre-planned, deemed necessary to answer the 
research questions outlined, and, apart from in the social support studies, investigated 
different constructs. Therefore, it was decided that due to the use of multiple analyses of 
the same construct in the social support studies, a conservative alpha level of .01 would be 
used for all statistical tests in these studies and an alpha level of .05 would be used in all of 
the other studies.  
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Terminology 
 To recap, the main analyses presented throughout this thesis investigate whether 
three main variables predict related outcomes. The first of these is participants’ actual 
experience of the construct of interest, for example, the number of days they experience 
symptoms, the number of hours sleep they get, and the frequency with which they receive 
support. This is often referred to as their “absolute experience”. The other two variables 
are measures of how participants believe their actual experience compares to others. 
These “others” are always either people in the general population or people around the 
participant’s age in the general population. Participants are asked to compare to these 
comparison groups in particular as they are shared between all or groups of participants. 
This means that the accuracy of participants’ beliefs about others can be investigated. The 
first comparison variable measures where participants think their absolute experience 
ranks in comparison to others. This is referred to as the “rank” variable. For example, if a 
participant believes that only 30% of people in the general population feel tired on more 
days a month than they do then their rank is 70 out of 100. The second comparison 
variable measures how different the participant’s absolute experience is from what they 
believe the average experience of others to be. This is referred to as the “distance from the 
average” variable. For example, if a participant feels tired 5 days a month but they believe 
that, on average, people in the general population feel tired on 10 days a month then their 
distance from the average is -5 days. 
Ethical Approval 
All studies were approved by the Department of Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Warwick. 
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Chapter 3: Physical and Mental Health 
Overview 
The studies outlined in this chapter aimed to replicate and extend the findings of 
Melrose et al. (2013). That study, completed during my Master’s degree, showed that 
participants’ judgements of whether they thought they suffered from depression or an 
anxiety disorder were predicted by the ranked position of their depression and anxiety 
symptom occurrence (the number of days a month they felt depressed or anxious) within 
what they believed the distribution of symptom occurrence in the general population to 
be. This was over and above their absolute experience of the symptom and the distance of 
their experience from the mean of the distribution. The present studies aim to replicate 
these findings (Study 1) and to see whether participants make judgements about their 
physical health as they do their mental health (Study 2). However, the main focus of both 
studies is to see whether and, (if so) how, social comparison affects help-seeking behaviour 
for physical and mental health problems. This will be investigated directly and indirectly 
through perceptions known to influence help-seeking behaviour such as judgements about 
symptom severity and worry about symptoms. Therefore, this introduction focuses on 
explaining previous research on health help-seeking, the role of social comparison within 
this and how the current studies build on previous findings. 
Introduction 
There has been much research investigating the processes involved and factors 
affecting health help-seeking behaviours, predominantly in an attempt to understand why 
people delay or do not seek help when they need to or do seek help when they do not 
need to. Both instances of inaccurate help-seeking behaviour are problematic and 
prevalent although research has tended to focus on the former, perhaps because delaying 
or not seeking treatment has more serious consequences than seeking help when it is not 
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needed. For example, delay in seeking treatment for cancer or a heart attack can result in 
life-threatening consequences as survival rates decline with the advancement of symptoms 
over time. Despite this, research has shown that people do delay in seeking help for cancer 
and heart attacks even when they are experiencing indicative symptoms. For example, in a 
survey of 1500 women with ovarian cancer, 70% stated that they had been experiencing 
symptoms for 3 months before seeking help and 15% for more than a year (Goff et al., 
1998). It has been estimated that around a third of women diagnosed with self-discovered 
breast cancer delay seeking help for at least 3 months with as much as a quarter delaying 6 
months (Facione, 1993; Richards, Westcombe, Love, Littlejohns, & Ramirez, 1999). Other 
studies have shown that people experiencing heart attacks often wait hours before seeking 
care. Goff, Nichaman, Ramsey, Meyer, & Labarthe (1995) found that 22% of patients 
surveyed waited at least 6 hours after the onset of symptoms to seek help. Hedges et al. 
(1998) found the median time taken by heart attack patients surveyed from first 
experiencing symptoms or sensations to calling emergency services for help was 7.25 
hours. Delay in treatment seeking for physical health problems is not specific to these 
disorders either. Ingham and Miller (1979) conducted a comprehensive medical screening 
of over 3000 people in one UK borough and found that 57% had a variety of symptoms 
warranting treatment that had never been sought. Scambler and Scambler (1985) refer to 
this as the ‘illness iceberg’.  
Delaying or not seeking help when it is needed is not just an issue in physical illness 
but in mental health as well. Evidence from general population surveys (e.g., Andrews, 
Issakidis, & Carter, 2001; Kessler et al., 2005; Mojtabai, Olfson, & Mechanic, 2002; Wang et 
al., 2005) suggests that around 30-40% of people with symptoms of mental illness have not 
sought help (Henshaw & Freedman-Doan, 2009). Untreated mental illness can be as costly 
as physical illnesses such as diabetes and heart disease (Druss, Rosenheck, & Sledge, 2000; 
Katon et al., 2008) in terms of the costs incurred from loss of productivity and wages in the 
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workplace (Adler et al., 2006), the impact mental illness has on physical illnesses such as 
hypertension (Katon & Ciechanowski, 2002) and the resulting overuse of primary care 
services for other reasons (Katon, 2003; White et al., 2008). 
Although many people do not seek help for mental health problems when they need 
to, Mojtabai (2008) notes that often the people who do seek help experience only minor 
symptoms, distress, and impairment in daily functioning. It has been estimated that 20-40% 
of people attending primary care do not have a major illness and that in 30-60% of cases 
people present with symptoms that have no serious underlying cause (Backett, Heady, & 
Evans, 1954; Barsky, 1981; Kroenke & Mangelsdorff, 1989). Unnecessary use of health 
services is common for particular symptoms such as cold and flu symptoms (Braun et al., 
2000). Such overuse wastes time and financial resources (be it the patient’s or the 
government’s) and may result in unnecessary exposure to iatrogenic diseases or 
complications (Peters, Stanley, Rose, & Salmon, 1998). 
Why do people seek help for health problems when they do not need to and fail to 
seek help when they do? Stage process models (e.g., Andersen, Cacioppo, & Roberts, 1995; 
Cauce et al., 2002; Safer, Tharps, Jackson, & Leventhal, 1979; Shaw, Brittain, Tansey, & 
Williams, 2008) view physical and mental health help-seeking as a decision making process 
in which people first have to decide whether they are ill, then whether they require 
medical attention, and who the correct person or service is to receive this from. Decisions 
about help-seeking appear to be heavily based on the experience of abnormal somatic or 
psychological sensations – the vast majority of people that seek medical help report 
experiencing some kind of symptom or symptoms (Berkanovic, Telesky, & Reader, 1981; 
Cameron, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 1993; Costa & McCrae, 1980; Leventhal, Hansell, 
Diefenback, Leventhal, & Glass, 1996; Stoller, 1997). Therefore, the decision about whether 
or not you are ill (and the subsequent decision on whether or not to seek help) is likely to 
reflect the appraisal of detected symptoms which may take into account objective 
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information about the symptoms such as their duration and frequency, and perceptions 
about their severity, significance, intensity and cause (Arnault, 2009; Cauce et al., 2002; 
Goldsmith, Jackson, & Hough, 1988; Rickwood, Deane, Wilson, & Ciarrochi, 2005; Shaw et 
al., 2008). Indeed, research has shown that symptom duration, the number of symptoms 
experienced and judgements of symptom severity are all significant predictors of health 
help-seeking (e.g., Elliott, McAteer & Hannaford, 2011; Scott & Walter, 2010).  
 It is argued here that people may make inaccurate appraisals about their symptoms 
when using social comparison to make these appraisals, leading to inaccurate judgements 
about whether or not they are ill and subsequent inaccurate help-seeking behaviour. It is 
therefore hypothesised that, when appraising their symptoms, people will compare their 
experience of the symptoms to other people’s experience of the same symptoms (Suls, 
Martin, & Leventhal, 1997). This may lead to inaccurate appraisals and subsequent help-
seeking when the distribution of the comparison dimension (e.g., symptom frequency) 
within the comparison sample is not representative of the distribution of the dimension in 
the general population. Specifically, it is proposed that people will compare the absolute 
experience of their symptoms, such as their frequency and duration, to the 
frequency/duration with which they think other people have experienced the symptoms. It 
is hypothesised that this comparison will directly influence help-seeking behaviours as 
absolute aspects of symptoms such as their duration have been shown to predict help-
seeking behaviour directly (e.g., Elliott et al., 2011). Where the symptom being appraised is 
indicative of a serious underlying disorder, the comparison may influence judgements 
about whether or not this disorder is present (as seen in Melrose et al., 2013) and these 
judgements may also influence help-seeking behaviour. The comparison may also indirectly 
influence help-seeking when it is used to make judgements known to influence help-
seeking such as judgements of symptom severity (e.g., Elliott et al., 2011). Help-seeking 
may also be indirectly influenced by the comparison if the comparison evokes distress as 
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there is a strong link between affective responses to symptom appraisals and help-seeking 
(Martin, Rothrock, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 2003). Figure 3.1 below outlines these 
associations, which are tested in the two studies outlined in this Chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Hypothesised direct and indirect associations between social comparison and 
help-seeking. 
 
Social Comparison and Help-seeking 
To my knowledge, these specific associations have not been tested before in the 
social comparison literature. Previous research on the use of social comparison when 
making decisions about seeking help for health problems has focused on the use of the ‘lay 
referral structure’ (Freidson, 1961) for information and advice about health help-seeking. 
When people experience ambiguous somatic or psychological sensations they use social 
comparison to reduce uncertainty and to appraise the significance of what they are feeling 
(Safer et al., 1979; Suls, 2011). They speak to people that are similar to them in age, 
gender, risk behaviours and physical shape (Buunk, Gibbons, & Visser, 2002) – the ‘lay 
referral structure’ – in order to better understand their symptoms and to get advice about 
what to do about them. It is proposed that incorrect advice from others may cause people 
to seek help when they do not need it or not seek help when they do need it (Buunk et al., 
2002). This effect of the lay referral structure on help-seeking was highlighted in a classic 
study where participants were asked to imagine that they were experiencing various 
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symptoms and to rate, on a nine-point scale from 1 = “very unlikely” to 9 = “very likely”, 
how likely they would be to visit a doctor about the symptoms (Sanders, 1981). Participants 
were also given an objective recommendation ascertained from a fictitious physical test as 
to whether or not they should see a doctor along with social comparison information that 
either contrasted or supported the objective test recommendation. As would be expected, 
when both pieces of information made the same recommendation, participants’ decisions 
to seek help were congruent with the recommendations (average likelihood rating 
following a recommendation to seek help: 8.5, and not seek help: 1.6). Participants whose 
test results indicated that they should see a doctor were unaffected by the 
recommendations of friends and family in the scenario not to seek help (average likelihood 
rating: 8.5). However, when the test indicated that they should not seek help but friends 
and family thought they should, participants still decided that they would likely seek help 
(average likelihood rating: 8.4). This demonstrates how social comparison information3 can 
sometimes override objective information and lead to inaccurate decisions. 
This previous work on the effect of social comparison on help-seeking is slightly 
different to the investigation being carried out here. Although Suls et al. (1997) 
acknowledge that people may compare their experience of symptoms to that of others in 
order to make help-seeking decisions, little evidence of the testing of this proposition could 
be found. One study that does provide some empirical evidence for this hypothesis found, 
using data from a large US national survey (N = 36,679), that people who stated that they 
were more worried, nervous, or anxious than others were significantly more likely to have 
sought help for mental health problems in the last 12 months (operationalised as whether 
or not they saw a doctor or mental health professional for problems with emotions, nerves 
                                                          
3 The “social comparison” information given was whether or not friends or family recommended a 
visit to the doctor. In my opinion this is not social comparison as no comparison took place - the 
symptoms were not compared to other people’s symptoms, the friends and family simply gave their 
opinion. However, this is classed in both the paper and the social comparison literature as social 
comparison which is why it is referred to as such here. 
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or mental health, were hospitalised overnight or prescribed medication for these problems) 
than those who believed they were less worried, nervous, or anxious than others 
(Mojtabai, 2008). Overall, 31.7% of people who stated that they were more worried, 
nervous, or anxious than others sought help whereas only 8.4% of people who said that 
they were less worried, nervous or anxious than others did. Furthermore, this effect of 
compared distress held when socio-demographic and clinical variables, including actual 
mental distress (measured using the K10 scale: Furukawa, Kessler, Slade, & Andrews, 2003, 
which is designed to measure non-specific psychological distress in the general population), 
that were significantly associated with both compared distress and help-seeking, were 
controlled in the analysis. The author argues that the study provides preliminary evidence 
that people’s perceptions about how their mental distress compares to others influenced 
their mental health help-seeking behaviour and that variations in the evaluation of 
experienced distress may contribute to inaccurate help-seeking behaviour. Although not 
explicitly mentioned in the paper, some evidence of this is shown in the study. Mojtabai 
(2008) shows a graph of the percentage of participants that sought help across the two 
compared distress groups (those that rated themselves as more worried, nervous, or 
anxious than others and those who rated themselves as less so) stratified across levels of 
actual distress – four score ranges on the K10 (<10, 10-19, 20-29, 30-40). Differences in 
help-seeking between the two compared distress groups were significant across all levels of 
actual distress – people who thought they were more worried, nervous, or anxious than 
others were more likely to seek help than those who thought they were less worried, 
nervous, or anxious than others. Kessler et al. (2002) state that people scoring under 20 on 
the K10 are likely to be well. This means that, of the people in the study likely to not have a 
mental health problem but who sought help anyway, significantly more thought they were 
more worried, nervous, or anxious than others. This indicates (although obviously no direct 
conclusions can be drawn) that it is possible that there is a link between inaccurate social 
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comparisons and inaccurate help-seeking behaviour. Unfortunately it is not known whether 
those people in the study likely to have a mental health problem but who did not seek help 
were more likely to think they were less worried, nervous, or anxious than others. The 
studies outlined below investigate differences in beliefs about how one compares to others 
both in people who are likely to have sought help when it was not needed and in people 
who have not sought help when it was needed. 
Current Studies 
The main aims of the current studies, outlined below, are therefore to: 
1. Replicate the findings of Melrose et al. (2013), namely the association between how 
symptoms of depression and anxiety are believed to compare to others and 
perceptions of the presence of these disorders (Study 1), 
2. Test for associations between beliefs about how symptoms compare to others and 
other constructs related to health help-seeking, namely judgements of symptom 
severity and worry about symptoms (Study 1 and 2), 
3. Test for direct and indirect associations between beliefs about how symptoms 
compare to others and help-seeking as outlined in Figure 3.1 (Study 1 and 2),  
4. Investigate how people compare to others when making health-related judgements 
and decisions about help-seeking, namely whether they use rank or average-based 
comparisons as consistent with DbS and ALT respectively (Study 1 and 2), and 
5. Explore differences in beliefs about others and the potential impact these differences 
may have on the accuracy of help-seeking decisions (Study 1). 
Study 1: Mental Health 
 In the original Melrose et al. (2013) study, participants were asked about the number 
of days a month they felt depressed and the number of days a month they felt anxious 
(depression and anxiety symptom occurrence). They were then given two distribution 
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elicitation tasks (explained in Chapter 2) asking them to estimate on how many days a 
month different percentiles of the general population feel depressed and feel anxious 
(from those who experience these feelings the most to those who experience them the 
least). From these answers, the relative ranked position of each participant’s symptom 
occurrence within their elicited distribution of symptom occurrence was calculated along 
with the distance of their occurrence from the mean of the distribution (i.e., the difference 
in days between their occurrence and the mean occurrence in their elicited distribution). 
These values were then used to predict participant’s answers to a question asking whether 
they thought they had depression and/or an anxiety disorder (on a 5-point scale from 
“definitely not” to “definitely”). The results (reported in Table 3.4 of the results section 
below for comparison to the current study) showed that participants’ judgements of 
whether they thought they suffered from depression or an anxiety disorder were predicted 
by the ranked position of their depression and anxiety symptom occurrence within their 
believed distribution of symptom occurrence in the general population. This was over and 
above their actual symptom occurrence (the number of days a month they experienced the 
symptoms) and the distance of this occurrence from the mean of their distributions. 
As previously stated, the main aims of Study 1 were to replicate the above findings 
and extend them by investigating whether there are any associations between beliefs 
about how symptoms compare to others, judgements of symptom severity and worry 
about symptoms and help-seeking behaviours. As is outlined in the method section below, 
a very similar methodology to the original study was used. Participants were again asked 
about the frequency with which they experienced feelings of depression and anxiety and a 
distribution elicitation task was used to calculate their rank within and distance from the 
mean of their believed distribution of symptom occurrence within the general population. 
In addition to this, the new rank and average measures outlined in Chapter 2 were also 
used allowing for a comparison of the two methodologies. Participants were again asked 
56 
 
about whether they thought they had depression and/or an anxiety disorder and they were 
also asked how severe they thought their symptom occurrence was and how worried they 
were about it. The current study builds on the original by investigating whether social 
comparisons influenced participants’ help-seeking behaviour and perceptions about their 
symptoms. Diagnostic measures were also included to investigate the accuracy of help-
seeking decisions and any potential effects of social comparison on this decision. 
Method 
Participants 
The 643 participants that completed this study were recruited through CrowdFlower 
panels and had a mean age of 35.0 years (SD = 11.7, range: 18-94 years), were 
predominantly White (85%, Indian = 3%, Black = 2%, Chinese = 2%, Pakistani = 2%, Other = 
6%) and 48% were male. Participants were all resident in the U.K. (as in the original study) 
and took part from towns and cities all over the country. Participants were mainly educated 
up to university (44%) or post-secondary (i.e., education between 16 and 18 years of age 
such as A-levels: 34%) level (some high school = 5%, finished school at 16 = 17%, rather not 
say < 1%). Participants were mainly low earners (< £14,999 = 33%, £15,000-£24,999 = 26%, 
£25,000-£34,999 = 16%, £35,000-£44,999 = 8%, >£45,000 = 7%, rather not say = 10%) and 
received $0.75 on completion of the study which took 10-15 minutes to complete.  
Design and procedure 
The questionnaire that participants completed in this study was designed and hosted 
using Qualtrics. Participants were asked the following: 
Symptom occurrence: Participants’ experience of feeling depressed and anxious was 
obtained through asking: “in a typical month, on how many days do you feel down, 
depressed or hopeless?” and “in a typical month, on how many days do you feel nervous, 
anxious or on edge?”. This wording of symptoms was taken from two of the four PHQ-4 
(Kroenke, Spitzer, Williams, & Löwe, 2009) items. The PHQ-4 is a brief screening tool for 
57 
 
anxiety and depression. In all questions where participants were asked to give an answer of 
“the number of days a month”, they were asked to consider a month to be 30 days. 
Distribution elicitation task: Participants were asked to imagine that all of the adults 
in the UK were lined up in order of the number of days a month they experience a 
symptom from those that experience it the least to those that experience it the most. They 
were then asked how many days a month they thought that adults at various positions 
along this line (corresponding to the 5th, 20th, 50th, 80th, and 95th percentiles of the 
distribution) experience the symptom. They were asked to do this for the two symptoms 
outlined above: “feeling down, depressed or hopeless” and “feeling anxious, nervous or on 
edge”. Figure 3.2 below shows how this task was presented to participants. 
In a typical month, the person standing at position 5 on the line feels down, depressed or 
hopeless on at least how many days? _____ 
 
Figure 3.2. An example of one of the distribution elicitation task questions. 
Direct measure of rank of symptom occurrence within the general population: After 
answering the above distribution elicitation questions participants were again shown the 
line that went from “people experiencing [symptom] the least” to “people experiencing 
[symptom] the most” and were asked what position on the line they themselves occupied 
for each symptom separately. This gave a direct measure of where each participant 
believed their symptom occurrence ranked in comparison to others. 
Direct measure of the average symptom occurrence in the general population: 
Participants were asked what they thought the average occurrence of each symptom was 
in the following format: “thinking about the general adult population, what do you think 
the average number of days that people feel down, depressed or hopeless is in a typical 
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month?” and “thinking about the general adult population, what do you think the average 
number of days that people feel nervous, anxious or on edge is in a typical month?”. 
 The following outcomes were measured: 
 Whether or not they thought they had depression and/or anxiety: These questions 
were the same as in the original study: “do you think you suffer from depression?” and “do 
you think you suffer from anxiety?” each answered on a 5-point scale: “definitely not”, 
“probably not”, “maybe”, “probably”, and “definitely”. 
 Worry: Participants rated how worried they were about the amount of time they 
experience each symptom, e.g.: “how worried are you about the amount of time you feel 
down, depressed or hopeless?” on a slider scale from “not at all” to “very much”. 
 Symptom severity: Participants then answered the questions “how severe are your 
feelings of depression?” and “how severe are your feelings of anxiety?” on a slider scale 
from “not at all severe” to “extremely severe”. 
 For all questions where a slider scale was used Qualtrics records where the 
participant placed the slider as a number between 0 and 100. 
 Help-seeking: For each symptom, participants were asked: “which of these actions 
have you taken over the past year to manage [symptom], tick all that apply” and were 
provided with the following list: looked for information, discussed feelings with other 
people, phoned NHS 24/NHS Direct/NHS 111, consulted a mental health charity or support 
group, consulted a pharmacist, consulted a nurse or doctor, consulted a therapist, took 
complementary medication, took conventional medication, or none of the above. These 
behaviours were taken and adapted from Elliott et al. (2011) who carried out a U.K. wide 
study on how people respond to symptoms. 
 Depression screening: Participants completed the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 
(PHQ-9: Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002, see Appendix 1) which is both a diagnostic tool and a 
measure of symptom severity for depression and has been validated for use within the 
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general population (Martin, Rief, Klaiberg, & Braehler, 2006). Items are based on diagnostic 
criteria and respondents rate the frequency with which they have been bothered by nine 
depression-related problems over the last 2 weeks on a 4-point scale: “not at all”, “several 
days”, “more than half the days”, and “nearly every day”.  Items are scored between 0 and 
3 with total scores between 0 and 27. A total score of 1-4 = no, 5-9 = mild, 10-14 = 
moderate, 5-19 = moderately severe and 20-17 = severe depression. The authors 
recommend that a cut point of 10 be used for screening as this has a sensitivity for major 
depression of 88% and a specificity of 88%. The PHQ-9 has excellent internal (Cronbach's α 
= 0.89) and test-retest (r = .84) reliability (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001). Scores on 
the PHQ-9 have been shown to correlate highly and significantly with both Beck Depression 
Inventory scores (r = .71; the BDI is another well used measure of depression severity) and 
scores on the mental health subscale of the SF-36 (r = -.71, lower scores on this subscale 
indicate poorer mental health, hence the negative correlation) suggesting that the PHQ-9 
has good convergent validity also (Martin et al., 2006). 
Anxiety screening: Participants completed the Generalised Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-
7: Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Löwe, 2006, see Appendix 2) which is both a diagnostic tool 
and a measure of symptom severity and has been validated for use within the general 
population (Löwe et al., 2008). Although the GAD-7 measures generalised anxiety disorder 
symptoms, it is a good overall measure of anxiety and is sensitive to posttraumatic stress 
disorder, panic disorder, and social anxiety disorder, which are the three most prevalent 
anxiety disorders seen in patients with somatic diseases (Kroenke, Spitzer, Williams, 
Monahan, & Löwe, 2007). Just as with the PHQ-9, items are based on diagnostic criteria 
and respondents rate the frequency with which they have been bothered by seven anxiety-
related problems using the same scale as the PHQ-9. Total scores range between 0 and 21 
with 0-4 = minimal, 5-9 = mild, 10-14 = moderate and 15-21 = severe anxiety. As with the 
PHQ-9, the authors recommend that a cut point of 10 be used for screening as this has a 
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sensitivity for anxiety of 89% and a specificity of 82%. The GAD-7 also has excellent internal 
(Cronbach's α = 0.92) and test-retest (r = .83) reliability (Spitzer et al., 2006). GAD-7 scores 
correlate highly and significantly with the Beck Anxiety Inventory (r = .72) and the anxiety 
subscale of the Symptom Checklist-90 (r = .74) indicating good convergent validity (Spitzer 
et al., 2006). 
Questions were ordered into three blocks: questions on symptom occurrence, 
comparison questions (distribution elicitation questions and direct rank and average 
questions) and outcome measures. The order that these blocks were presented was 
counterbalanced so that half the participants saw the outcome measures first and half saw 
them last and then half saw the symptom occurrence questions before the comparison 
questions and half saw the comparison questions before the symptom occurrence 
questions. Demographic characteristics (age, gender, level of education, ethnicity, and 
income bracket) were collected right at the end of the survey after all the above questions 
were presented.  
Results  
Data for each symptom were analysed separately. This results section addresses 
each of the aims outlined in the introduction on page 54 in turn although the use of rank or 
average-based comparison strategies (aim 4) is discussed throughout. This is achieved, in 
the main, through regression analyses and the main independent variables are labelled as 
follows:  
Symptom occurrence: There was one measure of symptom occurrence for each 
symptom: the number of days in the last month the participant felt down, depressed or 
hopeless (M = 8.92, SD = 8.52) and the number of days in the last month they felt nervous, 
anxious or on edge (M = 9.69, SD = 9.02). 
Rank: Two rank measures were calculated from the questions outlined above. 
Answers to the distribution elicitation task were used to construct each participant’s beliefs 
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about the distribution of depression and anxiety symptom occurrence within the general 
population (their believed distribution). Using their answers to the symptom occurrence 
questions, the rank of each participant’s symptom occurrence within their believed 
distribution of symptom occurrence was calculated, where possible, for both depression 
and anxiety (see Chapter 2 for a detailed explanation of how this is carried out). Due to 
inevitable exclusions from participants not understanding the task (again see Chapter 2 for 
more detail) this resulted in subjective rank values between 0 and 1 for 549 participants 
included in the depression analyses (M = 0.31, SD = 0.31) and 563 participants included in 
the anxiety analyses (M = 0.32, SD = 0.32). This variable is labelled ‘indirect rank’ in the 
analyses outlined below. The variable ‘direct rank’ is the direct measure of where 
participants think their symptom occurrence ranks in comparison to others, measured by 
the position they selected on the line that went from “people who experience the 
symptom the least” to “people who experience the symptom the most”. The resulting 
direct rank values are between 0 and 100 (depression: M = 32.43, SD = 31.51, anxiety: M = 
33.40, SD = 31.88). For both rank measures, high scores indicate that the participant 
believes their occurrence ranks highly within the general population, i.e., that the majority 
of people experience symptoms less frequently than they do.  
Distance from the average: Again, there are two distance from the average variables 
calculated from the two different methodologies. The mean of each participant’s believed 
distribution of depression and anxiety symptom occurrence in the general population was 
calculated and deducted from their own symptom occurrence to create the ‘indirect 
distance from the average’ variable (depression: M = -4.97, SD = 8.45, anxiety: M = -4.52, 
SD = 8.92). Participants’ answers to the two questions asking what they though the average 
occurrence of each symptom in the general population was were deducted from their 
answers to the relevant symptom occurrence questions. This gave a direct measure of how 
much their experience of the symptoms differed from their believed average experience of 
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others. This variable is labelled ‘direct distance from the average’ (depression: M = 0.26, SD 
= 8.84, anxiety: M = -0.03, SD = 9.46). Both distance from the average variables have 
possible values ranging from -30 to 30 with negative values indicating that the participant 
experiences the symptom less often than what they believe the average person does and 
positive values indicating that the participant experiences the symptom more often.  
Analyses: As explained in the methodology chapter on pages 41-45, when regression 
was used to investigate the aims of the study, models with the following steps were 
formulated:   
 Step 1: includes age, gender and symptom occurrence,  
 Step 2a: includes age, gender, symptom occurrence and rank,  
 Step 2b: includes age, gender, symptom occurrence and the distance from the 
average4.  
This is because it is hypothesised that people will either use rank-based comparison 
processes or will compare to the average of the comparison group when making 
judgements5. Evidence for the use of either rank or average-based social comparison is 
obtained from the variable’s performance in the model and from comparing the fit of the 
step 2a and 2b models (non-nested models). This is done using Hotelling’s t-tests (multiple 
linear regression models) and by calculating Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for the 
models (binary and ordinal regression models). 
Aim 1 
 The first aim of the study was to see whether the findings from Melrose et al. (2013) 
could be replicated using rank and distance from the average variables calculated from 
both methodologies – the standard distribution elicitation task as used in the original study 
                                                          
4 This format was used in all regression analyses reported in this thesis apart from those reported 
under Aim 1 of the current study for reasons explained in the paragraph below. 
5 Models which included all five independent variables (age, gender, absolute experience, rank and 
distance from the average) were also formulated. The pattern of results seen did not differ between 
methods. 
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and the new, simpler, direct comparison questions. Unfortunately, as Table 3.1 shows, both 
the indirect rank and indirect distance from the average variables were highly correlated 
with symptom occurrence for both symptoms. This meant that collinearity would likely be 
an issue in the regression analyses when these variables were included together in the 
models. Collinearity statistics confirmed this to be the case - tolerance values for these 
variables obtained through running multiple linear regression analyses ranged from .075 to 
.107. Although the correlations between symptom occurrence and the direct rank and 
distance from the average variables for both symptoms were also high (but not as high as 
the indirect measures), the tolerance values for these variables were acceptable, ranging 
from .351 to .416. It was therefore decided that the indirect measures would be used to 
investigate comparison effects for the first study aim only as this measure had been used in 
the original study. The analyses using these variables have been adjusted accordingly (see 
Table 3.2); the step 2a and 2b models do not include symptom occurrence and because 
they are no longer additional steps to the original step 1 model the three models calculated 
are labelled models 1-3. For investigation of the rest of the study aims, only the direct 
measures are used in analyses.  
 Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below show both the ordinal and multiple linear regression 
coefficients for predictors of participants’ judgements about whether they thought they 
had depression or anxiety using the indirect and direct measures respectively. To recap, 
this outcome was measured on a 5-point scale from 1 = “definitely not” to 5 = “definitely” 
as in the original study (depression: M = 2.85, SD = 1.37, anxiety: M = 3.06, SD = 1.34). 
There was a good range of responses despite the non-clinical sample: depression: 
“definitely not” = 19.3%, “probably not” = 26.1%, “maybe” = 21.8%, “probably” = 15.2%, 
“definitely” = 17.6%; anxiety: “definitely not” = 13.7%, “probably not” = 26.0%, “maybe” = 
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21.2%, “probably” = 19.0%, “definitely” = 20.2%. For comparison, the results from the 
original study are outlined in Table 3.4 below. 
Table 3.1. 
Correlations between Continuous Independent Variables. 
  Depression 
 Age 
Symptom 
Occurrence 
Indirect 
Rank 
Indirect 
Distance 
from the 
Average 
 Age 
Symptom 
Occurrence 
Direct 
Rank 
Direct 
Distance 
from the 
Average 
Age                          1 -.091* -0.077 -0.075  1 -0.076 -.099* -0.069 
Symptom 
Occurrence 
-.091* 1 .958*** .945***  -0.076 1 .804*** .774*** 
Rank -0.077 .958*** 1 .967***  -.099* .804*** 1 .648*** 
Distance from 
the Average 
-0.075 .945*** .967*** 1  -0.069 .774*** .648*** 1 
N 549 549 549 549   643 643 643 643 
 Anxiety 
Age 1 -.109** -.098* -.094*  1 -.087* -.134*** -0.061 
Symptom 
Occurrence 
-.109** 1 .962*** .948***  -.087* 1 .778*** .764*** 
Rank -.098* .962*** 1 .968***  -.134*** .778*** 1 .624*** 
Distance from 
the Average 
-.094* .948*** .968*** 1  -0.061 .764*** .624*** 1 
N 563 563 563 563   643 643 643 643 
Note.*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed).  
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Table 3.2. 
Ordinal and Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants think they have Depression and Anxiety from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, Indirect 
Rank of Symptom Occurrence, and Indirect Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence 
Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Ordinal Regression    Multiple Linear Regression 
Predictors: Depression RN2 Estimate (95% CI) Std. Error p Odds Ratio (95% CI)  R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Model 1 .52   <.001   .52***    <.001 
Age  0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .670 1.00 (0.98-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.02 .519 
Gender  0.54 (0.22-0.85) 0.16 .001 1.71 (1.24-2.35)   -0.31 (-0.48--0.14) 0.08 -.11 .001 
Symptom Occurrence  0.22 (0.19-0.25) 0.01 .001 1.25 (1.21-1.28)   0.11 (0.10-0.12) 0.01 .70 .001 
Model 2 .47   <.001   .47***    <.001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .380 0.99 (0.98-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.03 .319 
Gender  0.54 (0.23-0.86) 0.16 .001 1.72 (1.26-2.36)   -0.33 (-0.49--0.18) 0.08 -.12 .001 
Indirect Rank  5.31 (4.63-5.98) 0.35 .001 201.58 (102.39-396.84)   2.96 (2.66-3.24) 0.14 .67 .001 
Model 3 .47   <.001   .46***    <.001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .382 0.99 (0.98-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.04 .270 
Gender  0.57 (0.25-0.88) 0.16 .001 1.76 (1.28-2.41)   -0.34 (-0.52--0.17) 0.09 -.12 .001 
Indirect Distance from the Average  0.19 (0.17-0.22) 0.01 .001 1.21 (1.18-1.24)   0.11 (0.10-0.12) 0.01 .66 .001 
Predictors: Anxiety  
Model 1 .54   <.001   .51***    <.001 
Age  0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .644 1.00 (0.98-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.02 .537 
Gender  0.40 (0.08-0.71) 0.16 .014 1.49 (1.08-2.04)   -0.20 (-0.38--0.02) 0.08 -.07 .015 
Symptom Occurrence  0.22 (0.20-0.25) 0.01 .001 1.25 (1.22-1.28)   0.11 (0.10-0.11) 0.00 .70 .001 
Model 2 .48   <.001   .47***    <.001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .376 0.99 (0.98-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.03 .318 
Gender  0.38 (0.07-0.70) 0.16 .017 1.47 (1.07-2.01)   -0.21 (-0.39--0.04) 0.09 -.08 .011 
Indirect Rank  5.40 (4.71-6.09) 0.35 .001 221.29 (111.51-439.16)   2.80 (2.56-3.03) 0.12 .67 .001 
Model 3 .49   <.001   .47***    <.001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .296 0.99 (0.98-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.03 .257 
Gender  0.43 (0.11-0.74) 0.16 .008 1.53 (1.12-2.10)   -0.24 (-0.41--0.07) 0.08 -.09 .008 
Indirect Distance from the Average  0.20 (0.17-0.22) 0.01 .001 1.22 (1.19-1.25)   0.10 (0.09-0.11) 0.00 .67 .001 
Note. n = 549 for depression and n = 563 for anxiety, CI = confidence interval, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p <. 
001. 
  
 
6
6
 
Table 3.3. 
Ordinal and Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants think they have Depression and Anxiety from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, and 
Direct Social Comparison Measures (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Ordinal Regression    Multiple Linear Regression 
Predictors: Depression ∆RN2 Estimate (95% CI) Std. Error p Odds Ratio (95% CI)  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .49   <.001   .48***    <.001 
Age  0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .563 1.00 (0.98-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.02 .463 
Gender  0.39 (0.09-0.68) 0.15 .010 1.47 (1.10-1.97)   -0.23 (-0.39--0.08) 0.08 -.08 .002 
Symptom Occurrence  0.21 (0.18-0.23) 0.01 .001 1.23 (1.20-1.26)   0.11 (0.10-0.12) 0.01 .68 .001 
Step 2 .08   <.001   .09***    <.001 
Age  0.00 (-0.01-0.01) 0.01 .930 1.00 (0.99-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.01) 0.00 -.00 .931 
Gender  0.44 (0.14-0.73) 0.15 .004 1.55 (1.15-2.08)   -0.21 (-0.36--0.09) 0.07 -.08 .001 
Symptom Occurrence  0.10 (0.07-0.13) 0.02 .001 1.10 (1.07-1.14)   0.05 (0.03-0.06) 0.01 .29 .001 
Direct Rank  0.04 (0.04-0.05) 0.00 .001 1.04 (1.04-1.05)   0.02 (0.02-0.03) 0.00 .49 .001 
Step 2 .01   <.001   .00*    <.001 
Age  0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .596 1.00 (0.98-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.02 .470 
Gender  0.41 (0.11-0.70) 0.15 .007 1.50 (1.12-2.02)   -0.24 (-0.39--0.09) 0.08 -.09 .001 
Symptom Occurrence  0.18 (0.15-0.21) 0.02 .001 1.19 (1.16-1.23)   0.10 (0.08-0.11) 0.01 .60 .001 
Direct Distance from the Average  0.04 (0.02-0.07) 0.01 .002 1.04 (1.02-1.07)   0.02 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .11 .032 
Predictors: Anxiety  
Step 1 .51   <.001   .48***    <.001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .308 0.99 (0.98-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.04 .229 
Gender  0.34 (0.04-0.63) 0.15 .026 1.40 (1.04-1.88)   -0.17 (-0.33--0.02) 0.08 -.07 .027 
Symptom Occurrence  0.21 (0.18-0.23) 0.01 .001 1.23 (1.20-1.26)   0.10 (0.09-0.11) 0.00 .68 .001 
Step 2 .05   <.001   .06***    <.001 
Age  0.00 (-0.01-0.01) 0.01 .865 1.00 (0.99-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.01 .723 
Gender  0.44 (0.15-0.74) 0.15 .004 1.56 (1.16-2.10)   -0.20 (-0.36--0.05) 0.08 -.07 .014 
Symptom Occurrence  0.13 (0.10-0.16) 0.01 .001 1.14 (1.10-1.17)   0.06 (0.04-0.07) 0.01 .37 .001 
Direct Rank  0.03 (0.03-0.04) 0.00 .001 1.03 (1.03-1.04)   0.02 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .40 .001 
Step 2 .00   <.001   .01**    <.001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .277 0.99 (0.98-1.01)   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.04 .195 
Gender  0.34 (0.04-0.64) 0.15 .025 1.40 (1.04-1.89)   -0.17 (-0.34--0.01) 0.08 -.06 .033 
Symptom Occurrence  0.18 (0.15-0.21) 0.02 .001 1.19 (1.16-1.23)   0.09 (0.08-0.10) 0.01 .59 .001 
Direct Distance from the Average  0.04 (0.02-0.07) 0.01 .001 1.04 (1.02-1.07)   0.02 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .12 .007 
Note. N = 643, CI = confidence interval, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <. 001. 
 67 
 
Table 3.4. 
Regression Coefficients from the Original Study. 
 Think they suffer from 
depression 
Think they suffer from anxiety 
Predictor Variable Estimate Std. 
Error 
Wald p Estimate Std. 
Error 
Wald p 
Age -0.019 0.013 2.225 .136 -0.003 0.013 0.038 .844 
Gender -0.027 0.331 0.007 .934 -0.368 0.345 1.141 .285 
Symptom occurrence 0.176 0.028 39.117 .000 0.210 0.032 42.545 .000 
Nagelkerke Pseudo-
R2  
.367 .417 
Age -0.025 0.013 3.457 .063 -0.006 0.013 0.231 .631 
Gender 0.162 0.336 0.231 .630 -0.289 0.345 0.700 .403 
Symptom occurrence 0.064 0.041 2.515 .113 0.106 0.044 5.657 .017 
Subjective rank 3.303 0.924 12.764 .000 3.070 0.996 9.505 .002 
Nagelkerke Pseudo-
R2  
.429 .460 
Age -0.020 0.013 2.287 .130 -0.006 0.014 0.210 .647 
Gender 0.023 0.333 0.005 .945 -0.283 0.350 0.655 .418 
Symptom occurrence 0.194 0.031 39.350 .000 0.225 0.035 41.530 .000 
Subjective mean -0.064 0.042 2.293 .130 -0.057 0.044 1.694 .193 
Nagelkerke Pseudo-
R2 
.379 .425 
Note. n = 133 for depression, n = 135 for anxiety. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in 
bold. Taken from Melrose et al. (2013, p178). 
 
 As reported in Chapter 2, the two different rank and distance from the average 
measures correlated well together (depression rank variables: r = .843, anxiety rank 
variables: r = .814, depression distance from the average variables: r = .748, and anxiety 
distance from the average variables: r = .748, all p values < .001) indicating good construct 
validity. Reassuringly, although the analysis is slightly different, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show a 
very similar pattern of results providing further evidence that the different rank and 
distance from the average variables are measuring the same constructs. Therefore, only 
the findings from Table 3.3 are discussed, as this includes the full analysis with participants’ 
absolute experience of the symptoms in the step 2a and 2b models. This is more reflective 
of how we assume people actually make judgements and the models reported in Table 3.3 
are directly comparable to the findings from the original study reported in Table 3.4. 
 Comparison of the step 1 models in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 shows that, in both studies, 
the number of days in a typical month that participants experience feeling depressed or 
anxious is a significant predictor of whether they think they have depression or anxiety 
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respectively. In the original study, this effect was removed when the rank of this symptom 
occurrence within the general population was added to the model in step 2a for depression 
and was attenuated for anxiety. In the current study, the effect of symptom occurrence is 
not removed when rank is added to the model but it is attenuated for both symptoms by 
around 50%. The ordinal regression coefficients for symptom occurrence reduce from 0.21 
(depression and anxiety step 1) to 0.10 (depression step 2a) and 0.13 (anxiety step 2a) 
when rank is added to the model. Rank becomes the strongest predictor of whether 
participants think they are depressed - comparison of the beta coefficients in the step 2a 
multiple linear regression models showed that the rank beta weight was significantly larger 
than the symptom occurrence beta weight. However, symptom occurrence and rank 
predict whether participants think they have anxiety equally well - there was no significant 
difference in the beta coefficients for these variables. In the original study, the distance of 
participant’s symptom occurrence from the mean of their believed distribution of symptom 
occurrence in the population was not a significant predictor of whether they thought they 
had depression or anxiety. This is not the case for the current study where it was a 
significant predictor in both cases, as can be seen from the step 2b models in Table 3.3. 
However, for both symptoms, distance from the average was a significantly weaker 
predictor than both symptom occurrence and rank. This can be seen from comparison of 
the beta coefficients for these variables and the amount of additional variance accounted 
for by the step 2a and 2b models. The addition of rank to the step 1 models resulted in an 
8% increase (significant) in explained variance in judgements of whether participants 
thought they were depressed and a 5% increase (significant) in explained variance in 
judgements of whether participants thought they were anxious. Addition of the distance 
from the average variables to the step 1 models resulted in less than a 1% increase (only 
significant in the anxiety model) in explained variance in both judgements. Comparison of 
the ordinal regression models showed that, for both symptoms, there was very strong 
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evidence that the step 2a models including age, gender, symptom occurrence and rank 
fitted the data much better than the step 2b models including age, gender, symptom 
occurrence and distance from the average (differences in -2LL between the step 2a and 
step 2b models: depression models = -95.03, anxiety models = -61.64). Although not of 
primary interest, it should also be stated that there is a significant effect of gender such 
that females were significantly more likely to say that they thought they had depression or 
anxiety than men in the current study that was not present in the original.  
 Summary: Overall, both the original and replication study provide evidence that 
people compare their experience of depression and anxiety symptoms to other people’s 
experience of these symptoms when making judgements about whether or not they have 
depression or anxiety respectively. How participants’ believed their symptom occurrence 
compared to that of other people in the general population significantly predicted these 
judgements. The evidence across studies suggests that when comparing to others, people 
use rank-based strategies rather than comparing to the average of the comparison sample. 
Although in the current study both comparison variables were significant predictors of 
whether participants though they had depression or anxiety, it was the variable measuring 
where participants believed their symptom occurrence ranked in comparison to others that 
had the strongest effect. The model comparison showed that there was strong evidence 
that the models including the rank variables fitted the data better than those including the 
distance from the average variables. The amount of explained variance that the rank 
variables accounted for (depression: 9%; anxiety: 6%) was much greater than that of the 
distance from the average variables (depression: 0%; anxiety: 1%). 
Aim 2 
The second aim of the study was to test for associations between beliefs about how 
symptoms compare to others and other constructs related to health help-seeking, namely 
judgements of symptom severity and worry about symptoms. To recap, these judgements 
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were both measured on a 0 to 100 scale (depression severity: M = 30.95, SD = 29.85; 
anxiety severity: M = 33.21, SD = 31.55; depression worry: M = 36.62, SD = 32.97; anxiety 
worry: M = 36.55, SD =32.99) with low values indicating mild severity and worry and high 
values indicating extreme severity and worry. Therefore, multiple linear regression was 
used to investigate whether the direct rank and distance from the average variables 
predicted these judgements and these analyses are reported in Tables 3.5 (symptom 
severity) and 3.6 (worry) below. 
Symptom severity: The step 1 models in Table 3.5 show that the number of days a 
month that participants felt depressed or anxious were significant predictors of how severe 
they thought their feelings of depression and anxiety were respectively. Age was also a 
significant predictor in the models but symptom occurrence was by far the strongest 
predictor of symptom severity judgements (the symptom occurrence beta weights in both 
models were .72 compared to -.09 for age). These models accounted for 54% of the 
variance in symptom severity judgements. Addition of the rank variables in the step 2a 
depression and anxiety models increased the amount of explained variance significantly (by 
13% and 14% respectively). For both depression and anxiety, addition of these variables led 
to an attenuation of the effect of symptom occurrence by around 70%. Where the 
participants believed their symptom occurrence ranked in comparison to others became 
the strongest predictor of symptom severity judgements, over and above symptom 
occurrence (the rank beta weights were significantly greater than the symptom occurrence 
beta weights). In contrast, for both depression and anxiety, when distance from the 
average is added to the original step 1 models in step 2b, the increase in the amount of 
variance in symptom severity judgements accounted for by the models is less than 1% and 
is only significant in the anxiety model. How much participants’ symptom occurrence 
differs from what they believe the average symptom occurrence of others to be was a 
significant predictor of anxiety symptom severity judgements only and not depression.  
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Table 3.5. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Symptom Severity Ratings from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, Direct Rank of Symptom Occurrence, and Direct Distance 
from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Depression  Anxiety 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .54***    <.001  .54***    <.001 
Constant  17.01 (11.41-22.82) 3.03  .001   16.65 (8.86-23.79) 3.75  .001 
Age  -0.24 (-0.38--0.11) 0.07 -.09 .002   -0.25 (-0.43--0.07) 0.09 -.09 .007 
Gender  -0.33 (-3.41-3.09) 1.58 -.01 .835   1.73 (-1.25-5.08) 1.70 .03 .311 
Symptom Occurrence  2.52 (2.30-2.75) 0.11 .72 .001   2.53 (2.33-2.74) 0.10 .72 .001 
Step 2a .13***    <.001  .14***    <.001 
Constant  11.28 (6.70-16.57) 2.44  .001   9.39 (3.70-14.76) 2.78  .001 
Age  -0.18 (-0.30--0.07) 0.06 -.07 .004   -0.15 (-0.28--0.02) 0.07 -.06 .031 
Gender  0.12 (-2.46-2.55) 1.33 .00 .946   0.87 (-1.75-3.75) 1.42 .01 .562 
Symptom Occurrence  0.83 (0.47-1.24) 0.18 .24 .001   0.91 (0.56-1.29) 0.17 .26 .001 
Rank  0.57 (0.48-0.65) 0.05 .60 .001   0.59 (0.49-0.68) 0.05 .60 .001 
Step 2b .00    <.001  .00*    <.001 
Constant  18.31 (11.96-24.93) 3.28  .001   19.17 (10.90-27.46) 3.87  .001 
Age  -0.24 (-0.38--0.10) 0.07 -.09 .002   -0.25 (-0.41--0.09) 0.09 -.09 .006 
Gender  -0.41 (-4.00-2.69) 1.63 -.01 .794   1.77 (-1.80-5.07) 1.73 .03 .305 
Symptom Occurrence  2.37 (2.07-2.69) 0.16 .68 .001   2.28 (1.98-2.60) 0.15 .65 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.19 (-0.15-0.47) 0.16 .06 .239   0.32 (0.01-0.58) 0.15 .10 .039 
Note. N = 643, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. *p < .05, ***p < .001. 
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Table 3.6. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Ratings of Worry About Symptom Occurrence from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, Direct Rank of Symptom Occurrence, 
and Direct Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based 
on 1000 Samples). 
 Depression  Anxiety 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .50***    <.001  .30***    <.001 
Constant  26.19 (18.74-34.00) 3.63  .001   36.94 (28.25-45.80) 4.21  .001 
Age  -0.34 (-0.49--0.18) 0.08 -.12 .001   -0.44 (-0.63--0.26) 0.10 -.16 .001 
Gender  -2.79 (-6.42-0.58) 1.86 -.04 .146   -5.16 (-9.13--0.85) 2.10 -.08 .019 
Symptom Occurrence  2.64 (2.38-2.87) 0.12 .68 .001   1.96 (1.64-2.26) 0.15 .51 .001 
Step 2a .11***    <.001  .09***    <.001 
Constant  20.33 (13.72-27.00) 3.25  .001   31.50 (23.23-39.39) 3.85  .001 
Age  -0.28 (-0.42--0.13) 0.08 -.10 .001   -0.38 (-0.55--0.22) 0.09 -.14 .001 
Gender  -2.34 (-5.39-0.70) 1.61 -.04 .157   -4.73 (-8.66--0.72) 1.97 -.07 .017 
Symptom Occurrence  0.92 (0.53-1.28) 0.20 .24 .001   0.36 (-0.11-0.77) 0.23 .09 .116 
Rank  0.58 (0.48-0.69) 0.05 .56 .001   0.54 (0.43-0.66) 0.06 .52 .001 
Step 2b .00*    <.001  .00    <.001 
Constant  28.61 (21.64-35.64) 3.59  .001   39.32 (31.11-47.57) 4.19  .001 
Age  -0.34 (-0.50--0.18) 0.08 -.12 .001   -0.44 (-0.62--0.26) 0.10 -.16 .001 
Gender  -2.95 (-6.14-0.53) 1.77 -.05 .088   -5.32 (-9.70--0.82) 2.11 -.08 .011 
Symptom Occurrence  2.36 (2.01-2.71) 0.17 .61 .001   1.68 (1.24-2.12) 0.21 .44 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.35 (-0.02-0.69) 0.17 .09 .038   0.34 (-0.05-0.73) 0.20 .09 .088 
Note. N = 643, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. *p < .05, ***p < .001. 
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The effect of the distance from the average variable (β = .10) was significantly 
weaker than the effect of symptom occurrence (β = .65) in the step 2b anxiety model. 
Unsurprisingly, comparison of the predictive ability of the step 2a and 2b models showed 
that the step 2a models accounted for significantly more variance in symptom severity 
judgements than the step 2b models, depression: t(640) = 7.83, p < .001, anxiety: t(640) = 
8.32, p < .001. 
Worry: This pattern of results was much the same for judgements regarding how 
worried participants were about the amount of time they felt depressed or anxious. The 
step 1 models in Table 3.6 show that symptom occurrence was the strongest predictor of 
worry ratings and these models accounted for 50% and 30% of the variance in ratings of 
how worried participants were about their depression symptom occurrence and anxiety 
symptom occurrence respectively. When the rank variables are entered into the models at 
step 2a, the effect of symptom occurrence in the depression model is attenuated by about 
60% and is completely removed from the anxiety model. Rank becomes the strongest 
predictor of worry ratings for both symptoms – the rank beta weights are significantly 
larger than those of the other predictors in the models. The amount of explained variance 
in depression and anxiety worry ratings increases significantly by 11% and 9% respectively. 
Addition of the distance from the average variables to the step 1 models has little effect - 
the variance accounted for by the models increases by less than 1% (significant for the 
depression model only). Distance from the average is a significant predictor of worry 
ratings in the depression model only and is a significantly weaker predictor (β = .09) 
compared to symptom occurrence (β = .61). The step 2a models accounted for significantly 
more variance in worry ratings than the step 2b models, depression: t(640) = 6.56, p < .001, 
anxiety: t(640) = 6.32, p < .001. 
Summary: Overall, the results provide evidence that people do compare their 
experience of depression and anxiety symptoms to other people’s experiences of these 
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symptoms when judging both how severe their own symptoms are and how worried they 
are about the occurrence of these symptoms. In all four models reported, how participants’ 
believed their symptom occurrence compared to that of other people in the general 
population significantly predicted symptom severity and worry judgements. It was the 
social comparison variable measuring where participants believed their symptom 
occurrence ranked in comparison to other people in the general population that 
significantly predicted worry and symptom severity judgements in all four models. This 
variable accounted for, on average, across both symptoms, 14% of the variance in 
symptom severity judgements and 10% of the variance in worry judgements. Although the 
variable measuring how much participants’ symptom occurrence differed from what they 
believed the average symptom occurrence of others in the population to be significantly 
predicted anxiety symptom severity judgements and worry about depression symptom 
occurrence, the rank variables were much stronger predictors of these judgements. 
Comparison across all four models showed that the step 2a models including the rank 
variables accounted for significantly more variance in symptom severity and worry 
judgements than the step 2b models. The distance from the average variable accounted 
for, on average, across both symptoms, less than 1% of the variance in worry and symptom 
severity judgements. Furthermore, where participants believed their symptom occurrence 
ranked in comparison to others had a greater bearing on severity and worry judgements 
than their actual symptom occurrence.  
Aim 3 
The third aim of the study was to test for direct and indirect associations between 
beliefs about how symptoms compare to others and help-seeking as outlined in Figure 3.1. 
Direct associations will be explored first. Tables 3.7 to 3.10 below show the results from 
regression analyses investigating predictors of: 
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1. The number of help-seeking behaviours participants engaged in to manage depression 
(M = 1.47, SD = 1.63) and anxiety (M = 1.20, SD = 1.43) symptoms,  
2. Whether they had sought help at all for symptoms (depression: 61.7%; anxiety: 
57.5%),  
3. Whether they had consulted a professional about their symptoms (depression: 26.1%; 
anxiety: 31.7%), and  
4. Whether they had taken medication for symptoms (depression: 22.7%; anxiety: 
23.6%). 
Total number of help-seeking behaviours: Table 3.7 shows a very similar pattern of 
results to those reported thus far. The step 1 models each account for 20% of the variance 
in the total number of help-seeking behaviours participants engaged with in order to 
manage their symptoms of depression and anxiety with symptom occurrence being the 
strongest predictor of this. The rank variables account for an additional 5% of explained 
variance (both significant increases) and when they are added in step 2a the effect of 
symptom occurrence is attenuated by around 60% in both models making rank the 
strongest predictor in the models (the rank beta weights are significantly larger than those 
of other predictors in the models). Although distance from the average is also a significant 
predictor of the total number of help-seeking behaviours for both depression and anxiety 
symptoms, compared to symptom occurrence it is a significantly weaker predictor 
(depression: symptom occurrence β = .33, distance from the average β = .12; anxiety: 
symptom occurrence β = .32, distance from the average β = .14). Addition of the distance 
from the average variables resulted in a 1% increase in explained variance (significant for 
both models), however, the step 2a models including rank accounted for significantly more 
variance in the number of help-seeking behaviours than the step 2b models including 
distance from the average, depression: t(640) = 2.77, p = .003, anxiety: t(640) = 2.47, p = 
.007. 
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Table 3.7. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Number of Help-seeking Behaviours for Each Symptom from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, Direct Rank of 
Symptom Occurrence, and Direct Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals 
and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Depression  Anxiety 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .20***    <.001  .20***    <.001 
Constant  1.27 (0.86-1.72) 0.22  .001   0.89 (0.55-1.23) 0.19  .001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.00 -.07 .036   -0.01 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.05 .133 
Gender  -0.32 (-0.55--0.08) 0.12 -.10 .008   -0.26 (-0.48--0.03) 0.10 -.09 .014 
Symptom Occurrence  0.08 (0.06-0.10) 0.01 .42 .001   0.07 (0.05-0.08) 0.01 .42 .001 
Step 2a .05***    <.001  .05***    <.001 
Constant  1.08 (0.70-1.52) 0.22  .001   0.70 (0.36-1.06) 0.18  .001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.00 -.06 .082   0.00 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.03 .366 
Gender  -0.31 (-0.53--0.08) 0.11 -.09 .009   -0.28 (-0.50--0.06) 0.10 -.10 .010 
Symptom Occurrence  0.02 (0.00-0.05) 0.01 .13 .037   0.03 (0.00-0.05) 0.01 .16 .012 
Rank  0.02 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .37 .001   0.02 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .34 .001 
Step 2b .01*    <.001  .01*    <.001 
Constant  1.42 (0.96-1.90) 0.23  .001   1.05 (0.66-1.49) 0.21  .001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.01 -.07 .033   -0.01 (-0.01-0.00) 0.00 -.05 .145 
Gender  -0.33 (-0.56--0.10) 0.12 -.10 .006   -0.26 (-0.46--0.08) 0.10 -.09 .015 
Symptom Occurrence  0.06 (0.04-0.08) 0.01 .33 .001   0.05 (0.03-0.07) 0.01 .32 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.02 (0.00-0.04) 0.01 .12 .037   0.02 (0.01-0.04) 0.01 .14 .014 
Note. N = 643, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. *p < .05, ***p < .001. 
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Table 3.8. 
Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants Sought Help for Symptoms from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, Direct Rank of Symptom Occurrence, and 
Direct Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 
1000 Samples). 
 Depression  Anxiety 
Predictors 
∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
 ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .21***    <.001   .19***    <.001  
Constant   -0.04 (-0.66-0.60) 0.32 .902 0.96    -0.25 (-0.87-0.40) 0.31 .403 0.78 
Age  -0.12 -0.01 (-0.03-0.00) 0.01 .071 0.99 (0.97-1.00)   -0.12 -0.01 (-0.03-0.00) 0.01 .120 0.99 (0.97-1.00) 
Gender  0.16 0.31 (-0.04-0.64) 0.17 .082 1.36 (0.96-1.92)   0.12 0.23 (-0.14-0.61) 0.18 .206 1.25 (0.89-1.76) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.94 0.11 (0.09-0.16) 0.02 .001 1.12 (1.09-1.15)   0.90 0.10 (0.08-0.13) 0.01 .001 1.10 (1.08-1.13) 
Step 2a .04***    <.001   .05***    <.001  
Constant   -0.26 (-0.91-0.34) 0.32 .419 0.77    -0.59 (-1.17-0.01) 0.32 .058 0.56 
Age  -0.12 -0.01 (-0.03-0.00) 0.01 .119 0.99 (0.97-1.00)   -0.12 -0.01 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .276 0.99 (0.98-1.01) 
Gender  0.17 0.33 (-0.01-0.67) 0.18 .059 1.39 (0.97-1.98)   0.15 0.29 (-0.07-0.68) 0.18 .106 1.34 (0.95-1.90) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.43 0.05 (0.01-0.09) 0.02 .030 1.05 (1.01-1.09)   0.36 0.04 (0.01-0.07) 0.02 .030 1.04 (1.00-1.07) 
Rank  0.63 0.02 (0.01-0.04) 0.01 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03)   0.64 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.01 .001 1.02 (1.02-1.03) 
Step 2b .00    <.001   .01    <.001  
Constant   -0.06 (-0.71-0.60) 0.34 .851 0.94    -0.07 (-0.71-0.55) 0.34 .837 0.93 
Age  -0.12 -0.01 (-0.03-0.00) 0.01 .076 0.99 (0.97-1.00)   -0.12 -0.01 (-0.03-0.00) 0.01 .123 0.99 (0.97-1.00) 
Gender  0.15 0.30 (-0.06-0.65) 0.18 .081 1.35 (0.95-1.92)   0.12 0.23 (-0.13-0.61) 0.18 .192 1.25 (0.89-1.77) 
Symptom Occurrence  1.02 0.12 (0.08-0.16) 0.02 .001 1.12 (1.08-1.17)   0.72 0.08 (0.05-0.12) 0.02 .001 1.09 (1.05-1.12) 
Distance from the Average  0.00 0.00 (-0.04-0.03) 0.02 .829 1.00 (0.97-1.03)   0.19 0.02 (-0.01-0.06) 0.02 .149 1.02 (0.99-1.05) 
Note. N = 643, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < 
.001. 
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Table 3.9. 
Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants Sought Help from a Professional (Doctor, Nurse, Pharmacist or Therapist) for Symptoms from Age, Gender, 
Symptom Occurrence, Direct Rank of Symptom Occurrence, and Direct Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People in the General Population (95% 
BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Depression  Anxiety 
Predictors 
∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio  
(95% CI) 
 ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio  
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .18***    <.001   .10***    <.001  
Constant   -2.30 (-2.97--1.65) 0.36 .001 0.10    -1.53 (-2.21--0.93) 0.32 .001 0.22 
Age  0.00 0.00 (-0.01-0.02) 0.01 .674 1.00 (0.99-1.02)   0.00 0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .895 1.00 (0.98-1.01) 
Gender  0.15 0.29 (-0.09-0.68) 0.20 .149 1.33 (0.91-1.95)   0.17 0.33 (-0.06-0.75) 0.19 .073 1.39 (0.98-1.98) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.85 0.10 (0.08-0.12) 0.01 .001 1.10 (1.08-1.12)   0.54 0.06 (0.04-0.08) 0.01 .001 1.06 (1.04-1.08) 
Step 2a .06***    <.001   .04***    <.001  
Constant   -2.62 (-3.31--1.99) 0.37 .001 0.07    -1.85 (-2.60--1.22) 0.33 .001 0.16 
Age  0.12 0.01 (-0.01-0.02) 0.01 .482 1.01 (0.99-1.02)   0.00 0.00 (-0.01-0.02) 0.01 .719 1.00 (0.99-1.02) 
Gender  0.13 0.25 (-0.16-0.68) 0.20 .224 1.28 (0.86-1.90)   0.19 0.37 (-0.02-0.79) 0.19 .052 1.45 (1.01-2.07) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.17 0.02 (-0.01-0.06) 0.02 .206 1.02 (0.99-1.06)   0.09 0.01 (-0.02-0.04) 0.02 .672 1.01 (0.98-1.04) 
Rank  0.95 0.03 (0.02-0.04) 0.01 .001 1.03 (1.02-1.04)   0.64 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.00 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03) 
Step 2b .00    <.001   .00    <.001  
Constant   -2.20 (-2.95--1.51) 0.36 .001 0.11    -1.55 (-2.24--0.85) 0.34 .001 0.21 
Age  0.00 0.00 (-0.01-0.02) 0.01 .679 1.00 (0.99-1.02)   0.00 0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .900 1.00 (0.98-1.01) 
Gender  0.15 0.29 (-0.08-0.70) 0.20 .135 1.34 (0.91-1.96)   0.17 0.33 (0.02-0.65) 0.18 .070 1.39 (0.98-1.98) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.68 0.08 (0.05-0.12) 0.02 .001 1.09 (1.05-1.12)   0.54 0.06 (0.03-0.10) 0.02 .001 1.06 (1.03-1.10) 
Distance from the Average  0.18 0.02 (-0.02-0.05) 0.02 .341 1.02 (0.98-1.05)   0.00 0.00 (-0.03-0.02) 0.01 .852 1.00 (0.97-1.03) 
Note. N = 643, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2.  Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < 
.001. 
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Table 3.10. 
Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants Took Medication (Complementary or Conventional) for Symptoms from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, 
Direct Rank of Symptom Occurrence, and Direct Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap 
Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Depression  Anxiety 
Predictors 
∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
 ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .17***    <.001   .16***    <.001  
Constant   -3.07 (-3.82--2.36) 0.36 .001 0.05    -2.67 (-3.33--2.08) 0.35 .001 0.07 
Age  0.23 0.02 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .023 1.02 (1.00-1.04)   0.12 0.01 (-0.01-0.03) 0.01 .130 1.01 (1.00-1.03) 
Gender  0.27 0.53 (0.13-0.91) 0.21 .009 1.70 (1.13-2.54)   0.12 0.23 (-0.18-0.65) 0.21 .261 1.26 (0.85-1.86) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.77 0.09 (0.07-0.11) 0.01 .001 1.09 (1.07-1.12)   0.72 0.08 (0.06-0.11) 0.01 .001 1.09 (1.06-1.11) 
Step 2a .05***    <.001   .03***    <.001  
Constant   -3.42 (-4.20--2.72) 0.39 .001 0.03    -3.00 (-3.67--2.40) 0.36 .001 0.05 
Age  0.23 0.02 (0.00-0.04) 0.01 .007 1.02 (1.00-1.04)   0.23 0.02 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .039 1.02 (1.00-1.03) 
Gender  0.25 0.50 (0.09-0.89) 0.21 .012 1.65 (1.09-2.48)   0.12 0.24 (-0.18-0.68) 0.21 .247 1.28 (0.85-1.91) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.09 0.01 (-0.02-0.04) 0.02 .483 1.01 (0.98-1.05)   0.36 0.04 (0.00-0.07) 0.02 .030 1.04 (1.00-1.07) 
Rank  0.95 0.03 (0.02-0.04) 0.01 .001 1.03 (1.02-1.04)   0.64 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.01 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03) 
Step 2b .03***    <.001   .01    <.001  
Constant   -2.68 (-3.53--1.90) 0.38 .001 0.07    -2.49 (-3.32--1.78) 0.39 .001 0.08 
Age  0.23 0.02 (0.00-0.04) 0.01 .031 1.02 (1.00-1.04)   0.12 0.01 (-0.01-0.03) 0.01 .155 1.01 (1.00-1.03) 
Gender  0.28 0.55 (0.13-1.01) 0.22 .011 1.74 (1.16-2.62)   0.11 0.22 (-0.18-0.67) 0.20 .266 1.25 (0.84-1.86) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.26 0.03 (-0.01-0.07) 0.02 .077 1.03 (1.00-1.07)   0.54 0.06 (0.03-0.10) 0.02 .001 1.07 (1.03-1.10) 
Distance from the Average  0.62 0.07 (0.03-0.12) 0.02 .001 1.07 (1.03-1.11)   0.19 0.02 (-0.01-0.06) 0.02 .139 1.02 (0.99-1.06) 
Note. N = 643, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2.  Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < 
.001. 
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Binary logistic regression was used to investigate whether, and (if so) how, people 
compare to others when making judgements about whether to seek any kind of help for 
their symptoms, whether to consult a professional (doctor, nurse, pharmacist, or therapist) 
for their symptoms or whether to take medication (conventional or complementary) for 
their symptoms. Again, the results were largely consistent with previous findings.  
Whether sought help at all: The step 1 models in Table 3.8 show that symptom 
occurrence was the most important predictor of whether participants sought help for 
depression and anxiety symptoms - these models account for 19% and 21% of the variance 
in these behaviours respectively. The addition of the rank variables to the depression and 
anxiety models resulted in a 4% and 5% increase (both significant) in explained variance 
respectively and rank becomes the most important predictor of help-seeking. The addition 
of the distance from the average variables in step 2b had little effect – there was no 
significant increase in explained variance and these variables were not significant 
predictors of whether help was sought. Unsurprisingly, model comparison showed that, for 
both symptoms, there was very strong evidence that the step 2a models fitted the data 
much better than the step 2b models (differences in -2LL between the step 2a and step 2b 
models: depression models = -21.26, anxiety models = -25.15).  
Whether sought help from a professional: Table 3.9 shows the exact same pattern 
of results as above apart from that the effect of symptom occurrence is completely 
removed in the step 2a models. Rank is the most important predictor of whether 
participants sought help from a professional for depression and anxiety symptoms. Again, 
there was very strong evidence that the step 2a models fitted the data much better than 
the step 2b models (differences in -2LL between the step 2a and step 2b models: 
depression models = -26.71, anxiety models = -21.10). The step 1 models account for 18% 
and 10% of the variance in professional help-seeking behaviour for depression and anxiety 
symptoms respectively. Addition of the rank variables resulted in a 6% and 4% increase 
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(both significant) in explained variance respectively, whereas the addition of the distance 
from the average variables resulted in less than a 1% increase in both models (both 
nonsignificant). 
Whether took medication: The results presented in Table 3.10 are slightly different. 
Again, the step 1 models show symptom occurrence to be the most important predictor of 
whether participants took medication for depression or anxiety symptoms. These models 
account for 17% and 16% of the variance in these behaviours respectively. When rank is 
added in step 2a, the effect of symptom occurrence is removed for depression but remains 
for anxiety, however, rank is the most important predictor in both models. The addition of 
the rank variables to the depression and anxiety models resulted in a 5% and 3% increase 
(both significant) in explained variance respectively. The addition of the distance from the 
average variable in the step 2b anxiety model has no effect. However, when the distance 
from the average variable is added to the step 1 depression model the effect of symptom 
occurrence is removed, and the variance accounted for by the model increases significantly 
by 3%. However, there was very strong evidence that the step 2a depression model fitted 
the data better than the step 2b depression model (difference in -2LL = -12.60). This was 
the same for the anxiety models (difference in -2LL between the anxiety step 2a and step 
2b model = -13.04).  
Summary: Overall, the results provide evidence that people compare their 
experience of depression and anxiety symptoms to other people’s experiences of these 
symptoms when making decisions about whether to seek help for the symptoms and 
whether to consult a professional or take medication specifically. In all eight models 
reported, how participants’ believed their symptom occurrence compared to that of other 
people in the general population significantly predicted these help-seeking outcomes and 
the number of help-seeking actions that participants took to manage their symptoms. 
Again, the social comparison variable measuring where participants believed their 
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symptom occurrence ranked in comparison to other people in the general population 
significantly predicted all four of the help-seeking outcomes across both symptoms and 
was the most important predictor of these outcomes. This variable accounted for, on 
average, across both symptoms, 5% of the variance in the total number of help-seeking 
behaviours engaged with, decisions about seeking help, and decisions regarding whether to 
seek help from a professional and 4% of the variance in decisions regarding whether to 
take medication. In contrast, how participants’ symptom occurrence compared to what 
they believed the average symptom occurrence amongst people in the general population 
to be was a significant predictor in only three out of the eight models and accounted for, 
on average, less than 1% of the variance in all help-seeking outcomes. Unsurprisingly, 
across all help-seeking outcomes, model comparison suggested that there was very strong 
evidence that the step 2a models including the rank variables fitted the data better than 
the step 2b models including the distance from the average variables. 
 Indirect associations: The results so far have shown direct associations between how 
participants’ believe their symptoms of depression and anxiety compare to others and 1) 
whether or not they think they have depression or anxiety, 2) how worried they are about 
their experience of these symptoms, 3) how severe they think their symptoms are, and 4) 
whether they sought help for the symptoms. Previous studies have shown that these 
aspects of symptom appraisal (beliefs that symptoms represent the presence of a serious 
underlying disorder, judgements of symptom severity and worry or other emotional 
responses to symptoms) are also directly linked to seeking help for symptoms (e.g., Elliott 
et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2003). Therefore, the next section tests whether social 
comparison also affects help-seeking indirectly through these aspects using mediation 
analysis. As the strongest direct effects seen were obtained using the variable that 
measured where participants believed their experience of symptoms ranked in comparison 
to other people’s experiences of these symptoms this variable is used as the measure of 
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how participants’ symptoms compare to others. As in previous analyses age, gender and 
symptom occurrence are included as covariates in the model. Indirect effects were 
examined for each aspect separately due to sample size limitations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Models of rank of depression symptom occurrence as a predictor of help-
seeking, mediated by whether participants thought they had depression (top), how severe 
they thought their symptoms of depression were (middle) and how worried they were 
about how often they felt depressed (bottom). Figures represent unstandardised 
regression coefficients with associated 95% confidence intervals (BCa bootstrapped based 
on 1000 samples) in parentheses. ***p < .001, ns = not significant. 
 
  
How depression 
symptom occurrence 
compares to others 
(rank) 
0.021*** [0.018, 0.025] 0.772*** [0.554, 0.989] 
Direct effect: 0.009 ns [-0.003, 0.020] 
Indirect effect: 0.017*** [0.011, 0.023] 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
depression 
How depression 
symptom occurrence 
compares to others 
(rank) 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
depression 
Direct effect: 0.004 ns [-0.008, 0.016] 
Indirect effect: 0.021*** [0.014, 0.030] 
Depression symptom 
severity 
How depression 
symptom occurrence 
compares to others 
(rank) 
Whether participant 
thought they had 
depression 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
depression 
Direct effect: 0.002 ns [-0.010, 0.014] 
Indirect effect: 0.023*** [0.016, 0.030] 
Worry about 
depression symptom 
occurrence 
0.570*** [0.498, 0.642]  
0.582*** [0.496, 0.668] 
0.037*** [0.025, 0.049] 
0.039*** [0.029, 0.049] 
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Figure 3.4. Models of rank of anxiety symptom occurrence as a predictor of help-seeking, 
mediated by whether participants thought they had anxiety (top), how severe they thought 
their symptoms of anxiety were (middle) and how worried they were about how often they 
felt anxious (bottom). Figures represent unstandardised regression coefficients with 
associated 95% confidence intervals (BCa bootstrapped based on 1000 samples) in 
parentheses. ** p < .01, ***p < .001, ns = not significant. 
 
 Figures 3.3 and 3.4 above show that, for both symptoms, there were significant 
indirect effects of social comparison on help-seeking through judgements of whether 
participants thought they had depression/anxiety, symptom severity and worry about 
symptom occurrence. 
How anxiety 
symptom occurrence 
compares to others 
(rank) 
0.017*** [0.013, 0.020] 0.650*** [0.451, 0.849] 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
anxiety 
Direct effect: 0.014** [0.004, 0.024] 
Indirect effect: 0.011*** [0.007, 0.015] 
Whether participant 
thought they had 
anxiety 
How anxiety 
symptom occurrence 
compares to others 
(rank) 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
anxiety 
Direct effect: 0.006 ns [-0.005, 0.017] 
Indirect effect: 0.020*** [0.012, 0.027] 
Anxiety symptom 
severity 
How anxiety 
symptom occurrence 
compares to others 
(rank) 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
anxiety 
Direct effect: 0.005 ns [-0.006, 0.016]  
Indirect effect: 0.020*** [0.015, 0.027] 
Worry about anxiety 
symptom occurrence 
0.593*** [0.523, 0.662] 0.033*** [0.023, 0.044] 
0.550*** [0.468, 0.631] 0.037*** [0.028, 0.047] 
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Aim 4 
The fourth aim of the study was to investigate how people compare to others when 
making health-related judgements and decisions about help-seeking, namely whether they 
use rank or average-based comparisons as consistent with DbS and ALT respectively. The 
results reported above provide strong evidence that when people compare to others to 
make judgements about whether they have depression or anxiety, how severe their 
symptoms of depression and anxiety are and how worried they are about these symptoms 
and when they make decisions about help-seeking, they use their ranked position within 
the comparison sample (the general population) to do so rather than how much they differ 
from the sample average.  
In the results outlined above, where participants believed their depression and 
anxiety symptom occurrence ranked in comparison to the frequency with which other 
people experience these symptoms significantly predicted all seven outcomes across both 
symptoms. The rank comparison variables were the most important predictors in all of the 
models where they were included, often attenuating or removing the effect of symptom 
occurrence. Although the distance from the average variables were significant predictors of 
the outcomes in half of the models reported, their effect was only greater than that of 
symptom occurrence in one model.  
Comparison of the step 2a (including rank of symptom occurrence) and 2b (including 
distance from the average symptom occurrence) models across all outcomes and both 
symptoms consistently showed that the step 2a models accounted for significantly more 
variance in the outcome than the step 2b models (continuous outcomes) or that there was 
very strong evidence that the step 2a models fitted the data better than the step 2b 
models (ordinal and binary outcomes). The rank comparison variables accounted for, on 
average, across all outcomes and both symptoms, 7% of the variance in the judgements 
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and decisions measured (range: 3-14%) whereas the distance from the average comparison 
variable accounted for only 0.5% of the variance, on average (range: 0-3%). 
Aim 5  
The fifth and final aim of the study was to explore differences in beliefs about others 
and the potential impact these differences may have on the accuracy of help-seeking 
decisions.  
Beliefs about others: Differences in beliefs about others can be explored using data 
from the questions asking about the average occurrence of depression and anxiety 
symptoms in the general population and Figure 3.5 below shows the distribution of 
answers to these questions. Figure 3.5 shows considerable variation in participants’ beliefs 
about the average occurrence of depression and anxiety in the general population – a 
comparison group that is the same for all participants (depression: M = 8.66, SD = 5.84, 
range = 0-30; anxiety: M = 9.72, SD = 6.63, range = 0-30). Given such variation, it is likely 
that many participants will hold incorrect beliefs about the frequency with which other 
people experience depression and anxiety symptoms. The average number of days a month 
that participants felt depressed and anxious was 8.92 and 9.69 respectively. If these figures 
are representative of the general population then this would indicate that the majority of 
the participants have incorrect beliefs about the occurrence of depression and anxiety 
symptoms in the U.K.  
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Figure 3.5. Distributions of participants’ answers to questions asking them what they 
thought the average number of days a month people in the general population feel 
depressed (top) and anxious (bottom). 
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It is highly likely that a person holding incorrect beliefs about the distribution of 
symptom occurrence in their comparison sample will make inaccurate judgements about 
how their symptoms compare to others. Evidence of inaccurate beliefs about where 
symptoms rank in comparison to others can be seen when looking at the distributions of 
believed rank amongst participants who experience symptoms for the same number of 
days a month. Figure 3.6 below gives examples of some of these distributions (which again 
show variation indicating inaccuracy in some participants) for numbers of days a month 
symptoms were commonly experienced by participants; 2 (depression n = 79, anxiety n = 
68), 10 (depression n = 48, anxiety n = 51) and 20 (depression n = 48, anxiety n = 44) days.  
The charts in Figure 3.6 below show that generally these participants ranked 
themselves appropriately. For the lower and higher days a month that symptoms were 
experienced the responses are skewed towards the lower and higher ends of the believed 
rank scale respectively whilst for the middle symptom occurrence of ten days, which was 
around the average occurrence of all participants, responses are more normally 
distributed. However, quite a few participants have misjudged their rank. If the number of 
days a month that the sample experience symptoms of depression and anxiety for is 
representative of the number of days a month people in the general population experience 
these symptoms, then 70/74% of people experience symptoms of depression/anxiety 
respectively on more than 2 days and 11/14% of people experience symptoms of 
depression/anxiety respectively on more than 20 days. This means that all the participants 
who experienced depression/anxiety symptoms for two days and thought that they ranked 
above 30/26 out of 100 were incorrect (depression n = 7, anxiety n = 7) as were those 
participants who experienced the symptoms for 20 days and thought they ranked below 
89/86 out of 100 (depression n = 40, anxiety n = 36). 
 
  
 
8
9 
Depression Symptom Occurrence = 2 Days Depression Symptom Occurrence = 10 Days         Depression Symptom Occurrence = 20 Days 
 
    Anxiety Symptom Occurrence = 2 Days        Anxiety Symptom Occurrence = 10 Days          Anxiety Symptom Occurrence = 20 Days 
   
Figure 3.6. Variation in participants’ believed rank of their symptom occurrence amongst participants who had the same experience of symptoms.
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 Help-seeking accuracy: A procedure similar to that used by Mojtabai (2008) was 
used to investigate help-seeking accuracy. First, participants were split into two groups 
depending on their rank: those that believed they experienced symptoms of 
depression/anxiety more frequently than others (i.e., those that gave a rank of 51 or above 
indicating that they thought 49% or less of the population experienced symptoms on more 
days than them; depression: n = 188, anxiety: n = 189) and those that believed they 
experienced symptoms of depression/anxiety less frequently than others (i.e., those that 
gave a rank of 50 or below; depression: n = 455, anxiety: n = 454). For both depression and 
anxiety, there was a significant association between beliefs about where participants 
thought their symptom occurrence ranked in comparison to others and help-seeking 
(depression: χ2 (1) = 73.09, p < .001; anxiety: χ2 (1) = 68.46, p < .001). Participants who 
thought they experienced symptoms more frequently than others were more likely to seek 
help than those who thought they experienced symptoms less frequently than others. Of 
the participants who thought that they experienced symptoms of depression and anxiety 
more frequently than others, 87.2% (depression) and 82.5% (anxiety) sought help whereas 
51.2% (depression) and 47.1% (anxiety) of participants who thought they experienced 
symptoms less often than others sought help. 
 In order to investigate help-seeking accuracy, analyses were undertaken again but 
separately for participants classed as being likely and unlikely to have depression or anxiety 
based on their PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores. As a score of 10 or above on both measures 
indicates the likely presence of clinical levels of depression/anxiety, participants were 
classed as being likely to have depression or anxiety if they had a score of 10 or above and 
unlikely to have depression or anxiety if their score was below 10. It should be noted that 
although both measures have good psychometric properties (as explained earlier), these 
classifications of “likely” and “unlikely” presence of mental disorder are essentially based 
on self-report of symptoms and not an actual clinical diagnosis and therefore may not be 
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completely accurate. As previously mentioned, the PHQ-9 has a sensitivity for major 
depression of 88% and specificity of 88% and the GAD-7 has a sensitivity for anxiety of 89% 
and a specificity of 82%. Therefore, the following results should be interpreted as a good 
estimate of the effect of social comparison on help-seeking accuracy in light of participants’ 
medical information being unavailable/the inability to clinically screen participants. 
 Again, for both participants who were likely (n = 255) and unlikely (n = 388) to have 
depression, there was a significant association between beliefs about where participants 
thought their symptom occurrence ranked in comparison to others and help-seeking (likely 
to have depression: χ2 (1) = 10.37, p = .001; unlikely to have depression: χ2 (1) = 15.45, p < 
.001). Participants were more likely to seek help when they did not need to if they thought 
they experienced symptoms more frequently than others. Of the participants who thought 
that they experienced depression symptoms more frequently than others but were unlikely 
to have depression, 78.4% sought help whereas only 44.4% of participants who thought 
they experienced depression symptoms less often than others and who were unlikely to 
have depression sought help. Similarly, participants likely to have depression were less 
likely to seek help if they thought they experienced symptoms less frequently than others. 
Of the participants who likely had depression but thought they experienced depression 
symptoms less often than others, 26.0% did not seek help whereas only 10.6% of 
participants who likely had depression and who thought that they experienced depression 
symptoms more frequently than others did not seek help. 
 Participants’ beliefs about where their symptom occurrence ranked in comparison to 
others were significantly associated with help-seeking for participants who were unlikely to 
have anxiety only (likely to have anxiety: χ2 (1) = 3.29, p = .07; unlikely to have anxiety: χ2 
(1) = 23.95, p < .001). Again, participants were more likely to seek help when they did not 
need to if they thought they experienced symptoms more frequently than others. Of the 
participants who thought that they experienced anxiety symptoms more frequently than 
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others but were unlikely to have anxiety, 73.9% sought help whereas only 42.0% of 
participants who thought they experienced anxiety symptoms less frequently than others 
and were unlikely to have anxiety sought help. Although it was nonsignificant, there was a 
similar trend in help-seeking amongst participants likely to have anxiety as there was for 
those likely to have depression: 22.7% of participants who thought they experienced 
anxiety symptoms less frequently than others did not seek help whereas only 12.5% of 
participants who thought they experienced anxiety symptoms more frequently than others 
did not seek help. 
 These findings suggest that accuracy in help-seeking is somewhat linked to the 
accuracy of participants’ beliefs about where their experience of symptoms ranked in 
comparison to others. Although participants seemingly made inaccurate decisions about 
help-seeking (i.e., sought help when they were below the screening threshold for 
depression or anxiety or did not seek help when they were above this threshold) regardless 
of where they thought their experience of symptoms ranked in comparison to others, they 
were more likely to make inaccurate help-seeking decisions if they also made inaccurate 
rank judgements. Participants unlikely to have depression or anxiety were around four 
times more likely to seek help if they thought they experienced depression/anxiety 
symptoms more frequently than others (odds ratios: depression = 4.53, anxiety = 3.93). 
Participants likely to have depression or anxiety were two to three times more likely to not 
seek help if they thought they experienced symptoms less frequently than others (odds 
ratios: depression = 2.94, anxiety = 2.10). The implications of these and all of the other 
findings in this study will be outlined in the general discussion after Study 2.  
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Study 2: Physical Health 
The main aim of Study 2 was to investigate whether the effects seen in Study 1 
extend to judgements and decisions made about physical symptoms. The specific aims of 
the study were as follows: 
1. Test for associations between beliefs about how symptoms compare to others and 
other constructs related to health help-seeking, namely judgements of symptom 
severity and worry about symptoms, 
2. Test for direct and indirect associations between beliefs about how symptoms 
compare to others and help-seeking as outlined in Figure 3.1,  
3. Investigate how people compare to others when making health-related judgements 
and decisions about help-seeking, namely whether they use rank or average-based 
comparisons as consistent with DbS and ALT respectively, and 
4. Explore differences in beliefs about others. 
To this end, a similar procedure to Study 1 was followed in that participants were 
asked about their experiences of specific symptoms and how they thought their experience 
of these symptoms compared to others. Four symptoms were chosen as the focus of the 
study; 1) feeling tired or run down, 2) headaches, 3) muscle, joint or back pain, and 4) cold 
symptoms. The first three symptoms were chosen as they were identified as being the 
three most common symptoms in the U.K. in a recent nationwide survey of nearly 2,500 
adults (McAteer, Elliott, & Hannaford, 2011) and so it is therefore likely that participants 
will have experienced them. Participants were asked about their experiences of cold 
symptoms as this is one symptom where inappropriate help-seeking often occurs, for 
example, visiting a GP when they cannot treat colds (Braun et al., 2000).  
A limitation of Study 1 was that only one aspect of participants’ experiences of 
symptoms was measured – symptom occurrence. In Study 2 symptom duration was also 
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measured. For two of the symptoms (headaches and colds), participants were asked not 
just about how frequently they experienced the symptoms and how they thought their 
symptom occurrence compared to others but also about the duration of their symptoms 
and how they thought this duration compared to others. As discussed in Chapter 2, it was 
possible to ask participants about the frequency with which they experienced four 
symptoms, the duration that they experienced two of these symptoms for and the 
associated symptom comparison questions because the new, direct comparison measures 
were used solely in this study - the distribution elicitation questions were not included. 
Method 
Participants 
The 543 participants that completed this study were recruited through CrowdFlower 
panels and had a mean age of 36.1 years (SD = 11.8, range: 18-74 years), were 
predominantly White (90%, Indian = 2%, Black = 1%, Chinese = 1%, Other = 6%) and 49% 
were male. Participants were all resident in the U.K. and took part from towns and cities all 
over the country. Participants were mainly educated up to university (47%) or post-
secondary (i.e., education between 16 and 18 years of age such as A-levels: 33%) level 
(some high school = 4%, finished school at 16 = 16%, rather not say < 1%). Participants were 
mainly low earners (< £14,999 = 27%, £15,000-£24,999 = 24%, £25,000-£34,999 = 18%, 
£35,000-£44,999 = 11%, >£45,000 = 10%, rather not say = 10%) and received $0.75 on 
completion of the study which took 10-15 minutes to complete.  
Design and Procedure 
The questionnaire that participants completed in this study was designed and hosted 
using Qualtrics. Participants were asked the following: 
Symptom occurrence: Occurrence of the four symptoms was obtained through 
asking: “in the last three months, on how many days have you felt tired or run down?”, “in 
the last three months, on how many days have you experienced muscle, joint or back 
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pain?”, “in the last three months, how many headaches have you had?” and “in the last 
three months, how many colds have you had?”. A reporting period of three months was 
chosen to maximise the likelihood of the participant experiencing the symptom and so to 
reduce the likelihood of floor effects. Participants were asked to consider 3 months to be 
90 days. The wording was changed slightly for headaches and colds to ask about how many 
of each they had experienced in the last 3 months as this seemed more natural than asking 
about the number of days they had experienced each of these as one headache or cold 
could last more than one day.  
Symptom duration: Typical duration of headaches and colds was measured using the 
following questions: “typically, how long do your headaches last each time that you have 
one? (Please answer in number of hours)” and “typically, how long do your colds last each 
time that you have one? (Please answer in number of days)”.  
Rank of symptom occurrence and duration within the general population: A similar 
methodology to Study 1, but without the distribution elicitation questions, was used to 
elicit participants’ beliefs about where the occurrence and duration of their symptoms 
ranks in comparison to others. This was done using three sets of two questions. First, 
participants were asked to imagine that all of the adults in the U.K. were lined up in order 
of the number of days in the last 3 months that they have experienced a) feeling tired or 
run down and then b) muscle, joint or back pain from those that have experienced these 
symptoms the least number of days in the last 3 months to those that have experienced 
them the most number of days in the last 3 months. They were then asked where they 
thought their experience of these symptoms placed them along each line. Secondly, 
participants did this task again for headaches and cold symptoms but the wording was 
slightly different in that they were asked to think about the number of times rather than 
the number of days. Finally, participants were asked to do exactly the same thing again but 
thinking about the duration of their symptoms (the amount of time they lasted) rather than 
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their frequency (how many they had in the last 3 months). They again rated their 
experience of the symptoms on lines that went from “people who had the shortest 
headaches/colds in the last 3 months” to “people who had the longest headaches/colds 
over the last 3 months”. Participants were asked to consider ‘adults’ to be men and women 
of about their age as McAteer et al (2011) found age-related differences in the prevalence 
of two of the symptoms. They found that younger participants were more likely to have felt 
tired or run down over the previous two weeks than older participants who were more 
likely to have experienced joint pain than younger participants. These effects remained 
after controlling for sex, marital status, social support, level of education, housing tenure, 
employment status, household income, ethnicity, smoking status, and the presence of a 
chronic condition. 
Average symptom occurrence and duration in the general population: Participants 
were asked what they thought the average occurrence of each symptom was: “what do 
you think the average number of days that people felt tired or run down was over the last 
three months?”, “what do you think the average number of days that people experienced 
muscle, joint or back pain was over the last three months?”, “what do you think the 
average number of headaches that people experienced was over the last three months?” 
and “what do you think the average number of colds that people experienced was over the 
last three months?”. They were also asked what they thought the average duration of 
headaches and colds were: “when people had headaches over the last three months, how 
long on average do you think they lasted for? (Please answer in number of hours)” and 
“when people had colds over the last three months, how long on average do you think they 
lasted for? (Please answer in number of days)”. They were again asked to consider ‘people’ 
to be men and women of about their age and for three months to be 90 days. 
 As in Study 1, the following outcomes were measured: 
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 Symptom severity: Participants answered the questions “how severe are your 
feelings of being tired or run down typically?”, “how severe are your muscle, joint or back 
pains typically?”, “how severe are your headaches typically?” and “how severe are your 
colds typically?” on a slider scale from “not at all severe” to “extremely severe”. 
 Worry: Participants were asked to rate, using a slider scale from “not at all” to “very 
much” how worried they were about 1) the number of days in the last 3 months they felt 
tired or run down/ had muscle, joint or back pain, 2) the number of headaches/colds they 
have had in the last 3 months, and 3) the length of time their headaches/colds typically 
last. 
 Help-seeking: For each symptom participants were asked “which of these actions 
have you taken over the past three months to manage [symptom], tick all that apply” and 
were provided with the following list (modified slightly from the mental health study to be 
more relevant to physical symptoms): looked for information, discussed with other people, 
phoned NHS 24/NHS Direct/NHS 111, consulted a pharmacist, consulted a nurse or doctor, 
consulted a therapist, took complimentary medication, took over-the-counter medication, 
took prescribed medication or none of the above.  
 For all questions where a slider scale was used Qualtrics records where the 
participant placed the slider as a number between 0 and 100. Questions were allocated 
into two blocks of independent (symptom occurrence/duration, rank, and average 
questions) and dependent variables (all outcome measures) and half the participants saw 
the independent variable block first whilst half saw the dependent variable block first. 
Within this random presentation order, the presentation order of each of the sets of 
independent variable questions was randomised. Demographic characteristics (age, 
gender, level of education, ethnicity, and income bracket) were collected at the end of the 
survey after all the above questions were presented.  
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Results 
 As explained in Chapter 2, the sample size collected was 100 participants short of the 
minimum 643 participants recommended by the initial power calculation. However, 543 
participants is still a large enough sample size to have a 75% chance of detecting a small 
effect in a regression analysis with 4 predictor variables and, as the analyses below show, 
this sample size was large enough to detect social comparison effects. During data 
screening it became apparent that many participants had not read the headache and cold 
symptom occurrence questions properly. They did not note that they had to answer in 
terms of the number of times in the last 3 months they had experienced these symptoms 
and not the number of days they had experienced these symptoms as they had done for 
the previous questions asking about the frequency with which they felt tired or run down 
and experienced muscle joint or back pain. This was evident as some participants were 
stating that they had experienced upwards of 15 colds in the last 3 months and 60 
headaches etc. Unfortunately, there was no way of knowing which participants had read 
the question and answered correctly and so these data were not used in the analyses 
reported below. Therefore, the main independent variables included in the analyses are:  
Symptom occurrence: This was the number of days in the last 3 months participants 
felt tired or had no energy (M = 26.06, SD = 27.10) and the number of days in the last 
month they experienced muscle, joint or back pain (M = 21.60, SD = 29.13). 
Symptom duration: This was the number of hours participants typically experienced 
headaches for (M = 5.79, SD = 10.87) and the number of days they typically experienced 
colds for (M = 6.03, SD = 6.15). 
Rank of symptom occurrence: This rank measure was a direct measure of where the 
participants thought their experience of muscle, joint or back pain, and feeling tired or run 
down ranked in comparison to other people’s experience of these symptoms. Where 
participants placed their symptom occurrence on the line that went from “people who 
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experience the symptom the least” to “people who experience the symptom the most” 
corresponds to a rank value between 0 and 100 (tired or run down: M = 45.09, SD = 29.35, 
muscle, joint or back pain: M = 35.05, SD = 29.92). Higher values indicate that the 
participant thought that they experienced the symptom more frequently than the majority 
of others. 
Rank of symptom duration: Again, this was a direct measure of where the 
participants thought the length of their headaches and colds ranked in comparison to the 
amount of time other people experience these symptoms for. Where participants placed 
their symptom duration on the line that went from “people who had the shortest 
headaches/colds” to “people who had the longest headaches/colds” corresponds to a rank 
value between 0 and 100 (headaches: M = 28.50, SD = 25.45, colds: M = 31.01, SD = 26.65). 
Higher values indicate that the participant thought that they experienced the symptom for 
a longer period of time than the majority of others.  
Distance from the average symptom occurrence: Participants’ answers to the two 
questions asking what they thought the average occurrence of feeling tired or run down 
and experiencing muscle, joint or back pain in people from the general population about 
their age was were deducted from their answers to the relevant symptom occurrence 
questions. This produced a direct measure of how much their experience of the symptoms 
differed from what they believed the average experience of others to be. Both distance 
from the average symptom occurrence variables have possible values ranging from -90 to 
90 (tired or run down: M = 6.05, SD = 25.66, muscle, joint or back pain: M = 4.47, SD = 
28.22). Negative values indicate that the participant experiences the symptom less often 
than they believe the average person does and positive values indicate that the participant 
experiences the symptom more often.  
Distance from the average symptom duration: Participants’ answers to the two 
questions asking what they though the average length of time people about their age in the 
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general population experienced headaches and colds for was were deducted from their 
answers to the relevant symptom duration questions. This produced a direct measure of 
how much their symptom duration differed from their believed average duration of others 
(headaches: M = 0.18, SD = 11.48, colds: M = -0.72, SD = 8.73). Again, negative values 
indicate that the participant experiences the symptom for less time than they believe the 
average person does and positive values indicate that the participant experiences the 
symptom longer than they believe others do.  
As in Study 1, this results section addresses each of the aims outlined in the 
introduction to Study 2 on page 93 in turn, although the use of rank or average-based 
comparison strategies (aim 3) is discussed throughout. Correlations conducted prior to the 
main analyses showed that none of the continuous independent variables were highly 
correlated (see Table 3.11). Tolerance values obtained through running multiple linear 
regression analyses confirmed that collinearity is not problematic in any of the models 
(range of tolerance values for independent variables: tired or run down: .403-.996; muscle, 
joint or back pain: .334-.968; headaches: .574-.997; colds: .844-.995). 
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Table 3.11. 
Correlations between Continuous Independent Variables. 
 Tired or run down  Muscle, joint or back pain 
 Age 
Symptom 
Occurrence 
Rank of 
Symptom 
Occurrence  
Distance from 
the Average 
Symptom 
Occurrence 
 Age 
Symptom 
Occurrence 
Rank of 
Symptom 
Occurrence  
Distance from 
the Average 
Symptom 
Occurrence 
Age                          1 -.014 -.063 .009  1 .284*** .146** .249*** 
Symptom Occurrence -.014 1 .655*** .767***  .284*** 1 .625*** .807*** 
Rank of Symptom Occurrence -.063 .655*** 1 .554***  .146** .625*** 1 .527*** 
Distance from the Average 
Symptom Occurrence 
.009 .767*** .554*** 1  .249*** .807*** .527*** 1 
 Headaches  Colds 
 Age 
Symptom 
Duration 
Rank of 
Symptom 
Duration 
Distance from 
the Average 
Symptom 
Duration 
 Age 
Symptom 
Duration 
Rank of 
Symptom 
Duration 
Distance from 
the Average 
Symptom 
Duration 
Age 1 -.026 -.131** .004  1 .001 -.171*** .051 
Symptom Duration -.026 1 .414*** .641***  .001 1 .344*** .302*** 
Rank of Symptom Duration -.131** .414*** 1 .361***  -.171*** .344*** 1 .167*** 
Distance from the Average 
Symptom Duration 
.004 .641*** .361*** 1  .051 .302*** .167*** 1 
Note. N = 543, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed).  
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Aim 1 
The first aim of Study 2 was to test for associations between beliefs about how 
symptoms compare to others and judgements of symptom severity and worry about 
symptoms. To recap, these judgements were both measured on a 0 to 100 scale with low 
values indicating mild severity and worry and high values indicating extreme severity and 
worry. Severity judgements were general, i.e., participants rated how severe their 
symptoms were overall (tired run down: M =39.01, SD = 28.26; muscle, joint and back pain: 
M = 33.06, SD = 27.83; headaches: M = 31.94, SD = 25.95; colds: M = 31.85, SD = 24.45), 
whereas worry judgements were specific to the aspect of the symptom experience 
measured, i.e., worry about symptom occurrence and worry about symptom duration 
(tired run down occurrence: M = 33.38, SD = 31.24; muscle, joint and back pain occurrence: 
M = 27.35, SD =29.52; headaches duration: M = 20.71, SD = 26.36; colds duration: M 
=20.82, SD = 25.46). Multiple linear regression was used to investigate whether the rank 
and distance from the average variables predicted these judgements and these analyses 
are reported in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 (symptom severity) and 3.14 and 3.15 (worry) below. 
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Table 3.12. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Symptom Severity Ratings from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, Rank of Symptom Occurrence, and Distance from the 
Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 
1000 Samples). 
 Tired or Run Down  Muscle, Joint or Back Pain 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .45***    <.001  .38***    <.001 
Constant  29.21 (22.44-36.14) 3.34  .001   30.44 (23.51-37.39) 3.54  .001 
Age  -0.21 (-0.36--0.08) 0.08 -.09 .010   -0.20 (-0.37--0.02) 0.09 -.09 .020 
Gender  -1.59 (-5.19-2.06) 1.87 -.03 .400   -6.74 (-10.56--2.62) 1.86 -.12 .001 
Symptom Occurrence  0.70 (0.63-0.77) 0.04 .67 .001   0.62 (0.55-0.69) 0.04 .65 .001 
Step 2a .11***    <.001  .16***    <.001 
Constant  15.73 (9.47-21.98) 3.04  .001   17.66 (11.83-23.18) 3.19  .001 
Age  -0.16 (-0.29--0.02) 0.07 -.07 .027   -0.16 (-0.32--0.01) 0.07 -.07 .034 
Gender  -0.79 (-3.93-2.29) 1.62 -.01 .658   -4.15 (-7.85--0.85) 1.64 -.08 .015 
Symptom Occurrence  0.40 (0.30-0.51) 0.05 .38 .001   0.30 (0.20-0.39) 0.05 .31 .001 
Rank  0.42 (0.33-0.50) 0.04 .44 .001   0.48 (0.40-0.58) 0.05 .52 .001 
Step 2b .02***    <.001  .00    <.001 
Constant  32.23 (25.55-39.04) 3.24  .001   31.61 (24.63-38.20) 3.47  .001 
Age  -0.22 (-0.36--0.09) 0.07 -.09 .006   -0.21 (-0.39--0.04) 0.08 -.09 .016 
Gender  -1.64 (-5.54-1.92) 1.89 -.03 .379   -6.53 (-10.01--2.59) 1.93 -.12 .001 
Symptom Occurrence  0.55 (0.43-0.66) 0.06 .53 .001   0.55 (0.44-0.66) 0.06 .57 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.21 (0.09-0.33) 0.06 .19 .003   0.09 (-0.04-0.21) 0.06 .09 .134 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3.13. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Symptom Severity Ratings from Age, Gender, Symptom Duration, Rank of Symptom Duration, and Distance from the Believed 
Average Symptom Duration of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 
Samples). 
 Headaches  Colds 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .19***    <.001  .11***    <.001 
Constant  37.44 (30.43-44.38) 3.45  .001   35.23 (27.37-41.94) 3.73  .001 
Age  -0.29 (-0.45--0.14) 0.08 -.13 .001   -0.27 (-0.43--0.12) 0.08 -.13 .004 
Gender  -1.29 (-5.15-2.69) 2.05 -.03 .533   -1.13 (-5.22-2.40) 2.04 -.02 .605 
Symptom Duration  1.00 (0.82-1.23) 0.10 .42 .001   1.18 (0.77-1.89) 0.25 .30 .001 
Step 2a .27***    <.001  .21***    <.001 
Constant  18.26 (11.80-24.52) 3.19  .001   17.71 (11.89-23.42) 3.16  .001 
Age  -0.14 (-0.29-0.00) 0.07 -.07 .057   -0.10 (-0.24-0.03) 0.07 -.05 .155 
Gender  -0.56 (-3.76-2.42) 1.62 -.01 .734   1.12 (-2.52-4.59) 1.79 .02 .538 
Symptom Duration  0.43 (0.28-0.60) 0.08 .18 .001   0.48 (0.14-1.01) 0.20 .12 .020 
Rank  0.59 (0.51-0.66) 0.04 .57 .001   0.46 (0.38-0.54) 0.04 .50 .001 
Step 2b .01*    <.001  .00    <.001 
Constant  38.93 (32.80-45.30) 3.41  .001   36.17 (28.49-43.38) 3.86  .001 
Age  -0.30 (-0.46--0.13) 0.08 -.14 .001   -0.28 (-0.46--0.12) 0.09 -.14 .002 
Gender  -2.03 (-5.99-2.04) 2.12 -.04 .344   -1.36 (-5.38-2.56) 2.04 -.03 .512 
Symptom Duration  0.82 (0.59-1.05) 0.11 .34 .001   1.10 (0.68-1.80) 0.26 .28 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.27 (0.07-0.52) 0.10 .12 .010   0.18 (-0.11-0.47) 0.14 .06 .097 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3.14. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Ratings of Worry about the Number of Times Participants Feel Tired or Run Down and Experience Muscle, Joint or Back Pain 
(Symptom Occurrence), from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, Rank of Symptom Occurrence, and Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People 
Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Tired or Run Down  Muscle, Joint or Back Pain 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .34***    <.001  .32***    <.001 
Constant  26.70 (18.36-35.04) 3.86  .001   25.46 (18.79-32.86) 3.78  .001 
Age  -0.24 (-0.41--0.08) 0.09 -.09 .007   -0.24 (-0.43--0.06) 0.10 -.09 .019 
Gender  -4.39 (-8.71--0.03) 2.32 -.07 .059   -5.10 (-8.89--1.01) 2.08 -.09 .012 
Symptom Occurrence  0.68 (0.59-0.76) 0.05 .59 .001   0.60 (0.51-0.70) 0.05 .59 .001 
Step 2a .10***    <.001  .16***    <.001 
Constant  12.38 (5.31-20.42) 3.65  .002   12.06 (5.61-18.98) 3.39  .001 
Age  -0.18 (-0.35--0.03) 0.08 -.07 .023   -0.19 (-0.36--0.01) 0.08 -.08 .020 
Gender  -3.55 (-7.57-0.15) 2.13 -.06 .092   -2.38 (-5.98-1.32) 1.94 -.04 .209 
Symptom Occurrence  0.36 (0.23-0.48) 0.06 .31 .001   0.27 (0.15-0.39) 0.06 .26 .001 
Rank  0.45 (0.35-0.54) 0.05 .42 .001   0.51 (0.41-0.60) 0.05 .51 .001 
Step 2b .01*    <.001  .01    <.001 
Constant  28.87 (21.28-36.61) 3.76  .001   27.04 (20.08-34.38) 3.84  .001 
Age  -0.25 (-0.40--0.09) 0.09 -.09 .006   -0.24 (-0.44--0.04) 0.10 -.10 .017 
Gender  -4.43 (-8.82--0.04) 2.29 -.07 .050   -4.82 (-8.59--0.63) 2.03 -.08 .014 
Symptom Occurrence  0.57 (0.44-0.71) 0.07 .49 .001   0.51 (0.37-0.64) 0.07 .50 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.15 (0.01-0.29) 0.07 .12 .038   0.12 (-0.02-0.25) 0.07 .12 .074 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. *p < .05, ***p < .001. 
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Table 3.15. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Ratings of Worry about the Duration of Headaches and Colds from Age, Gender, Symptom Duration, Rank of Symptom 
Duration, and Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Duration of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals 
and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Headaches  Colds 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .21***    <.001  .11***    <.001 
Constant  30.21 (22.95-37.75) 3.59  .001   31.20 (23.16-39.19) 4.15  .001 
Age  -0.38 (-0.53--0.23) 0.08 -.17 .001   -0.41 (-0.57--0.24) 0.09 -.19 .001 
Gender  -3.34 (-7.43-0.60) 2.07 -.06 .110   -3.88 (-8.02-0.06) 2.08 -.08 .069 
Symptom Duration  1.01 (0.71-1.36) 0.15 .42 .001   1.06 (0.65-1.67) 0.25 .26 .001 
Step 2a .28***    <.001  .24***    <.001 
Constant  10.18 (4.20-16.30) 3.28  .002   11.74 (4.61-18.78) 3.52  .001 
Age  -0.22 (-0.36--0.08) 0.07 -.10 .003   -0.22 (-0.36--0.08) 0.07 -.10 .003 
Gender  -2.59 (-5.69-0.53) 1.62 -.05 .122   -1.39 (-5.02-2.09) 1.79 -.03 .429 
Symptom Duration  0.42 (0.17-0.74) 0.13 .17 .002   0.29 (-0.06-0.76) 0.19 .07 .115 
Rank  0.61 (0.52-0.70) 0.05 .59 .001   0.51 (0.43-0.59) 0.04 .54 .001 
Step 2b .00    <.001  .00    <.001 
Constant  30.69 (23.90-37.75) 3.43  .001   31.36 (23.72-37.96) 4.09  .001 
Age  -0.38 (-0.53--0.23) 0.08 -.17 .001   -0.41 (-0.59--0.21) 0.09 -.19 .001 
Gender  -3.58 (-7.38-0.58) 2.00 -.07 .080   -3.92 (-8.30-0.43) 2.12 -.08 .062 
Symptom Duration  0.96 (0.73-1.22) 0.13 .39 .001   1.05 (0.66-1.69) 0.23 .25 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.08 (-0.21-0.33) 0.12 .04 .464   0.03 (-0.34-0.28) 0.14 .01 .772 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < .001. 
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Symptom severity: Symptom occurrence: Table 3.12 shows that the number of days 
participants felt tired or run down and experienced muscle, joint or back pain was the 
strongest predictor of how severe they thought their experience of these symptoms was. 
These models accounted for 45% and 38% of the variance in these judgements for feeling 
tired or run down and muscle, joint or back pain respectively.  Addition of the rank 
variables in the step 2a models increased the amount of explained variance significantly, by 
11% and 16% respectively. For both symptoms, addition of these variables led to an 
attenuation of the effect of symptom occurrence by 45-50%. Where the participants 
believed their symptom occurrence ranked in comparison to others became the strongest 
predictor of muscle/joint/back pain severity judgements, over and above symptom 
occurrence (the rank beta weights were significantly greater than the symptom occurrence 
beta weights). For tired/run down severity judgements, the effect of symptom occurrence 
and rank was similar (no significant difference in beta weights). For tired/run down, when 
distance from the average is added to the original step 1 model in step 2b, the amount of 
variance in symptom severity judgements accounted for by the model increases 
significantly but only by 2%. In contrast, for muscle/joint/back pain this increase is less than 
1% and nonsignificant. How much participants’ symptom occurrence differs from what they 
believe the average symptom occurrence of others to be was a significant predictor of 
tired/run down severity judgements only. The effect of distance from the average (β = .19) 
was much weaker than the effect of symptom occurrence (β = .53) in the step 2b tired/run 
down model. Unsurprisingly, comparison of the predictive ability of the step 2a and 2b 
models showed that the step 2a models accounted for significantly more variance in 
symptom severity judgements than the step 2b models, tired/run down: t(540) = 4.92, p < 
.001, muscle/joint/back pain: t(540) = 6.99, p < .001. 
Symptom duration: Table 3.13 shows exactly the same pattern of results as Table 
3.12. In the step 1 models for both headaches and colds, symptom duration is the strongest 
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predictor of symptom severity judgements. These models accounted for 19% and 11% of 
the variance in these judgements for headaches and colds respectively. Addition of the 
rank variables in the step 2a models increased the amount of explained variance 
significantly, by 27% and 21% respectively. For both symptoms, addition of these variables 
led to an attenuation of the effect of symptom duration by 50% and where the participants 
believed their symptom duration ranked in comparison to others became the strongest 
predictor of symptom severity judgements, again, over and above symptom duration. For 
headaches, when distance from the average is added in step 2b, the amount of variance in 
symptom severity judgements accounted for by the model increases significantly but only 
by 1%, for colds this increase is less than 1% and nonsignificant. How much participants’ 
symptom duration differs from what they believe the average symptom duration of others 
to be was a significant predictor of headache severity judgements only. The effect of 
distance from the average (β = .12) was again significantly weaker than the effect of 
symptom occurrence (β = .34) in the step 2b headache model. Comparison of the predictive 
ability of the step 2a and 2b models showed that the step 2a models accounted for 
significantly more variance in symptom severity judgements than the step 2b models, 
headaches: t(540) = 8.75, p < .001, colds: t(540) = 7.12, p < .001. 
Worry: Symptom occurrence: This pattern of results was much the same for 
judgements regarding how worried participants were about the number of days they felt 
tired or run down and experienced muscle, joint or back pain. Again, the step 1 models in 
Table 3.14 show that symptom occurrence was the strongest predictor of worry ratings 
(the symptom occurrence beta weights were significantly larger than those of the other 
predictors in the models) and these models accounted for 34% and 32% of the variance in 
tired/run down worry ratings and muscle/joint/back pain worry ratings respectively. 
Although the effect of symptom occurrence is attenuated by around 50% when the rank 
variables are entered into the models at step 2a, rank becomes the strongest predictor for 
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muscle/joint/ back pain worry judgements only (the rank beta weight was significantly 
larger than those of the other predictors). The effect of rank and symptom occurrence is 
similar in the tired/run down model (no significant difference in beta weights). The amount 
of explained variance in tired/run down and muscle/joint/ back pain worry ratings 
increases by 10% and 16% respectively (both significant) when the rank variables are added 
at step 2a. In contrast, when the distance from the average variables are added to the step 
1 model at step 2b, the amount of explained variance increases by less than 1% in both 
models (significant for the tired/run down model only). Distance from the average is a 
significant predictor of tired/run down worry ratings only and is a significantly weaker 
predictor (β = .12) compared to symptom occurrence (β = .49). The step 2a models 
accounted for significantly more variance in worry ratings than the step 2b models, 
tired/run down: t(540) = 4.68, p < .001, muscle/joint/ back pain: t(540) = 6.40, p < .001. 
Symptom duration: The step 1 models in Table 3.15 show that symptom duration 
was the strongest predictor of how worried participants were about the number of hours 
they experienced headaches for (the symptom duration beta weight was significantly larger 
than those of the other predictors) and that symptom duration and age predicted how 
worried participants were about the number of days they experienced colds for similarly 
(no significant difference in beta weights). These models accounted for 21% of the variance 
in worry about headache duration judgements and 11% of the variance in worry about cold 
duration judgements. When the rank variables are added in step 2a the effect of symptom 
duration is completely removed from the cold model and is attenuated by around 55% in 
the headache model with rank becoming the strongest predictor of worry about headache 
duration (the rank beta weights were significantly larger than those of the other predictors 
in the models). The amount of explained variance in headache and cold worry ratings 
increases dramatically by 28% and 24% respectively (both significant). In contrast, when 
the distance from the average variables are added at step 2b, the amount of explained 
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variance increases by less than 1% in both models (nonsignificant in both cases) and neither 
variable is a significant predictor of worry ratings. Unsurprisingly, the step 2a models 
accounted for significantly more variance in worry ratings than the step 2b models, 
headaches: t(540) = 9.49, p < .001, colds: t(540) = 7.95, p < .001. 
Summary: Overall, as in Study 1, the results provide evidence that people do 
compare their experience of symptoms to other people’s experiences of these symptoms 
when judging both how severe their own symptoms are and how worried they are about 
these symptoms and that they do this for both mental and physical health symptoms. In all 
of the eight models reported, how participants’ symptoms compared to those of other 
people significantly predicted worry and symptom severity judgements. The findings show 
that people compare not just their symptom occurrence to that of others but also the 
duration of their symptoms and suggest that they do so using rank-based strategies. It was 
the social comparison variable measuring where participants believed their symptom 
occurrence and duration ranked in comparison to other people around their age in the 
general population that significantly predicted worry and symptom severity judgements in 
all eight models. This variable accounted for, on average, 19% of the variance in symptom 
severity judgements and 20% of the variance in worry judgements. Furthermore, in the 
majority of cases, where participants believed their symptom occurrence and duration 
ranked in comparison to others had more bearing on severity and worry judgements than 
their actual symptom occurrence and duration. In contrast, how participants’ symptom 
occurrence and duration compared to what they believed the average symptom 
occurrence and duration to be amongst people their age in the general population was a 
significant predictor in only three out of the eight models and accounted for, on average, 
less than 1% of the variance in worry and symptom severity judgements. The effect of the 
distance from the average comparison variable was never as strong as symptom 
occurrence or duration in the models. 
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Aim 2 
The second aim of the study was to test for direct and indirect associations between 
beliefs about how symptoms compare to others and help-seeking as outlined in Figure 3.1. 
Direct associations will be explored first. Tables 3.16 to 3.23 below show the results from 
regression analyses investigating predictors of: 
1. The number of help-seeking behaviours participants engaged in to manage feeling 
tired/run down (M = 1.30, SD = 1.48), muscle/joint/back pain (M = 1.15, SD = 1.31), 
headaches (M = 1.05, SD = 0.92) and cold symptoms (M = 1.03, SD = 1.10),  
2. Whether participants sought help at all for symptoms (tired/run down: 58.7%; 
muscle/joint/back pain: 62.8%; headaches: 77.3%; colds: 67.0%),  
3. Whether participants had consulted a professional about their symptoms (tired/run 
down: 19.5%; muscle/joint/back pain: 17.3%; headaches: 11.0%; colds: 10.1%), and  
4. Whether participants had taken medication for symptoms (tired/run down: 34.4%; 
muscle/joint/back pain: 47.7%; headaches: 68.7%; colds: 57.8%). 
  
 
1
1
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Table 3.16. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Number of Help-seeking Behaviours for Each Symptom from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, Rank of Symptom 
Occurrence, and Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence 
Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Tired or Run Down  Muscle, Joint or Back Pain 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .09***    <.001  .13***    <.001 
Constant  1.56 (1.10-2.02) 0.24  .001   1.28 (0.92-1.62) 0.18  .001 
Age  -0.02 (-0.03--0.01) 0.01 -.12 .002   -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.00 -.10 .016 
Gender  -0.19 (-0.41-0.02) 0.12 -.06 .112   -0.21 (-0.40--0.02) 0.10 -.08 .046 
Symptom Occurrence  0.02 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .28 .001   0.02 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .38 .001 
Step 2a .04***    <.001  .05***    <.001 
Constant  1.12 (0.68-1.56) 0.23  .001   0.94 (0.58-1.29) 0.18  .001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.01 -.11 .005   -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.00 -.09 .025 
Gender  -0.16 (-0.37-0.04) 0.12 -.05 .171   -0.14 (-0.34-0.05) 0.10 -.05 .169 
Symptom Occurrence  0.01 (0.00-0.01) 0.00 .10 .086   0.01 (0.00-0.01) 0.00 .19 .003 
Rank  0.01 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .27 .001   0.01 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .30 .001 
Step 2b .00    <.001  .00    <.001 
Constant  1.64 (1.19-2.09) 0.24  .001   1.32 (0.94-1.70) 0.19  .001 
Age  -0.02 (-0.03--0.01) 0.01 -.13 .002   -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.00 -.10 .015 
Gender  -0.19 (-0.42-0.02) 0.12 -.06 .115   -0.20 (-0.41-0.00) 0.11 -.08 .060 
Symptom Occurrence  0.01 (0.00-0.02) 0.00 .20 .004   0.02 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .33 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.01 (0.00-0.01) 0.00 .10 .132   0.00 (0.00-0.01) 0.00 .06 .350 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3.17. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Number of Help-seeking Behaviours for Each Symptom from Age, Gender, Symptom Duration, Rank of Symptom 
Duration, and Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Duration of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals 
and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Headaches  Colds 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .05***    <.001  .04***    <.001 
Constant  1.43 (1.15-1.72) 0.15  .001   1.37 (1.04-1.74) 0.19  .001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02--0.01) 0.00 -.14 .001   -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.01 -.14 .006 
Gender  -0.10 (-0.25-0.05) 0.08 -.05 .237   -0.09 (-0.28-0.08) 0.09 -.04 .318 
Symptom Duration  0.01 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .16 .003   0.03 (0.01-0.04) 0.01 .14 .002 
Step 2a .05***    <.001  .06***    <.001 
Constant  1.13 (0.82-1.45) 0.17  .001   0.95 (0.59-1.33) 0.19  .001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.00 -.11 .004   -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.00 -.09 .041 
Gender  -0.08 (-0.24-0.06) 0.08 -.05 .271   -0.04 (-0.21-0.13) 0.09 -.02 .664 
Symptom Duration  0.01 (0.00-0.01) 0.00 .05 .270   0.01 (0.00-0.02) 0.01 .05 .174 
Rank  0.01 (0.01-0.01) 0.00 .25 .001   0.01 (0.01-0.01) 0.00 .27 .001 
Step 2b .00    <.001  .01    <.001 
Constant  1.46 (1.17-1.77) 0.15  .001   1.32 (0.93-1.72) 0.19  .001 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02--0.01) 0.00 -.14 .002   -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.01 -.13 .010 
Gender  -0.11 (-0.25-0.03) 0.07 -.06 .140   -0.08 (-0.25-0.09) 0.09 -.04 .390 
Symptom Duration  0.01 (0.00-0.02) 0.01 .12 .038   0.03 (0.02-0.05) 0.01 .17 .003 
Distance from the Average  0.01 (0.00-0.01) 0.00 .07 .190   -0.01 (-0.03-0.00) 0.01 -.08 .113 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3.18. 
Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants Sought Help for Symptoms from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, Rank of Symptom Occurrence, and 
Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard 
Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Tired or Run Down  Muscle, Joint or Back Pain 
Predictors 
∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
 ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .10***    <.001   .13***    <.001  
Constant   0.47 (-0.18-1.08) 0.33 .150 1.59    0.14 (-0.57-0.80) 0.33 .679 1.14 
Age  -0.24 -0.02 (-0.04--0.01) 0.01 .004 0.98 (0.97-0.99)   0.00 0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .701 1.00 (0.98-1.01 
Gender  0.14 0.28 (-0.16-0.68) 0.19 .134 1.32 (0.92-1.91)   0.02 0.03 (-0.34-0.44) 0.19 .871 1.03 (0.71-1.49) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.54 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.00 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03)   0.87 0.03 (0.02-0.05) 0.01 .001 1.03 (1.02-1.04) 
Step 2a .03***    <.001   .07***    <.001  
Constant   0.04 (-0.65-0.68) 0.34 .885 1.04    -0.36 (-1.09-0.36) 0.35 .278 0.70 
Age  -0.24 -0.02 (-0.04-0.00) 0.01 .011 0.98 (0.97-1.00)   0.00 0.00 (-0.02-0.02) 0.01 .943 1.00 (0.98-1.02) 
Gender  0.13 0.25 (-0.20-0.65) 0.19 .182 1.28 (0.89-1.86)   -0.07 -0.13 (-0.49-0.29) 0.20 .500 0.88 (0.60-1.29) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.27 0.01 (0.00-0.02) 0.01 .041 1.01 (1.00-1.02)   0.29 0.01 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .049 1.01 (1.00-1.02) 
Rank  0.59 0.02 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.02)   0.90 0.03 (0.02-0.04) 0.01 .001 1.03 (1.02-1.03) 
Step 2b .00    <.001   .00    <.001  
Constant   0.52 (-0.12-1.14) 0.32 .086 1.69    0.20 (-0.42-0.86) 0.35 .581 1.22 
Age  -0.24 -0.02 (-0.04--0.01) 0.01 .006 0.98 (0.97-0.99)   0.00 0.00 (-0.02-0.02) 0.01 .671 1.00 (0.98-1.01) 
Gender  0.14 0.28 (-0.08-0.69) 0.19 .140 1.32 (0.92-1.91)   0.01 0.02 (-0.34-0.40) 0.18 .901 1.02 (0.71-1.48) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.54 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.01 .002 1.02 (1.01-1.03)   0.87 0.03 (0.01-0.04) 0.01 .001 1.03 (1.01-1.04) 
Distance from the Average  0.00 0.00 (-0.01-0.02) 0.01 .495 1.00 (0.99-1.02)   0.00 0.00 (-0.01-0.02) 0.01 .469 1.00 (0.99-1.02) 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < 
.001. 
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Table 3.19. 
Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants Sought Help for Symptoms from Age, Gender, Symptom Duration, Rank of Symptom Duration, and Distance 
from the Believed Average Symptom Duration of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors 
Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Headaches  Colds 
Predictors 
∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
 ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .04**    .003   .07***    <.001  
Constant   2.05 (1.22-2.84) 0.41 .001 7.79    0.66 (-0.03-1.38) 0.35 .057 1.94 
Age  -0.24 -0.02 (-0.04-0.00) 0.01 .011 0.98 (0.96-1.00)   -0.24 -0.02 (-0.03-0.00) 0.01 .023 0.98 (0.97-1.00) 
Gender  -0.15 -0.29 (-0.69-0.12) 0.21 .155 0.75 (0.50-1.13)   0.09 0.18 (-0.15-0.57) 0.19 .328 1.20 (0.83-1.75) 
Symptom Duration  0.33 0.03 (-0.01-0.18) 0.04 .206 1.03 (1.00-1.06)   0.68 0.11 (0.06-0.17) 0.03 .001 1.11 (1.06-1.17) 
Step 2a .06***    <.001   .11***    <.001  
Constant   1.42 (0.52-2.26) 0.44 .001 4.12    -0.06 (-0.72-0.62) 0.37 .888 0.94 
Age  -0.24 -0.02 (-0.04-0.00) 0.01 .068 0.98 (0.97-1.00)   -0.12 -0.01 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .322 0.99 (0.98-1.01) 
Gender  -0.17 -0.34 (-0.74-0.09) 0.21 .108 0.71 (0.47-1.08)   -0.01 -0.02 (-0.37-0.37) 0.20 .946 0.99 (0.67-1.46) 
Symptom Duration  0.00 0.00 (-0.03-0.13) 0.03 .949 1.00 (0.97-1.03)   0.31 0.05 (0.00-0.10) 0.02 .049 1.05 (1.00-1.10) 
Rank  0.76 0.03 (0.01-0.04) 0.01 .001 1.03 (1.01-1.04)   0.80 0.03 (0.02-0.04) 0.01 .001 1.03 (1.02-1.04) 
Step 2b .00    .006   .00    <.001  
Constant   2.07 (1.38-2.81) 0.40 .001 7.93    0.61 (-0.10-1.30) 0.38 .109 1.84 
Age  -0.24 -0.02 (-0.04-0.00) 0.01 .016 0.98 (0.96-1.00)   -0.24 -0.02 (-0.03-0.00) 0.01 .036 0.98 (0.97-1.00) 
Gender  -0.14 -0.27 (-0.64-0.11) 0.21 .189 0.76 (0.51-1.15)   0.09 0.17 (-0.26-0.58) 0.19 .369 1.19 (0.81-1.73) 
Symptom Duration  0.22 0.02 (-0.01-0.21) 0.04 .283 1.02 (0.99-1.06)   0.74 0.12 (0.06-0.19) 0.03 .001 1.12 (1.06-1.19) 
Distance from the Average  0.11 0.01 (-0.03-0.06) 0.02 .590 1.01 (0.98-1.03)   -0.17 -0.02 (-0.05-0.01) 0.02 .174 0.98 (0.95-1.02) 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2.  Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. **p < .01, 
***p < .001. 
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Table 3.20. 
Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants Sought Help from a Professional (Doctor, Nurse, Pharmacist or Therapist) for Symptoms from Age, Gender, 
Symptom Occurrence, Rank of Symptom Occurrence, and Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People Around the Same Age in the General 
Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Tired or Run Down  Muscle, Joint or Back Pain 
Predictors 
∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
 ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .09***    <.001   .11***    <.001  
Constant   -2.41 (-3.29--1.55) 0.43 .001 0.09    -1.62 (-2.28--0.97) 0.37 .001 0.20 
Age  0.12 0.01 (-0.02-0.02) 0.01 .623 1.01 (0.99-1.02)   -0.24 -0.02 (-0.05-0.00) 0.01 .032 0.98 (0.96-1.00) 
Gender  0.19 0.37 (-0.09-0.85) 0.23 .099 1.45 (0.92-2.28)   0.24 0.48 (-0.02-0.97) 0.25 .044 1.62 (1.01-2.62) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.54 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.00 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03)   0.58 0.02 (0.02-0.03) 0.00 .001 1.02 (1.02-1.03) 
Step 2a .03***    <.001   .05***    <.001  
Constant   -3.02 (-3.96--2.14) 0.47 .001 0.05    -2.15 (-2.86--1.48) 0.40 .001 0.12 
Age  0.12 0.01 (-0.01-0.03) 0.01 .536 1.01 (0.99-1.03)   -0.24 -0.02 (-0.05-0.00) 0.01 .035 0.98 (0.96-1.00) 
Gender  0.18 0.35 (-0.11-0.83) 0.23 .118 1.42 (0.89-2.25)   0.20 0.40 (-0.12-0.88) 0.25 .096 1.50 (0.92-2.44) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.27 0.01 (0.00-0.02) 0.01 .052 1.01 (1.00-1.02)   0.29 0.01 (0.00-0.02) 0.01 .017 1.01 (1.00-1.02) 
Rank  0.59 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.01 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03)   0.60 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.01 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03) 
Step 2b .00    <.001   .00    <.001  
Constant   -2.34 (-3.22--1.48) 0.47 .001 0.10    -1.67 (-2.44--0.93) 0.37 .001 0.19 
Age  0.12 0.01 (-0.02-0.03) 0.01 .638 1.01 (0.99-1.02)   -0.24 -0.02 (-0.04-0.00) 0.01 .023 0.98 (0.96-1.00) 
Gender  0.19 0.37 (-0.10-0.87) 0.23 .100 1.45 (0.92-2.29)   0.25 0.49 (0.03-0.99) 0.25 .040 1.64 (1.01-2.64) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.54 0.02 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .005 1.02 (1.01-1.03)   0.87 0.03 (0.01-0.04) 0.01 .001 1.03 (1.01-1.04) 
Distance from the Average  0.26 0.01 (-0.01-0.02) 0.01 .453 1.01 (0.99-1.02)   0.00 0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .676 1.00 (0.98-1.01) 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < 
.001. 
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Table 3.21. 
Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants Sought Help from a Professional (Doctor, Nurse, Pharmacist or Therapist) for Symptoms from Age, Gender, 
Symptom Duration, Rank of Symptom Duration, and Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Duration of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% 
BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Headaches  Colds 
Predictors 
∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
 ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .08***    <.001   .05**    <.001  
Constant   -1.12 (-2.15--0.09) 0.49 .020 0.33    -1.60 (-2.69--0.50) 0.57 .003 0.20 
Age  -0.47 -0.04 (-0.07--0.02) 0.01 .001 0.96 (0.93-0.98)   -0.35 -0.03 (-0.07--0.01) 0.02 .041 0.97 (0.94-0.99) 
Gender  0.34 0.68 (0.18-1.26) 0.30 .013 1.97 (1.12-3.47)   0.33 0.66 (0.06-1.28) 0.31 .028 1.93 (1.08-3.45) 
Symptom Duration  0.22 0.02 (-0.01-0.04) 0.01 .065 1.02 (1.00-1.04)   0.18 0.03 (-0.02-0.06) 0.02 .100 1.03 (0.99-1.06) 
Step 2a .02*    <.001   .04**    <.001  
Constant   -1.62 (-2.74--0.51) 0.54 .001 0.20    -2.35 (-3.57--1.21) 0.61 .001 0.10 
Age  -0.47 -0.04 (-0.07--0.02) 0.01 .001 0.96 (0.94-0.99)   -0.35 -0.03 (-0.06-0.00) 0.02 .097 0.98 (0.95-1.00) 
Gender  0.34 0.67 (0.15-1.27) 0.30 .014 1.96 (1.10-3.47)   0.30 0.60 (0.00-1.19) 0.31 .047 1.82 (1.01-3.28) 
Symptom Duration  0.11 0.01 (-0.02-0.03) 0.01 .500 1.01 (0.99-1.03)   0.00 0.00 (-0.06-0.04) 0.03 .887 1.00 (0.96-1.05) 
Rank  0.25 0.01 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .009 1.01 (1.00-1.03)   0.53 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.01 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03) 
Step 2b .00    <.001   .02*    <.001  
Constant   -1.15 (-2.13-0.01) 0.50 .024 0.32    -1.72 (-2.85--0.57) 0.58 .003 0.18 
Age  -0.47 -0.04 (-0.07--0.02) 0.02 .004 0.96 (0.93-0.98)   -0.35 -0.03 (-0.07-0.00) 0.02 .060 0.97 (0.95-1.00) 
Gender  0.30 0.60 (-0.03-1.25) 0.30 .042 1.82 (1.02-3.24)   0.31 0.61 (0.02-1.21) 0.31 .039 1.84 (1.02-3.32) 
Symptom Duration  0.33 0.03 (0.00-0.06) 0.02 .028 1.03 (1.00-1.06)   0.25 0.04 (-0.01-0.08) 0.02 .040 1.04 (1.00-1.08) 
Distance from the Average  -0.23 -0.02 (-0.04-0.02) 0.02 .169 0.98 (0.96-1.01)   -0.17 -0.02 (-0.06-0.00) 0.02 .035 0.98 (0.96-1.00) 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2.  Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. *p < .05, 
**p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Table 3.22. 
Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants Took Medication (Complementary or Conventional) for Symptoms from Age, Gender, Symptom Occurrence, 
Rank of Symptom Occurrence, and Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Occurrence of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap 
Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Tired or Run Down  Muscle, Joint or Back Pain 
Predictors 
∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
 ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .08***    <.001   .12***    <.001  
Constant   -0.89 (-1.56--0.29) 0.01 .010 0.41    -0.90 (-1.60--0.35) 0.32 .004 0.41 
Age  -0.12 -0.01 (-0.02-0.01) 0.19 .473 0.99 (0.98-1.01)   0.24 0.02 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .061 1.02 (1.00-1.03) 
Gender  -0.03 -0.05 (-0.42-0.32) 0.00 .819 0.95 (0.65-1.38)   -0.16 -0.31 (-0.66-0.06) 0.18 .086 0.73 (0.51-1.05) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.54 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.34 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03)   0.58 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.00 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03) 
Step 2a .03***    <.001   03**    <.001  
Constant   -1.50 (-2.22--0.85) 0.01 .001 0.22    -1.19 (-1.94--0.57) 0.33 .002 0.31 
Age  0.00 0.00(-0.02-0.01) 0.20 .632 1.00 (0.98-1.01)   0.24 0.02 (0.00-0.04) 0.01 .042 1.02 (1.00-1.03) 
Gender  -0.05 -0.09 (-0.48-0.30) 0.01 .669 0.91 (0.62-1.34)   -0.20 -0.39 (-0.74-0.01) 0.18 .035 0.67 (0.47-0.97) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.27 0.01 (0.00-0.01) 0.00 .277 1.01 (1.00-1.01)   0.29 0.01 (0.00-0.02) 0.01 .019 1.01 (1.00-1.02) 
Rank  0.59 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.37 .001 1.02 (1.01-1.03)   0.30 0.01 (0.01-0.02) 0.00 .001 1.01 (1.01-1.02) 
Step 2b .00    <.001   .01    <.001  
Constant   -0.76 (-1.49--0.09) 0.01 .030 0.47    -0.78 (-1.44--0.17) 0.33 .014 0.46 
Age  -0.12 -0.01 (-0.02-0.01) 0.20 .429 0.99 (0.98-1.01)   0.24 0.02 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .056 1.02 (1.00-1.03) 
Gender  -0.03 -0.05 (-0.44-0.34) 0.01 .796 0.95 (0.65-1.39)   -0.17 -0.33 (-0.71-0.02) 0.18 .066 0.72 (0.50-1.03) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.27 0.01 (0.00-0.02) 0.01 .054 1.01 (1.00-1.02)   0.29 0.01 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .013 1.01 (1.00-1.02) 
Distance from the Average  0.26 0.01 (0.00-0.03) 0.35 .078 1.01 (1.00-1.02)   0.28 0.01 (0.00-0.02) 0.01 .164 1.01 (1.00-1.02) 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2.  Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. **p < .01, 
***p < .001. 
   
  
  
 
1
1
9
 
Table 3.23. 
Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants Took Medication (Complementary or Conventional) for Symptoms from Age, Gender, Symptom Duration, Rank 
of Symptom Duration, and Distance from the Believed Average Symptom Duration of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap 
Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Headaches  Colds 
Predictors 
∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
 ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .04**    .003   .02    .071  
Constant   0.81 (0.18-1.49) 0.33 .017 2.24    0.28 (-0.31-0.86) 0.33 .384 1.32 
Age  0.12 0.01 (-0.01-0.02) 0.01 .408 1.01 (0.99-1.02)   0.00 0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .743 1.00 (0.98-1.010 
Gender  -0.31 -0.61 (-0.99--0.24) 0.19 .002 0.54 (0.38-0.79)   -0.09 -0.18 (-0.56-0.19) 0.18 .340 0.84 (0.59-1.18) 
Symptom Duration  0.11 0.01 (-0.01-0.07) 0.02 .379 1.01 (0.99-1.03)   0.25 0.04 (0.00-0.10) 0.02 .062 1.04 (1.00-1.07) 
Step 2a .01**    <.001   .08***    <.001  
Constant   0.45 (-0.28-1.19) 0.36 .204 1.57    -0.42 (-1.09-0.23) 0.34 .218 0.66 
Age  0.12 0.01 (-0.01-0.03) 0.01 .237 1.01 (0.99-1.03)   0.12 0.01 (-0.01-0.02) 0.01 .464 1.01 (0.99-1.02) 
Gender  -0.32 -0.63 (-1.03--0.25) 0.19 .001 0.53 (0.37-0.77)   -0.16 -0.31 (-0.68-0.05) 0.19 .097 0.73 (0.51-1.05) 
Symptom Duration  0.00 0.00 (-0.02-0.05) 0.02 .946 1.00 (0.98-1.02)   0.00 0.00 (-0.03-0.05) 0.02 .896 1.00 (0.97-1.04) 
Rank  0.25 0.01 (0.00-0.02) 0.01 .013 1.01 (1.00-1.02)   0.53 0.02 (0.01-0.03) 0.00 .001 1.02 (1.02-1.03) 
Step 2b .02**    <.001   .01    .034  
Constant   0.87 (0.23-1.60) 0.34 .009 2.38    0.36 (-0.31-0.99) 0.34 .290 1.43 
Age  0.12 0.01 (-0.01-0.02) 0.01 .451 1.01 (0.99-1.02)   0.00 0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .694 1.00 (0.98-1.01) 
Gender  -0.27 -0.53 (-0.90--0.17) 0.20 .006 0.59 (0.40-0.86)   -0.08 -0.15 (-0.51-0.19) 0.18 .400 0.86 (0.61-1.22) 
Symptom Duration  0.00 0.00 (-0.03-0.05) 0.02 .770 1.00 (0.97-1.02)   0.18 0.03 (-0.01-0.09) 0.02 .189 1.03 (0.99-1.07) 
Distance from the Average  0.34 0.03 (0.01-0.08) 0.02 .018 1.03 (1.01-1.06)   0.17 0.02 (-0.01-0.10) 0.02 .139 1.02 (1.00-1.05) 
Note. N = 543, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. **p < .01, 
***p < .001. 
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Total number of help-seeking behaviours: Symptom occurrence: Table 3.16 shows a 
pattern of results very similar to those reported thus far. The step 1 models account for 9% 
and 13% of the variance in the total number of help-seeking behaviours participants 
engaged with in order to manage feeling tired/run down and muscle/joint/back pain 
respectively. Symptom occurrence was the strongest predictor in both models (the 
symptom occurrence beta weights were significantly larger than those of the other 
predictors in the models). The rank variables account for an additional 4% (tired/run down 
model) and 5% (muscle/joint/back pain model) of explained variance (both significant 
increases). When they are added in step 2a, the effect of symptom occurrence is removed 
in the tired/run down model and attenuated by around 50% in the muscle/joint/back pain 
model. Rank was the strongest predictor of the total number of help-seeking behaviours 
for feeling tired/run down (the rank beta weight was significantly larger than those of the 
other predictors) but the effect of symptom occurrence (β = .19) and rank (β = .30) on the 
total number of help-seeking behaviours for muscle/joint/back/pain was not significantly 
different. When the distance from the average variables are added to the step 1 model in 
step 2b there is no significant increase in the amount of variance accounted for by either 
model and these variables are not significant predictors of the total number of help-seeking 
behaviours. Unsurprisingly, the step 2a models including rank accounted for significantly 
more variance in the number of help-seeking behaviours than the step 2b models including 
distance from the average, tired/run down: t(540) = 2.28, p = .012, muscle/joint/back pain: 
t(540) = 2.97, p = .002. 
Symptom duration: Table 3.17 shows a similar pattern of results for symptom 
duration as for symptom occurrence in Table 3.16 apart from the effect of symptom 
duration, which was completely removed for both models when the rank variables were 
added in step 2a. The step 1 models account for 5% and 4% of the variance (both 
significant) in the total number of help-seeking behaviours participants engaged with in 
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order to manage their headaches and colds respectively, with age and symptom duration 
being equally strong significant predictors. The rank variables account for an additional 5% 
(headache model) and 6% (cold model) of explained variance (both significant increases) 
when they are added in step 2a and become the strongest predictors of the total number 
of help-seeking behaviours (the rank beta weights were significantly larger than those of 
the other predictors in the models). Addition of the distance from the average variables in 
step 2b again results in no significant change in explained variance.  Again, the step 2a 
models including rank accounted for significantly more variance in the number of help-
seeking behaviours than the step 2b models which included distance from the average, 
headaches: t(540) = 2.88, p = .002, colds: t(540) = 2.78, p = .003. 
Binary logistic regression was used to investigate whether, and (if so) how, people 
compare to others when making judgements about whether or not to seek any kind of help 
for their symptoms, whether or not to consult a professional (doctor, nurse, pharmacist or 
therapist) for their symptoms or whether or not to take medication (over-the-counter, 
prescription or complementary) for their symptoms. Again, the results were largely 
consistent with previous findings.  
Whether sought help at all: Symptom occurrence: The step 1 models in Table 3.18 
show that symptom occurrence was the most important predictor of whether participants 
sought help for feeling tired/run down and muscle/joint/back pain and these models 
account for 10% and 13% of the variance in these behaviours respectively. The effect of 
symptom occurrence remains when rank is added in both the step 2a models but rank 
becomes the most important predictor of help-seeking. The addition of the rank variables 
to the tired/run down and muscle/joint/back models resulted in a 3% and 7% increase in 
explained variance respectively (both significant). The step 2b models show that the 
addition of the distance from the average variables has no effect – these variables are not 
significant predictors of whether help was sought and add very little additional explained 
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variance; less than 1% in both models (both nonsignificant increases). Unsurprisingly, 
model comparison showed that, for both symptoms, there was very strong evidence that 
the step 2a models fitted the data much better than the step 2b models (differences in -2LL 
between the step 2a and step 2b models: tired/run down models = -11.86, 
muscle/joint/back pain models = -32.53).  
Symptom duration: Table 3.19 shows that symptom duration was not a significant 
predictor of whether participants sought help for headaches in any of the models. Age was 
the sole significant predictor of headache help-seeking in step 1 (this model accounted for 
4% of the variance in help-seeking behaviour) but its effect was removed when rank was 
added to the model in step 2a (resulting in a significant 6% increase in explained variance). 
Age continues to be the only significant predictor when distance from the average is added 
in step 2b (resulting in no significant increase in explained variance). Both age and 
symptom duration significantly predicted whether participants sought help for colds with 
symptom duration being the most important predictor (this model accounted for 7% of the 
variance in help-seeking behaviour). When rank is added in step 2a, the effect of age is 
removed and although the effect of symptom duration remains, rank becomes the most 
important predictor of whether participants sought help and accounts for additional 11% of 
variance (significant increase). Again, distance from the average has no effect when it is 
added in step 2b. Model comparison again showed that, for both symptoms, there was 
very strong evidence that the step 2a models fitted the data much better than the step 2b 
models (differences in -2LL between the step 2a and step 2b models: headache models = -
22.66, cold models = -47.59).  
Whether sought help from a professional: Symptom occurrence: Table 3.20 shows 
symptom occurrence to be the sole significant predictor of whether participants sought 
help from a professional for feeling tired/run down in step 1. This effect is removed when 
rank is added to the model in step 2a (rank becomes the only significant predictor in the 
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model) but symptom occurrence remains the sole significant predictor when distance from 
the average is added in step 2b. Age, gender and symptom occurrence are all significant 
predictors of whether participants sought help from a professional for muscle/joint/back 
pain in the step 1 model. Symptom occurrence is the most important predictor with the 
effect of age and gender being around the same. When rank is added in step 2a, the effect 
of gender is removed and rank becomes the most important predictor of whether 
participants sought help from a professional for muscle/joint/back pain. When distance 
from the average is added in step 2b, it has no effect and the importance and significance 
of predictors remains the same as in the step 1 model. The step 1 models account for 9% 
and 11% of the variance in professional help-seeking behaviour for feeling tired/run down 
and muscle/joint/back pain respectively. Addition of the rank variables resulted in a 3% and 
5% increase in explained variance respectively (both significant) whereas the addition of 
the distance from the average variables resulted in less than a 1% increase (both 
nonsignificant). Again, there was very strong evidence that the step 2a models fitted the 
data much better than the step 2b models (differences in -2LL between the step 2a and 
step 2b models: tired/run down models = -12.18, anxiety models = -17.64).  
Symptom duration: the step 1 headache model in Table 3.21 shows that age and 
gender were significant predictors of whether participants sought help from a professional 
for headaches. Age was the most important predictor and the model accounted for 8% of 
the variance in this behaviour. When rank is added in step 2a, an additional 2% of variance 
is accounted for by the model (a significant increase). Rank is a significant predictor of 
seeking help from a professional but age remains the most important predictor. There is no 
significant increase in explained variance when the distance from the average variable is 
added in step 2b although the effect of symptom duration becomes significant but again 
age remains the most important predictor. For colds, age and gender are again significant 
predictors (with similar effects) of whether participants sought help from a professional for 
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cold symptoms in step 1. This model accounted for 5% of the variance in this behaviour. 
The variance accounted for by the model increases by 4% (significant) when rank is added 
in step 2a, rank becomes a significant predictor and the most important predictor in the 
model whilst the effect of age is removed. When distance from the average is added in step 
2b the variance accounted for by the model increases by 2% (significant) and both distance 
from the average and symptom duration become significant predictors in the model. The 
effect of age is removed and gender becomes the most important predictor. This time 
there was just positive evidence that the step 2a models fitted the data better than the 
step 2b models (differences in -2LL between the step 2a and step 2b models: headache 
models = -4.42, cold models = -6.76).  
Whether took medication: Symptom occurrence: The step 1 models presented in 
Table 3.22 show symptom occurrence to be the sole predictor of whether participants took 
medication for feeling tired/run down or muscle/joint/back pain. These models account for 
8% and 12% of the variance in these behaviours respectively. The addition of the rank 
variables to the models resulted in a 3% increase (significant) in explained variance in both 
models. Rank becomes the sole predictor of whether participants took medication for 
feeling tired/run down, removing the effect of symptom occurrence. In the 
muscle/joint/back pain step 2a model, all predictors are significant and have similar effects. 
Addition of the distance from the average variables in the step 2b models does not increase 
the amount of explained variance significantly. Symptom occurrence remains the sole 
predictor of whether participants took medication for muscle/joint/back pain but its effect 
is removed in the tired/run down model. There was very strong evidence that the step 2a 
tired/run down model fitted the data better than the step 2b model (difference in -2LL = -
16.95). There was strong evidence that the step 2a muscle/joint/back pain model fitted the 
data better than the step 2b model (difference in -2LL = -9.53). 
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Symptom duration: Table 3.23 shows that symptom duration was not a significant 
predictor of whether participants took medication for headaches or colds in any of the 
models. Gender was the sole significant predictor of whether participants took medication 
for headaches in the step 1 model, which accounted for 4% of the variance in this 
behaviour. When rank is added in step 2a an additional 1% of variance is accounted for 
(significant) and rank is a significant predictor of whether participants took medication for 
headaches but gender remains the most important predictor in the model. When distance 
from the average is added in step 2b an additional 2% of variance is accounted for 
(significant) and distance from the average becomes the most important predictor in the 
model although the effect of gender remains. For colds, the step 1 model does not predict 
whether participants took medication any better than the baseline model (i.e., the model is 
not significant). However, when rank is added in step 2a the model becomes significant and 
rank becomes the sole predictor of whether participants took medication for colds, 
accounting for 8% of the variance (significant) in this behaviour. The addition of distance 
from the average to the model has no effect. As these results suggest, this time there is no 
difference in the fit of the step 2a and 2b headache models (difference in -2LL = 0.98), 
although there is very strong evidence that the step 2a cold model fitted the data better 
than the step 2b model (difference in -2LL = -31.89). 
 Summary: Overall, as in Study 1, the results provide strong evidence that people 
compare their experience of physical symptoms to other people’s experiences of these 
symptoms when making decisions about whether to seek help for the symptoms and 
whether to consult a professional or take medication specifically. In all of the 16 models 
reported above, participants’ beliefs about how their symptoms compared to those of 
other people significantly predicted these help-seeking outcomes and the number of help-
seeking actions that participants took to manage their symptoms. Again, the findings show 
that, when making help-seeking decisions, people compare not just their symptom 
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occurrence to that of others but also the duration of their symptoms and suggest that they 
do so using rank-based strategies. Again, the social comparison variable measuring where 
participants believed their symptom occurrence and duration ranked in comparison to 
other people around their age in the general population significantly predicted all four of 
the help-seeking outcomes across all symptoms, and, in the majority of cases, was the most 
important predictor. This variable accounted for, on average, 5% of the variance in the total 
number of help-seeking behaviours engaged with, 7% of the variance in decisions about 
seeking help and 4% of the variance in decisions regarding whether to seek help from a 
professional and whether to take medication. In contrast, how participants’ symptom 
occurrence and duration compared to what they believed the average symptom 
occurrence and duration to be amongst people their age in the general population was a 
significant predictor in only 2 out of the 16 models and accounted for, on average, less than 
1% of the variance in all help-seeking outcomes.  
 Indirect associations: As in Study 1, the results so far have shown direct associations 
between how participants’ believe the frequency with which they experience feeling tired 
or run down and muscle, joint or back pain and the length of time they experience 
headaches and colds for compares to other people’s experiences of these symptoms and 
how worried they are about their experience of these symptoms, how severe they think 
their symptoms are and whether they sought help for the symptoms. As in Study 1, the 
next section tests whether social comparison also affects help-seeking indirectly through 
worry about symptoms and judgements of symptom severity using mediation analysis. 
Again, the rank comparison variable is used in this analysis as the strongest direct effects 
seen were obtained using this variable. Age, gender and symptom occurrence are included 
as covariates in the model. Indirect effects were examined for each aspect separately due 
to sample size limitations. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 below show that, for all symptoms, there 
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were significant indirect effects of social comparison on help-seeking through judgements 
of symptom severity and worry about symptom occurrence/duration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Models of rank of symptom occurrence as a predictor of help-seeking, mediated 
by how severe participants thought their symptoms were and how worried they were 
about how often they experienced symptoms for feeling tired or run down (top two) and 
muscle, joint or back pain (bottom two). Figures represent unstandardised regression 
coefficients with associated 95% confidence intervals (BCa bootstrapped based on 1000 
samples) in parentheses. *p < .05, ***p < .001, ns = not significant. 
How frequency of 
feeling tired/run 
down compares to 
others (rank) 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
feeling tired/run 
down Direct effect: 0.001 ns [-0.009, 0.011] 
Indirect effect: 0.015*** [0.010, 0.021] 
Tired/run down 
severity 
How frequency of 
feeling tired/run 
down compares to 
others (rank) 
 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
feeling tired/run 
down 
on 
Direct effect: 0.001 ns [-0.009, 0.010] 
Indirect effect: 0.016*** [0.011, 0.022] 
Worry about 
frequency of feeling 
tired/run down 
0.420*** [0.348, 0.492] 
0.426*** [0.357, 0.536] 
0.036*** [0.025, 0.046] 
0.036*** [0.026, 0.045] 
How muscle/joint/ 
back pain occurrence 
compares to others 
(rank) 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
muscle/joint/back 
pain Direct effect: 0.003 ns [-0.008, 0.014] 
Indirect effect: 0.027*** [0.019, 0.037] 
Muscle/joint/back 
pain severity 
How muscle/joint/ 
back pain occurrence 
compares to others 
(rank) 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
muscle/joint/back 
pain Direct effect: 0.013* [0.003, 0.023] 
Indirect effect: 0.013*** [0.007, 0.019] 
Worry about 
frequency of 
muscle/joint/back 
pain 
0.483*** [0.4141, 0.551] 
0.506*** [0.428, 0.523] 
0.056*** [0.042, 0.069] 
0.026*** [0.015, 0.037] 
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Figure 3.8. Models of rank of symptom duration as a predictor of help-seeking, mediated by 
how severe participants thought their symptoms were and how worried they were about 
the length of time that they experienced symptoms for, for headaches (top two) and colds 
(bottom two). Figures represent unstandardised regression coefficients with associated 
95% confidence intervals (BCa bootstrapped based on 1000 samples) in parentheses. ** p < 
.01, ***p < .001, ns = not significant. 
 
How duration of 
headaches compares 
to others (rank) 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
headaches 
Direct effect: -0.007 ns [-0.020, 0.007] 
Indirect effect: 0.029*** [0.018, 0.041] 
How duration of 
headaches compares 
to others (rank) 
Whether participant 
sought help for 
headaches 
Direct effect: 0.008 ns [-0.005, 0.020] 
Indirect effect: 0.013** [0.006, 0.025] 
Worry about 
headache duration 
0.598*** [0.527, 0.667] 
0.592*** [0.524, 0.661] 
0.048*** [0.033, 0.064] 
0.022** [0.007, 0.038] 
How duration of 
colds compares to 
others (rank) 
Whether participant 
sought help for colds 
Direct effect: 0.014** [0.004, 0.025] 
Indirect effect: 0.014*** [0.008, 0.021] 
Cold severity 
How duration of 
colds compares to 
others (rank) 
Whether participant 
sought help for colds 
Direct effect: 0.019*** [0.009, 0.029] 
Indirect effect: 0.011** [0.004, 0.019] 
Worry about cold 
duration 
0.501*** [0.434, 0.569] 
0.522*** [0.454, 0.590] 
0.028*** [0.017, 0.039] 
0.021** [0.008, 0.037] 
Headache severity 
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Aim 3 
The third aim of the study was to investigate how people compare to others when 
making health-related judgements and decisions about help-seeking, namely whether they 
use rank or average-based comparisons as consistent with DbS and ALT respectively. As in 
Study 1, the results reported above provide strong evidence that when people compare to 
others to make such judgements and decisions they use their ranked position within the 
comparison sample (people in the general population about their age) to do so rather than 
how much they differ from the average of the sample. Across all four symptoms, 
participants’ beliefs about where their experience of symptoms (i.e., their occurrence and 
duration) ranked in comparison to other people’s experience of the same symptoms 
predicted all six outcome measures (judgements of symptom severity, worry about 
symptoms, and decisions regarding whether to seek help, how much help to seek, and 
whether to consult a professional or take medication). In the majority of cases, the rank 
comparison variable was the most important predictor in the model, often attenuating or 
removing the effect of participants’ absolute experience of the symptom (i.e., their actual 
symptom occurrence or duration that they experienced the symptom). In contrast, how 
participants’ experiences of the symptoms compared to what they believed the average 
experience of others to be was a significant predictor in only 5 out of the 24 models and 
the effect of the distance from the average variable was only greater than the effect of the 
absolute symptom experience in one of those models.   
 Comparison of the step 2a (including the rank variables) and 2b (including the 
distance from the average variables) models across all outcomes and symptoms showed 
that the step 2a models accounted for significantly more variance in the outcome than the 
step 2b models (continuous outcomes) or that there was good to very strong evidence that 
the step 2a models fitted the data better than the step 2b models (ordinal and binary 
outcomes) for all but one of the 24 models where there was no difference in the fit of the 
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step 2a compared to the step 2b model. The rank comparison variable accounted for, on 
average, across all outcomes and symptoms, 10% of the variance in the judgements and 
decisions measured (range: 1-28%) whereas the distance from the average comparison 
variable accounted for only 0.5% of the variance, on average (range: 0-2%). Table 3.24 
below shows a detailed breakdown of the effects of the two comparison variables across all 
symptoms and outcomes and both studies. 
Table 3.24. 
The Amount of Variance (percentage) accounted for by the Rank and Distance from the Average 
Variables Across all Analyses and the Associated Size of These Effects. 
  Symptom 
Outcome Variable Depression Anxiety 
Tired or 
Run 
Down 
Muscle, 
Joint or 
Back 
Pain 
Headache Cold 
Thinks Has 
Disorder 
Rank 9a 6a - - - - 
DftA 0a 1a - - - - 
Symptom 
Severity 
Rank 13a 14b 11a 16b 27c 21b 
DftA 0 0a 2a 0 1a 0 
Worry 
Rank 11a 9a 10a 16b 28c 24b 
DftA 0a 0 1a 1 0 0 
No. of Help-
seeking 
Behaviours 
Rank 5a 5a 4a 5a 5a 6a 
DftA 1a 1a 0 0 0 1 
Whether Sought 
Help 
Rank 4a 5a 3a 7a 6a 11a 
DftA 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Professional 
Consulted 
Rank 6a 4a 3a 5a 2a 4a 
DftA 0 0 0 0 0 2a 
Medication 
Taken 
Rank 5a 3a 3a 3a 1a 8a 
DftA 3a 1 0 1 2a 1 
Note. N = 643 for depression and anxiety, N = 543 for all other symptoms. DftA = distance from the 
average. Letters represent effect sizes calculated by transforming the R2 values into f2 values; a = 
small effect, b = medium effect, c = large effect. Where no letter is denoted, this indicates a 
nonsignficant effect. 
 
 
Aim 4 
The fourth and final aim of the study was to explore differences that participants may 
have in their beliefs about others. The results so far have shown that people compare to 
others when making judgements about their health and decisions about health help-
seeking. It is hypothesised that people may make inaccurate judgements and decisions 
when using social comparison to do so if their beliefs about others are inaccurate. 
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Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine whether participants made accurate help-
seeking decisions for the symptoms that were measured in the same way that this was 
investigated in Study 1. In Study 1 the symptoms measured (feeling depressed and anxious) 
were core symptoms of mental health disorders (depression and anxiety) and it was 
possible, using standardised measures, to ascertain whether participants met the clinical 
threshold on the measures for these disorders and therefore whether their help-seeking 
was appropriate or not. In Study 2 this was not the case; the symptoms chosen were simply 
commonly experienced symptoms which may have been experienced in isolation or with 
other symptoms and so it is difficult to ascertain whether help-seeking was appropriate or 
not. Therefore, this section will investigate differences in beliefs about others that 
participants may have which could potentially affect the accuracy of their help-seeking. As 
in Study 1, these differences can be explored using data from the questions asking about 
the average occurrence/duration of the symptoms in the general population and where 
participants believe their experience of the symptoms ranks in comparison to others. As 
participants were asked to think about people about their age when answering this 
question (because previous research has shown age-related differences in the frequency 
with which people experience the symptoms, e.g., older people are more likely to 
experience joint pain), differences are explored in participants aged 30-40 as this age 
bracket had the highest number of participants (n = 185). Figure 3.9 below shows the 
distribution of answers to the questions asking what participants thought the average 
occurrence of feeling tired or run down and muscle, joint or back pain (days in the last 3 
months) was in people about their age and what they thought the average duration of 
headaches (in hours) and colds (in days) was. 
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Figure 3.9. Distributions of participants’ (aged 30-40) answers to questions asking them 
what they thought the average number of days in the last three months people about their 
age in the general population felt tired or run down (top left) and experienced muscle, joint 
or back pain (top right) and the what they thought the average duration of headaches 
(bottom left) and colds (bottom right) people about their age in the general population 
was. 
 
 As in Study 1, considerable variation in participants’ beliefs about the average 
occurrence and duration of symptoms existed; tired/run down occurrence: M = 20.50, SD = 
17.83, range = 0-80 days; muscle/joint/back pain occurrence: M = 16.14, SD = 16.87, range 
= 0-90 days; headache duration: M = 4.92, SD = 6.66, range = 0.5-48 hours; cold duration: 
M = 5.57, SD = 4.55, range = 1-35 days. Given such variation, it is likely that many 
participants will hold incorrect beliefs about the frequency and duration with which other 
people experience symptoms. The average number of days in the last 3 months that 
participants aged 30-40 felt tired or run down and experienced muscle, joint or back pain 
was 25.25 and 17.17 respectively. The average amount of time that participants aged 30-40 
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experienced a headache for was 7.92 hours and a cold for was 1.52 days. If these figures 
are representative of the general population it would indicate that many of the participants 
have incorrect beliefs about the occurrence and duration of the symptoms measured in 
people about their age in the U.K.  
It is likely that a person holding incorrect beliefs about the distribution of aspects of 
symptoms such as their occurrence and duration in their comparison sample will make 
inaccurate judgements about how their symptoms compare to others. Evidence of 
inaccurate beliefs about where symptoms rank in comparison to others can be seen when 
looking at the distributions of believed rank amongst participants who experience 
symptoms for the same frequency/duration. Figure 3.10 below gives examples of some of 
these distributions (which again show variation indicating inaccuracy in some participants) 
for the frequencies/durations with which the symptoms were most commonly experienced 
by participants aged 30-40; tired/run down: 20 days (n = 22); muscle/joint/back pain: 5 
days (n = 24); headaches: 1 hour (n = 45) and colds: 7 days (n = 32).  
As in Study 1, an idea of the number of participants misjudging their rank can be 
obtained through estimating what the actual rank of participants’ symptom 
occurrence/duration is and seeing how close this is to the participants’ estimates of their 
rank. This is again done using the distribution of symptom occurrence and duration in 
participants aged 30-40 and assuming that this is representative of all 30-40 year olds in 
the population. Thirty eight percent of participants felt tired or run down on more than 20 
days and fifty percent felt tired or run down on less than 20 days. Therefore, participants 
estimating their rank to be between 50 and 62 (100 minus 38) would be correct. Only 4 out 
of 22 participants (18%) estimated their rank to be within this bracket. The percentage of 
participants correctly estimating their rank of muscle/joint/back pain symptom occurrence 
was 8% (2 out of 24), headache duration was 40% (18 out of 45) and cold duration was 6% 
(2 out of 32).  Although this is quite a crude way of investigating the accuracy of 
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participants’ beliefs about how they rank in comparison to others it does highlight the fact 
that inaccuracy is common and could affect the accuracy of judgements about symptoms 
and decisions regarding help-seeking when social comparison is being used to make these 
judgements and decisions. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Variation in participants’ (aged 30-40) believed rank of symptom 
occurrence/duration amongst participants who had the same experience of symptoms. 
 
Discussion 
 The two studies reported above aimed to replicate the findings from Melrose et al. 
(2013) whereby participants’ judgements of whether they thought they had depression or 
anxiety were predicted by their beliefs about where their depression/anxiety symptom 
occurrence ranked in comparison to others, over and above their actual symptom 
occurrence. The current studies also aimed to extend these findings in the following ways: 
1. By investigating whether participant’s beliefs about how their symptoms compare to 
others are also associated with decisions regarding help-seeking for symptoms both 
 135 
 
directly and indirectly through other aspects of symptom appraisal known to affect 
help-seeking decisions (namely judgements of the presence of an underlying disorder, 
symptom severity and worry about symptoms), 
2. By exploring the above in somatic as well as psychological symptoms and using more 
than one aspect of symptom experience; occurrence and duration, 
3. By further investigating how people compare to others, i.e., whether they use rank or 
average-based strategies, and 
4. By investigating whether comparison of symptoms can lead to inaccurate judgements 
and decisions. 
 An overview of the findings relating to these aims will be given first followed by 
explanations of the implications of the results, suggestions for future research and 
limitations of the studies. 
Findings 
 Replication: The finding of Melrose et al. (2013) that participant’s beliefs about how 
their experience of depression and anxiety symptoms compared to that of others 
(specifically, where they believed their symptom occurrence ranked in comparison to 
others) predicted whether they thought they had depression or anxiety was replicated in 
Study 1 using a much larger sample (N = 643 compared to N = 133 and 135) and two 
different methods of eliciting how participants thought their experience of symptoms 
compared to that of others. The rank comparison variables accounted for 9% and 6% of the 
variance in judgements of whether participants thought they had depression and anxiety 
respectively. For depression, the rank variable was the strongest predictor of this 
judgement, over and above symptom occurrence, as in the original study. For anxiety, the 
effect of the rank and symptom occurrence variables was comparable. 
 Help-seeking: Help-seeking decisions such as whether participants sought any kind 
of help at all, the number of help-seeking behaviours engaged with, and whether 
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professionals were consulted or medication taken for symptoms, were all significantly 
predicted by where participants believed their experience of symptoms ranked in 
comparison to other people’s experiences of the same symptoms. This was the case across 
both studies and all six symptoms measured: feeling down, depressed or hopeless; feeling 
nervous, anxious or on edge; feeling tired or run down; muscle, joint or back pain; 
headaches and colds. The average amount of variance in these help-seeking decisions that 
the rank comparison variables accounted for, across all symptoms, was 5.1% (range: 1-
11%).  
 Likewise, across both studies and all symptoms, judgements of symptom severity and 
worry about symptoms were all significantly predicted by where participants thought their 
symptoms ranked in comparison to others. Rank variables accounted for, on average, 
across symptoms, 17.0% (range: 11-27%) and 16.3% (range: 9-28%) of the variance in 
symptom severity and worry judgements respectively. Given these significant associations 
and that these judgements have been shown to affect health help-seeking directly (e.g., 
Elliott et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2003), indirect effects between comparison of symptoms 
and help-seeking were also investigated. These showed that the associations between how 
participants believed their experience of symptoms ranked in comparison to that of others 
and whether or not they sought help for symptoms were fully mediated by judgements of 
symptom severity and worry about symptoms for all symptoms apart from colds, where 
the associations were partially mediated. In addition, further mediation analyses were 
undertaken in Study 1 that showed that, for depression, this association between rank of 
symptom occurrence and help-seeking was also fully mediated by participants’ beliefs 
about whether they had depression and, for anxiety, was partially mediated by 
participants’ beliefs about whether they had anxiety. 
 Symptom type and aspect: Comparison effects were seen consistently across both 
mental and physical health symptoms. The results suggest that people may compare the 
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frequency and/or the duration with which they experience symptoms to that of others 
when making judgements and decisions about their health. 
 Mechanisms underlying social comparison: Thus far, when summarising the 
comparison effects seen across the studies I have done so referring to the rank comparison 
variables only. This is because the results provided considerable evidence that when 
participants compared to others to make judgements and decisions about their symptoms 
they did so using rank-based strategies and not by comparing to the average of the 
comparison sample. The rank comparison variables were significant predictors of all of the 
outcomes measured across all six symptoms - a total of 38 models. The average amount of 
variance accounted for by these variables was 9.1% (range: 1-28%). In contrast, the 
distance from the average variables were only significant predictors in 12 out of the 38 
models (32%) and accounted for, on average, only 1.2% (range: 0-1%) of explained variance 
in these 12 models. In 37 out of the 38 full models, the step 2a models (including the rank 
variables) either accounted for significantly more variance in the outcomes or there was 
very good evidence that the model fitted the data better than the step 2b models 
(including the distance from the average variables). Furthermore, in 31 out of the 38 step 
2b models, rank was the strongest predictor of the outcomes, over and above participant’s 
absolute experience of the symptom.  
 Accuracy of judgements and decisions: There was considerable variation in 
participants’ beliefs about the average number of days in the last month (Study 1) or three 
months (Study 2) that people in the general population experience feeling depressed, 
anxious, tired or run down and muscle joint or back pain and the average length of time 
they experience headaches and colds for. This variation indicates that many participants 
had incorrect beliefs about the frequency and duration with which people experience these 
symptoms. Unsurprisingly given these findings, there was also considerable variation in 
participants’ beliefs about where their symptom occurrence and duration ranked in 
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comparison to others among participants who experienced the same symptom occurrence 
or duration. This indicates that many participants misestimated their rank. This could affect 
the accuracy of health-related judgements and decisions if participants base these 
judgements and decisions on their beliefs about how their symptoms compare to those of 
others. Indeed, when help-seeking accuracy could be examined in Study 1, the findings 
showed that participants unlikely to have depression or anxiety were around four times 
more likely to seek help if they thought they experienced depression/anxiety symptoms 
more frequently than others. Participants likely to have clinical levels of depression or 
anxiety were two to three times more likely to not seek help if they thought they 
experienced symptoms less frequently than others. 
Implications and Areas for Future Research 
Symptom appraisal: The findings presented support previous research suggesting 
that people take into account the frequency with which they experience symptoms and the 
length of time that they experience them for when appraising their symptoms, i.e., making 
judgements about them such as how severe they are, how worried they are about them 
and whether they may be indicative of an underlying disorder (e.g., Arnault, 2009; Cauce et 
al., 2002; Elliott et al., 2011; Rickwood et al., 2005; Scott & Walter, 2010; Shaw et al., 2008). 
However, the results from both studies suggest that it is not the absolute experience of the 
symptom that matters most in this appraisal but where this experience is believed to rank 
in comparison to other people’s experience of the symptom. In the vast majority of the 
regression models reported across both studies, the rank variables were the most 
important predictors of the judgement outcomes, over and above the absolute experience 
of the symptoms. When rank variables were added to the step 1 models including age, 
gender and the absolute experience, rank always either attenuated or removed the effect 
of the absolute experience. Furthermore, this pattern was consistent across all symptoms 
measured and both aspects of symptom experience. This suggests that social comparison 
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may be an integral part of symptom appraisal but, to my knowledge, this is not reflected in 
symptom appraisal models (see Whitaker, Scott, and Wardle, 2015, for a review of such 
models). The current studies may be the first to show the importance of social comparison 
in symptom appraisal but more research is needed to understand this process fully. 
Help-seeking: Models of help-seeking generally concur that although help-seeking is 
influenced by many factors (Scott and Walter, 2010, suggest over 70), it is always preceded 
by some form of symptom appraisal which is likely to strongly influence help-seeking 
decisions (Cornally & McCarthy 2011; Henshaw & Freedman-Doan, 2009). Although many 
studies have shown that judgements such as those measured in this study do predict help-
seeking behaviour, it has been acknowledged that little is known about how people actually 
interpret their symptoms and make these influential judgements about them (e.g., 
Henshaw & Freedman-Doan, 2009; Wills & Gibbons, 2009). The results from both studies 
provide a better understanding of the processes involved in this association between 
symptom appraisal and help-seeking. Where people believe their experience of symptoms 
ranks in comparison to other people’s experience of the symptoms is linked directly to 
help-seeking decisions (the decision to seek help at all, the number of help-seeking 
behaviours to engage with and decisions to consult a professional and take medication) 
and indirectly through judgements of symptom severity, whether the symptom represents 
the presence of an underlying disorder and worry about symptoms. This suggests that 
individuals are evaluating their experience of symptoms by comparing to others and then 
using this evaluation to make help-seeking decisions directly and to make judgements 
about their symptoms that also influence help-seeking decisions. 
The results not only provide a new understanding of how people evaluate their 
symptoms in order to make judgements and decisions about them, but also provide an 
explanation of how people can make inaccurate judgements and decisions. In the context 
of help-seeking, inaccurate decisions are made when people either fail to seek help when 
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they need to or do seek help when they do not need to. As discussed in the introduction, 
the majority of research in this area has focused on why the former occurs. Models such as 
the general model of total patient delay (Safer et al., 1979) suggest that many factors play a 
part in delaying seeking help when it is needed. Delay can occur at the symptom appraisal 
stage when people are evaluating whether they are ill, between making this decision and 
deciding whether professional care is needed, and between making the decision to seek 
care and actually going to the clinic or service. When these stages have been compared, 
appraisal delay has been found to contribute the most to the total delay time (e.g., 
Andersen et al., 1995; Ristvedt & Trinkaus, 2005). Making inaccurate judgements about not 
needing help at this stage can be costly and therefore it is important to understand why 
people may be doing so. The findings from the current studies show an association 
between beliefs about how symptoms compare to others and help-seeking accuracy such 
that participants were more likely to have not sought help when they needed to if they 
believed that they experienced symptoms less frequently than others. Similarly, 
participants were much more likely to seek help when they did not need to if they believed 
that they experienced symptoms more frequently than others. Therefore, inaccurate 
health help-seeking decisions may be made if an individual bases their decision on how 
they believe their health compares to that of others but their beliefs about others are not 
representative of the actual state of the world.  
Henshaw and Freedman-Doan (2009) suggest that providing people with the 
information needed to make accurate symptom appraisals via public health messages and 
education campaigns could encourage more people that need help to seek it (and possibly 
discourage those that don’t from help-seeking). The results reported here suggest that such 
campaigns should provide objective information about symptom experiences, such as 
telling people to seek help if they have experienced a symptom for more than a certain 
number of days, in order to discourage social comparison and the errors in judgement that 
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may occur because of it. Alternatively, information about the actual distribution of aspects 
of symptoms such as their occurrence or duration could be provided in order to encourage 
more accurate comparisons and hopefully more accurate decisions. Developing and testing 
the efficacy of such interventions could be a worthwhile area for future research. 
Social comparison: As mentioned in the introduction, previous research on the use 
of social comparison in health-related decision-making has focused largely on the use of 
the lay referral structure for health advice with inaccuracy in help-seeking being explained 
as occurring due to receipt of inaccurate advice. The current studies suggest that social 
comparison plays a much more pivotal role, not only affecting help-seeking decisions but 
also influencing symptom evaluation and appraisal. These studies appear to be among the 
first to test whether people actually compare their symptoms to those of others when 
making related judgements and decisions and the first testing whether social comparison 
of symptoms can account for inaccurate health help-seeking behaviour. Motjabai (2008) 
showed an association between how people believed their mental distress compared to 
that of others (whether they thought they were more or less worried, nervous, or anxious 
than others) and help-seeking for mental health problems. The current studies support and 
extend these findings, showing associations between how people believe their experience 
of symptoms compares to that of others and a range of symptom-related judgements and 
help-seeking decisions. Mojtabai (2008) did not explicitly explore accuracy in help-seeking 
decisions as has been done here but his results suggested that people might have been 
more likely to seek help when it was not needed if they believed that they were more 
distressed than others. The current studies suggest that this could well be the case and that 
the same process may also cause people to not seek help when they need to because they 
believe that they are better off than others when in fact they are not. 
The results also provide insights into the mechanisms underlying the comparison 
process. As explained in Chapter 1, it is largely assumed in the social comparison literature 
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that, when comparing to others, people do so through comparing to the average of the 
sample. The results from both studies suggest that, when making health-related 
judgements and decisions using social comparison, participants did so using rank-based 
strategies and not through comparing to the sample average.  
Study Limitations 
There were a number of limitations to the studies, the main one being the loss of the 
headache and cold symptom occurrence data due to participants not reading the questions 
properly. This was unfortunate as it would have been interesting to investigate which (if 
either) of the two symptom aspects, occurrence or duration, participants were more likely 
to compare to others when making judgements and decisions about their headaches and 
colds. It is possible that a better questionnaire design might have prevented this from 
happening. For example, if the headache and cold symptom occurrence questions had 
been placed on a separate page and more attention drawn to the fact participants were 
being asked about the number of headaches and colds they had had and not the number of 
days they had experienced these symptoms on as they had been for the tired/run down 
and muscle/joint/back pain questions. 
A limitation of both studies was that the help-seeking measures were all self-
reported, as it was not possible to obtain information from other sources such as medical 
records that could have verified help-seeking behaviours due to the large sample sizes 
needed and time limitations. Such sample sizes were needed as the majority of the 
comparison effects seen were small, as hypothesised. Similarly, the diagnostic tools used to 
measure whether participants had clinical levels of depression and anxiety so that their 
help-seeking accuracy could be investigated were also self-report measures. Ideally, this 
would have been determined using a diagnostic interview but again this was not possible 
due to the large number of participants. However, the PHQ-9 and GAD-7 are routinely used 
screening tools so as long as participants answered truthfully then this should not have 
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affected the results greatly. Comparison effects were still seen despite all of these 
limitations. 
Conclusions 
To conclude, two studies showed associations between where participants believed 
their experiences of six symptoms (feeling down, depressed or hopeless, nervous, anxious 
or on edge, tired or run down, muscle, joint or back pain, headaches, and cold symptoms) 
ranked in comparison to other people’s experiences of these symptoms and judgements of 
symptom severity, worry about symptom and the presence of an underlying disorder 
(depression and anxiety only). Furthermore, direct associations between believed rank of 
symptom experience and help-seeking were also seen along with indirect associations 
through the above judgements. The results suggest that people compare to others and do 
so using rank-based strategies when they are appraising their symptoms and making help-
seeking decisions. Help-seeking accuracy was also associated with believed rank of 
symptom experience – participants were more likely to seek help when it was not needed if 
they believed that they experienced symptoms more frequently than others and not to 
seek help when it was needed if they believed that they experienced symptoms less 
frequently than others. These comparison effects were small to medium in size. 
The results have implications for models of symptom appraisal and help-seeking as 
they provide a new understanding of some of the mechanisms involved in these processes. 
They also provide a new understanding of how people can come to inaccurate help-seeking 
decisions and suggest ways in which inaccurate help-seeking may be targeted by 
information-based interventions. Finally, the studies provide evidence that people compare 
to others using rank-based strategies and show the existence of social comparison effects 
in a new area. Although it had previously been hypothesised that people may compare 
their experience of symptoms to those of others in order to make help-seeking decisions, 
this appears to have not been tested properly before. 
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Chapter 4: Sleep 
Overview 
 Dysfunctional beliefs about sleep have been shown to exacerbate the kind of 
negative cognitive activity that leads to heightened arousal and emotional distress and 
ultimately sleep disturbance (Harvey, 2002). Such beliefs and their magnitude are typically 
identified and addressed in therapy for sleep disorders using the Dysfunctional Beliefs and 
Attitudes about Sleep scale (DBAS: Morin, 1993). Although this scale encompasses a wide 
range of sleep-related dysfunctional beliefs it is possible that other types of dysfunctional 
beliefs not included in the scale, such as how much one’s sleep differs from an inaccurate 
perceived norm, may also play a role in this cycle. Therefore, the main aim of this study was 
to investigate whether there was any association between how people believe their sleep 
compares to that of others and sleep-related distress and worry. As in Chapter 3, this will 
be investigated by determining participants’ beliefs about how their experience of sleep 
ranks in comparison to other people’s sleep experiences and how much their experience 
differs from what they believe the average experience of others to be. Whether these 
beliefs influence help-seeking decisions for sleep problems will also be investigated. 
Introduction 
The American Psychiatric Association (2013) reports that around a third of the 
general population experience symptoms of insomnia (difficulty initiating sleep, 
maintaining sleep and waking up early and not being able to return to sleep), with 10-15% 
also experiencing associated daytime impairments (such as impairments to social, 
occupational, educational, academic or behavioural functioning), and 6-10% meeting 
diagnostic criteria for insomnia disorder (see Table 4.1 for full details). Consequences of 
insomnia include increased utilisation of health care services and consultations with health 
care professionals, increased use of medication (both prescription and over-the-counter) 
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and alcohol, increased accidents, increased absence from work, decreased productivity at 
work and poorer general health (Colten, Altevogt, & the Institute of Medicine Committee 
on Sleep Medicine and Research, 2006; Daley et al 2009). The estimated cost of insomnia 
alone to the US economy is around $63 billion a year (Kessler et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, unhealthy sleep is associated with decreased health-related quality of 
life, increased morbidity and mortality, and the aetiology of many physical and mental 
health disorders. Much research from around the world has shown that people who 
routinely sleep for short or long durations (i.e. less than 7 hours a night or more than 9) are 
at increased risk of mortality (for a review see Grandner, Patel, Hale, & Moore, 2010), as 
are people who have been diagnosed with sleep disorders, especially sleep apnoea 
(Gooneratne et al., 2011). Habitual short and/or long sleep duration is associated with an 
increased risk of developing diabetes (Knutson, 2010; Zizi, et al., 2010), hypertension 
(Friedman, Bradley, Ruttanaumpawan, & Logan, 2010; Knutson, 2010) and weight problems 
(increased body mass index/obesity: Knutson, 2010; Nielsen, Danielsen, & Sorensen, 2010) 
as well as an increased risk of developing or dying from coronary heart disease, stroke and 
cardiovascular disease (Cappuccio, Cooper, D’Elia, Strazzullo, & Miller, 2011). High 
comorbidity between psychological and sleep disorders has been well documented (e.g., 
Morin & Ware, 1996). For example, around 40-50% of people with insomnia (the most 
prevalent sleep disorder) also have a psychological disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Insomnia is associated not only with the development of depression but 
also with relapse of episodes and resistance to treatment (Buysee et al., 2008; Ford & 
Kamerow, 1989; Ohayon, 2002; Okajima, Komada, Nomura, Nakashima, & Inoue, 2012). 
Insomnia is also associated with an increased risk of developing anxiety, stress, and 
problems related to substance abuse (Breslau, Roth, Rosenthal, & Andreski, 1996; Ford & 
Kamerow, 1989; Meerlo, Sgoifo, & Suchecki, 2008). Finally, using data from large-scale 
survey studies in the USA, France, and Japan, Léger et al. (2012) found that people with 
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insomnia had significantly lower health-related quality of life scores than good sleepers 
across countries. 
Models of Insomnia 
Many models of the development and maintenance of insomnia exist (e.g., the 
psychobiological inhibition model: Espie, Broomfield, MacMahon, Macphee, & Taylor, 
2006; the stimulus control model: Bootzin, 1972; Harvey’s 2002 cognitive model of 
insomnia; the neurobiological model of insomnia: Buysse, Germain, Hall, Monk, & 
Nofzinger, 2011; for a review see Buysee et al., 2011). These models are based on a 
number of distinct or integrated perspectives (e.g., biological, behavioural, cognitive, 
neuroscience). The diathesis-stress or ‘3P’ model (Speilman, Caruso, & Glovinsky, 1987) and 
work by Ellis and colleagues (Ellis, Gehrman, Espie, Riemann, & Perlis, 2012; Ellis, Perlis, 
Neale, Espie, & Bastien, 2012) suggests that the transition from good sleeper to chronic 
insomnia begins with a trigger. This can be a perceived or actual stressor, such as a life 
event or series of events, which may be negative (e.g., a death, stress at work or illness) or 
positive in nature (e.g., planning a wedding). This can lead to sleep disturbance and the 
experience of acute insomnia (symptoms of insomnia for a period of between 3 days and 3 
months - see Table 4.1 for a full definition). For most people (Espie, Perlis, et al. (2012) 
estimate 79%), normal sleep resumes after the initial trigger is resolved or managed, but 
for others acute insomnia develops into chronic insomnia. The model suggests that this 
may occur particularly to people who are predisposed to sleep difficulties - those who are 
female, older, more susceptible to hyperarousal and anxiety or who have a history of 
insomnia. Development of chronic insomnia is also likely to occur if people adopt 
behaviours (e.g., napping through the day, spending too much time in bed when not 
sleeping, drinking alcohol or caffeine) or cognitions (e.g., worrying about sleep and/or 
performance the next day) known to maintain or exacerbate sleep difficulties. As this study 
is concerned with the role that cognitions, particularly sleep-related beliefs, play in 
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influencing perceptions of sleep and sleep-related help-seeking behaviours, previous 
research on the role of cognition in sleep disturbance will be discussed briefly.  
Harvey (2002) proposes a cognitive model of insomnia (and reviews the literature 
that supports it) whereby sleep disturbance is perpetuated by excessive, negatively toned 
cognitive activity. This could be, for example, uncontrollable worry and intrusive thoughts 
about such things as not getting enough sleep and the impact that this will have on health 
or functioning the next day. This cognitive activity then leads to autonomic arousal, 
emotional distress and anxiety, which is then likely to lead to an actual sleep deficit as sleep 
onset is unlikely under such conditions of high arousal (Bonnet & Arand, 1997). 
Furthermore, excessive cognitive activity during the day, such as ruminating about negative 
appraisals of the quality or duration of sleep obtained during the previous night, can also 
lead to physiological arousal and anxiety which is likely to impact on functioning that day.  
The Role of Dysfunctional Beliefs in Sleep Disorder 
Of the cognitive mechanisms thought to perpetuate unhealthy sleep, there has 
recently been a lot of interest in the role that sleep-related dysfunctional beliefs play in the 
maintenance of sleep disturbance. In Harvey’s (2002) model, dysfunctional beliefs are 
shown to exacerbate the negative cognitive activity that leads to heightened arousal and 
emotional distress and subsequent sleep disturbance and/or deficits in daytime 
performance. As the model suggests, there are many studies that have shown how sleep-
related dysfunctional beliefs contribute to the development (Jansson-Fröjmark & Linton, 
2008), maintenance (Carney & Edinger, 2006; Edinger, Wohlgemuth, Radtke, Marsh, & 
Quillian, 2001b; Jansson-Fröjmark & Linton, 2007) and exacerbation (Morin, 1993; Morin, 
Blais, & Savard, 2002) of sleep disorders. As a result, the examination and challenge of 
sleep-related dysfunctional beliefs has been integrated into cognitive behavioural therapy 
for insomnia (CBT-I; a recommended standard and effective treatment for insomnia, 
Morgenthaler et al., 2006). There is also evidence to suggest that sleep-related 
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dysfunctional beliefs may be a factor in the sleep difficulties experienced by people with 
depression (Carney, Edinger, Manber, Garson, & Segal, 2007; Roecklein et al., 2013), 
seasonal affective disorder (Roecklein et al., 2013), fibromyalgia (Carney et al., 2007) and 
comorbid insomnia and mood disturbance (Carney et al., 2007). 
 The presence and strength of such beliefs are typically measured using the 
Dysfunctional Beliefs and Attitudes about Sleep scale (DBAS: Morin, 1993; Morin, Stone, 
Trinkle, Mercer, & Remsberg, 1993). The original version of the DBAS consists of 30 
statements which respondents rate their level of agreement/disagreement with. There are 
also 16 (DBAS-16: Morin, Vallières, & Ivers, 2007) and 10 item (DBAS-10 or DBAS-SF:  Espie, 
Inglis, Harvey, & Tessier, 2000) versions. The full DBAS contains statements relating to five 
aspects of sleep-related dysfunctional beliefs: misconceptions of the causes of insomnia 
(e.g., “I believe insomnia is essentially the result of a chemical imbalance”), misattributions 
or amplifications of the consequences of insomnia (e.g., “after a poor night’s sleep, I know 
that it will interfere with my daily activities on the next day”), unrealistic sleep expectations 
(e.g., “ I should sleep as well as my bed partner”), diminished perceptions of control (e.g., 
“when I sleep poorly on one night, I know it will disturb my sleep schedule for the whole 
week”), and faulty beliefs about sleep-promoting practices (e.g., “more time in bed ensures 
more sleep”). Depending on versions, respondents rate their level of 
agreement/disagreement with each of the statements on either a 100 mm analogue scale 
(strongly disagree to strongly agree) or a Likert scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 
(strongly agree).  The DBAS is used to evaluate beliefs and identify cognitions that can be 
addressed in therapy and is used as an outcome measure of treatment. 
Although this scale encompasses a wide range of sleep-related dysfunctional beliefs 
it is possible that other types of beliefs, such as how much one’s sleep differs from the 
perceived norm, may also exacerbate the excessive negative cognitive activity that leads to 
emotional distress and ultimately disturbances in sleep and daytime functioning. For 
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example, Lack (2007) and Bruck, Dolan, and Lack (2015) describe norm-related inaccurate 
sleep beliefs held by participants in their studies. In both studies, the authors asked 
participants (both general population samples) to plot, on a chart, what they believed the 
normal sleep of both a healthy 18-year-old and a healthy 65-year-old to be. The chart had 
four blocks each underneath one another that were labelled ‘awake’, ‘light sleep’, ‘deep 
sleep’ and ‘very deep sleep’ and, on the top left, had the label ‘night’ and the top right the 
label ‘morning’. In both studies, around 70% of participants plotted a U-shaped curve of 
unbroken sleep for both ages, with the average curve for the 18-year-old showing slightly 
deeper sleep than the average curve for the 65-year-old. Bruck et al. (2015) examined 
whether this response pattern differed across age groups and found that around 95% of 
younger adults and 75% of older adults believed that normal sleep for both 18 and 65-year-
olds was gradual transition into and then out of deep sleep without any awakenings. The 
results indicate that many people hold the belief that a normal night’s sleep involves 
continuous, deep sleep with no awakenings when, in fact, sleep occurs in cycles and it is 
quite normal to wake several times during the night (Ohayon, Carskadon, Guilleminault, & 
Vitiello, 2004). The authors conclude that it is likely that experiencing light sleep and/or 
awakenings during the night when holding the beliefs that most people sleep deeply and 
have unbroken sleep will cause anxiety, worry and possibly distress about sleep patterns, 
which may lead to sleep disturbance. 
Possibly because of extensive use of the DBAS in this area there appears to have 
been little research apart from the above studies that has investigated people’s 
perceptions of “normal” sleep. There has also been no research specifically looking at 
whether people compare aspects of their sleep to these perceived norms and the effect 
this may have on sleep-related worry or distress. Therefore, this study aims to do just that 
– to investigate whether people compare aspects of their sleep (such as how long they 
sleep for or the amount of time it takes them to get to sleep) to what they believe other 
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people experience in terms of these aspects and to see whether these comparisons are 
associated with how worried and distressed an individual is about their sleep.  
Help-seeking 
The second part of the study is concerned with investigating whether people’s beliefs 
about how their sleep compares to that of others is associated with decisions regarding 
seeking help for sleep problems. This investigation is very similar to that conducted in the 
physical and mental health studies (reported in Chapter 3) in that both direct and indirect 
associations between compared sleep and help-seeking are explored. It is possible that, 
just as was found in these health studies, people may decide whether to seek help for sleep 
disturbances based on general perceptions and feelings they have about their sleep and/or 
how much they believe their sleep differs from perceived sleep norms. 
Studies that have investigated determinants of sleep help-seeking behaviours have 
mainly focused on identifying symptoms and personal characteristics that predict help-
seeking behaviours. These studies have identified that women, middle-aged and older 
adults, those with poorer general health and those with higher education, SES and self-
efficacy to cope are the most likely to seek help for sleep difficulties (Ancoli-Isreal & Roth, 
1999; Hohagen, et al., 1993; Hsu et al., 2013; Morin, LeBlanc, Daley, Gregoire, & Mérettee, 
2006; Morin & Jarrin, 2013; Shochat, Umphress, Israel, & Ancoli-Israel, 1999). Morin et al. 
(2006) asked respondents in their survey who had previously sought help for sleep 
problems (n = 265) what had prompted them to do so, although they do not report if they 
were asked to select options from a list or write their answers freely. They found that the 
main determinants of help-seeking were daytime fatigue (48%), psychological distress 
(40%), and physical discomfort (22%) followed by suggestion by a significant other (14%), 
reduced work productivity (13%), suggestion by a health professional (11%), significant 
sleep loss (11%), self-referral (4%), and stress (3%).  
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 As mentioned in previous chapters, improved knowledge about the determinants of 
help-seeing behaviour may help in understanding why people seek help when they do not 
need to and do not seek help when they do. Although there does not appear to be much 
research investigating this issue in the context of sleep help-seeking, there is some 
evidence that inappropriate help-seeking (either too much or too little) may be 
problematic. For example, using data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey, 2005–2010, Chong, Fryar, and Gu (2013) report that people who sleep for nine 
hours a night use prescription sleep aids at around the same rate as those who sleep five 
hours or less (5.3% compared to 6.0% respectively) and that 4.1% of people who sleep for 8 
hours take prescription sleep aids. It could be argued that these people sleep for so long 
because they are taking the medication but it is also possible that these figures indicate 
that good sleepers may be taking medication when they do not need to. If so, this 
phenomenon can be explained by people comparing themselves to inaccurate social 
norms. In the context of sleep, people may seek help for sleep difficulties when they do not 
need to if they believe that what they are experiencing is abnormal or may not seek help 
when they believe what they are experiencing is normal. For example, an individual may 
take, on average, 25 minutes to fall asleep but if they believe that the majority of others 
take 15 minutes or less to get to sleep they may think that their sleep onset latency is 
abnormal and seek help for this. On the other hand, someone who takes, on average, an 
hour to get to sleep may think this is perfectly normal if they believe that it takes the 
majority of people over an hour to get to sleep. It has been suggested that a sleep onset 
latency greater than 30 minutes indicates clinically significant severity (Ellis, Gehrman, et 
al., 2012; Lichstein, Durrence, Taylor, Bush, & Riedel, 2003) and so in this case, both 
individuals have come to incorrect judgements about the normality of their symptom 
because of the incorrect beliefs they hold about others. There is some anecdotal evidence 
that people may indeed compare to others to judge the severity of their sleep disturbance 
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and, consequently, whether or not they should seek help. In a qualitative study that 
assessed help-seeking in 26 individuals with chronic insomnia, Cheung, Bartlett, Armour, 
Glozier, and Saini (2014) report that, for participants who had a family history of sleep 
disturbance, “insomnia was embedded into the family culture, and appeared an acceptable 
way of life, which, therefore, did not warrant further investigation or medical help” (p. 
112). This suggests that having people around you who also have insomnia almost 
normalises the experience leading to perceptions that help is not needed.  
As mentioned earlier, indirect associations between social comparison and help-
seeking will also be explored, using the same framework as in Chapter 3. As explained in 
that chapter, previous studies have shown that aspects of symptom appraisal, such as 
beliefs that symptoms represent the presence of a serious underlying disorder, judgements 
of symptom severity and worry or other emotional responses to symptoms, are also 
directly linked to seeking help for symptoms (e.g., Elliott et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2003). 
Findings from the mental and physical health studies supported this. It is hypothesised here 
that such appraisals – general perceptions and feelings about sleep – will also influence 
sleep help-seeking behaviours and that, as in the mental and physical health studies, social 
comparison will influence help-seeking directly and indirectly through these appraisals. The 
specific appraisals that are tested (based on previous research) are participants’ beliefs 
about whether they have a sleep disorder, their perceptions of the quality of their sleep, 
how worried they are about their sleep and distress caused by sleeping problems.  
There is some evidence to suggest that people do compare to others when making 
general judgements about their sleep such as whether they are good sleepers. Davis, 
Moore and Bruck (2006) asked 46 older adults living in community care homes to 
categorise themselves as either a good (n = 22) or poor (n = 24) sleeper and to complete 
the Pittsburg Sleep Quality Index (PSQI: Buysse, Reynolds, Monk, Berman, & Kupfer, 1989). 
This is a global measure of sleep quality that measures sleep onset latency, sleep duration, 
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habitual sleep efficiency, sleep disturbance, use of sleeping medication, subjective sleep 
quality, and daytime dysfunction. They found that all the self-categorised poor sleepers fell 
within the “poor” PSQI global score range but that over half of the self-categorised good 
sleepers fell within this range too. Based on conversations with the participants, the 
authors concluded that social comparison had contributed greatly to participants’ self-
categorisations. Self-categorised poor sleepers often made upward social comparisons or 
temporal comparisons to how they slept earlier on in their lives when no comparison group 
was available. Self-categorised good sleepers on the other hand mainly employed 
downward comparison strategies making them perceive that they were much better 
sleepers than they actually were. 
 In sum, based on the theory and findings outlined above, the following associations 
are tested: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Hypothesised direct and indirect associations between social comparison and 
help-seeking. 
 
 Therefore, the full aims of the study are to: 
1. Investigate whether judgements about sleep are in fact influenced by beliefs about 
how sleep compares to others and which specific aspects of sleep (such as sleep 
duration and the length of time taken to get to sleep) are compared,  
Judgement about the presence 
of a sleep disorder 
Help seeking 
behaviours 
How symptom 
compares to 
others 
Beliefs about 
others  
Sleep-related worry and 
distress 
Perceptions of sleep quality 
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2. Investigate whether worry and distress about sleep is associated with how people 
think their sleep compares to that of others, 
3. Investigate whether people compare to others when making general judgements 
about their sleep such as whether they have a sleep problem and what they perceive 
the overall quality of their sleep to be, 
4. Investigate whether people compare to others when making decisions about help-
seeking for sleep problems either directly or indirectly through worry/distress about 
sleep and/or general sleep perceptions, 
5. Investigate how people compare to others when making judgements and decisions 
about their sleep, namely whether they use rank or average-based comparisons as 
consistent with DbS and ALT respectively, and 
6. Investigate whether there is any association between beliefs about how sleep 
compares to others and help-seeking accuracy. 
 Findings from this study may have implications for insomnia treatment, dysfunctional 
belief measurement and information and education campaigns. As previously mentioned, 
CBT-I is a standard treatment for insomnia and as its efficacy has been established (for a 
recent meta-analysis of RCTs see Okajima, Komada, & Inoue, 2011). Focus has recently 
turned to how treatment can be optimised for all insomnia patients. Sánchez-Ortuño and 
Edinger (2010) note that although the cognitive component of CBT targets dysfunctional  
beliefs, myths, and misconceptions about sleep, this tends to be done in quite a 
standardised way either by providing psychoeducation that targets specific, common 
misconceptions (Edinger, Wohlgemuth, Radtke, Marsh, & Quillian, 2001a) or through a 
standard cognitive restructuring protocol (Morin, Colecchi, Stone, Sood, & Brink, 1999). It is 
therefore possible that by using standardised methods some but not all dysfunctional 
beliefs and misconceptions are addressed. A more tailored approach could target all 
relevant misconceptions and may prove more beneficial to the patient. It is possible that, 
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as the DBAS is used extensively in CBT-I to identify dysfunctional beliefs, and as an outcome 
measure to measure change in these beliefs, other beliefs that could be causing the patient 
distress and perpetuating symptoms (such as variance from inaccurate perceived sleep 
norms) are not addressed in treatment. This study will investigate whether such beliefs 
may be a worthy target in CBT-I and whether they should be included in standard measures 
of dysfunctional beliefs. 
 As previously mentioned, dysfunctional beliefs can perpetuate sleep disturbance 
through causing distress about sleep but CBT-I interventions have shown that dysfunctional 
beliefs can be challenged effectively (e.g., Edinger et al., 2001b; Morin et al., 2002). 
Therefore, information and/or education campaigns that target challenging such beliefs 
may be effective in alleviating some of the distress that these beliefs may cause and, in 
turn, reduce sleep problems. If variance from inaccurately perceived sleep norms is found 
to cause distress about sleep, these norms could be targeted in campaigns that could 
explain what is ‘normal’ sleep in terms of hours of sleep per night, time taken to get to 
sleep and number of awakenings per night, etc. This may be of benefit not just to people 
with chronic insomnia but also to those with acute insomnia and good sleepers and may 
generally make people feel better about their sleep patterns and stop them from worrying 
so much about their sleep. Such information campaigns may also be useful to stop people 
from seeking help for sleep disorders when they do not need to and to encourage people 
who do need help to do so. 
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Table 4.1.  
Diagnostic Criteria for Chronic and Acute Insomnia 
 Acute Insomnia* Chronic Insomnia** 
Trigger 1) Any life event or train of life 
events which results in a 
significant reduction in quality 
of life from the individual’s 
ideal. 
2) Distress at current situation. 
1) Predominant complaint of 
dissatisfaction with sleep 
quantity or quality, associated 
with one (or more) of the 
symptoms below. 
2) The sleep disturbance causes 
clinically significant distress or 
impairment in social, 
occupational, educational, 
academic, behavioural, or other 
important areas of functioning. 
Symptoms 1. Difficulty initiating sleep. 
2. Difficulty maintaining sleep, characterized by frequent awakenings or 
problems returning to sleep after awakenings. 
3. Early-morning awakening with inability to return to sleep. 
Minimum 
frequency 
3 or more nights per week 
Duration 3 days - 3 months 3 months 
Course Acute: 3-14 days. 
Transient: 2-4 weeks. 
Subchronic: 1-3 months. 
Episodic: symptoms last at least 1 
month but less than 3. 
Persistent: symptoms last 3 months 
or longer. 
Recurrent: two (or more) episodes 
within a year. 
Additional criteria 1) The sleep difficulty occurs despite adequate opportunity for sleep. 
2) The insomnia is not better explained by and does not occur 
exclusively during the course of another sleep-wake disorder (e.g., 
narcolepsy, a breathing-related sleep disorder, a circadian rhythm 
sleep-wake disorder, a parasomnia). 
3) The insomnia is not attributable to the physiological effects of a 
substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication). 
4) Coexisting mental disorders and medical conditions do not 
adequately explain the predominant complaint of insomnia. 
Qualitative severity Severity mild/moderate/severe as 
defined by the patient. 
 
Quantitative 
severity 
+ 30 min sleep onset latency. 
+ 30 min wake after sleep onset. 
 
Note. *Definition taken from Ellis, Gehrman, et al. (2012), **definition taken from The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V, American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). 
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Method 
As explained above, the main aims of the study were to investigate whether people 
compare their sleep to that of others when making sleep-related judgements and help-
seeking decisions and to investigate whether there is any association between how 
participants believe their sleep compares to others and worry/distress about sleep. As in 
previous studies, how people compare to others and the extent to which their beliefs about 
others are correct are also investigated.  
Participants 
The 656 participants that completed this study were recruited through MTurk and 
had a mean age of 35.6 years (SD = 12.2, range: 18-75 years), were predominantly White 
(75%, Asian = 10%, Black = 7%, Hispanic/Latino = 4%, Native American or Alaskan Native = 
1%, Other = 3%) and 57% were male. Participants were all resident in the U.S. and took part 
from 50 different states. Participants were mainly educated up to university (70%) or high 
school (28%) level (some high school = 1%, rather not say < 1%). Participants were mainly 
low to mid earners (< $14,999 = 21%, $15,000-$29,999 = 24%, $30,000-$49,999 = 25%, 
$50,000-$64,999 = 14%, >$65,000 = 14%, rather not say = 2%) and received $1.50 on 
completion of the study which took 10-15 minutes to complete. 
Design and Procedure 
The questionnaire that participants completed in this study was designed and hosted 
using Qualtrics. Participants were asked the following: 
Sleep experiences: participants were asked the following about their experiences of 
five sleep aspects: 
Sleep duration: “Over the last 90 days, how many hours of actual sleep did you get 
each night on average? (This may be different to the number of hours you spend in bed.)” 
Sleep latency: “Over the last 90 days, how long (in minutes), on average, has it 
usually taken you to fall asleep each night?” 
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Sleep disturbance: “On how many of the last 90 nights have you had trouble sleeping 
because of waking up in the middle of the night or early morning?” 
Daytime sleepiness: “On how many of the last 90 days have you had trouble staying 
awake during the day?” 
Non-restorative sleep: “On how many of the last 90 days did you feel that your sleep 
was not refreshing and that you did not feel rested after sleeping?” 
These aspects were chosen as they are commonly measured and have been found to 
be associated with general sleep perceptions and help-seeking behaviour in the literature 
(e.g., Harvey, Stinson, Whitaker, Moskovitz, & Virk, 2008; Ohayon, 2005; Morin et al., 
2006). The wording of the first four items was taken from the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality 
Index (Buysee et al., 1989) which, as previously mentioned, is a measure of perceived sleep 
quality. The wording of the non-restorative sleep item was adapted from Ohayon (2005). 
As in the physical health study, a reporting period of 90 days was chosen to reduce the 
likelihood of floor effects. 
Relative rank of sleep experience: Participants were asked directly where they 
thought their sleep experiences ranked amongst people their age in the general population 
through the questions below.  
Sleep duration: “Out of 100 people, how many do you think have had more hours of 
actual sleep than you, on average, over the last 90 days?” 
Sleep latency: “Out of 100 people, how many do you think have taken more time to 
get to sleep each night than you have, on average, over the last 90 days?” 
Sleep disturbance: “Out of 100 people, how many do you think have had trouble 
sleeping because of waking up in the middle of the night or early morning on more nights 
than you over the last 90 days?” 
Daytime sleepiness: “Out of 100 people, how many do you think have had trouble 
staying awake during the day on more days than you over the last 90 days?” 
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Non-restorative sleep: “Out of 100 people, how many do you think have felt that 
their sleep was not refreshing and that they did not feel rested after sleeping on more days 
than you over the last 90 days?” 
This question format was used instead of the line placement procedure used in the 
mental and physical health studies reported in Chapter 3 as the procedure is much shorter 
in terms of explaining instructions to participants. Given that participants were asked about 
five different aspects, it was decided that a shorter question format would be more 
beneficial to the participants. Participants were asked to consider ‘people’ to be adults of 
about their age randomly selected from the U.S. population. Participants were asked to 
compare to people their age as studies have shown age-related changes in the sleep 
aspects included in this study (e.g., Ohayon et al., 2004). 
Average sleep experience: Participants were asked what they thought the average 
experience of each sleep aspect was in people their age in the general population: 
Sleep duration: “What do you think the average number of hours of sleep that 
people had each night over the last 90 nights was?” 
Sleep latency: “What do you think the average time (in minutes) that it took people 
to fall asleep each night over the last 90 nights was?” 
Sleep disturbance: “On average, on how many of the last 90 nights do you think 
people had trouble sleeping because of waking up in the middle of the night or early 
morning?” 
Daytime sleepiness: “On average, on how many of the last 90 days do you think 
people had trouble staying awake during the day?” 
Non-restorative sleep: “On average, on how many of the last 90 days do you think 
people felt that their sleep was not refreshing and that they did not feel rested after 
sleeping?” 
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The following outcomes were measured: 
General sleep perceptions: Participants were asked the following general questions 
about their sleep: 
Abnormality: “Do you think you have a sleep problem?” which participants 
answered using a slider scale that went from “definitely not” to “definitely yes”. 
Quality: “During the past 90 days, how would you rate your sleep quality overall?” 
which participants answered using a slider scale that went from “very bad” to “very good”. 
Worry: “During the past 90 days, how worried have you been about your sleep 
overall?” which participants answered using a slider scale that went from “not at all” to “a 
lot”. 
Distress: “During the past 90 days, how much distress have sleeping problems 
caused you?” which participants answered using a slider scale that went from “no distress” 
to “severe distress”. 
After each of these questions participants were asked which of the five sleep aspects 
(“the number of hours of sleep you get each night”, “the length of time it takes you to fall 
asleep”, “the number of times you wake up through the night or wake up early”, “how 
often you have had trouble staying awake during the day”, and “how often you wake up 
not feeling refreshed or rested after sleeping”) they had considered the most when 
answering the question so that their absolute, rank and distance from the average values 
relating to that aspect could be used to predict the general judgements. 
Specific sleep perceptions: In addition to the outcomes measuring general 
perceptions about sleep overall, outcome measures specific to each sleep aspect that 
participants were asked about were also measured. This was for two reasons: firstly, to test 
whether people compare any or all of these aspects when making judgements about their 
sleep – use of an outcome measure related to each aspect such as worry about the aspect 
allows for a test of social comparison effects using each aspect in isolation. Secondly, if 
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people are comparing sleep aspects, this methodology allows for a more comprehensive 
investigation of how people are comparing (i.e., whether they are using rank-based 
strategies or whether they compare to the average of the comparison sample). For brevity, 
the following specific questions were asked about two of the outcomes: 
Abnormality: “Based on the sleep you have had over the last 90 nights, do you think 
that you have a problem with any of the following?” participants were then presented with 
a list of the five aspects and gave their answer for each aspect on a slider scale from 
“definitely not” to “definitely yes”. 
Worry: “Based on the sleep you have had over the last 90 nights, how worried are 
you about:” again, participants were presented with the same list of sleep aspects and gave 
their answer for each on a slider scale from “not at all” to “a lot”. 
Help-seeking behaviours: Participants were asked “which of these actions have you 
taken in the past 90 days to manage sleeping problems specifically? (Tick all that apply)” 
and given the following list:  
 Looked for information,  
 Discussed with other people,  
 Contacted a charity or support group,  
 Consulted a pharmacist,  
 Consulted a nurse or doctor,  
 Consulted a counselor or psychologist,  
 Consulted any other professional (e.g., hypnotherapist, acupuncturist, homeopath, 
etc.),  
 Taken over-the-counter medication,  
 Taken prescribed medication,  
 Undertaken cognitive behavioral therapy,  
 Drank alcohol,  
 Drank more caffeinated drinks during the day to combat tiredness after poor sleep,  
 Used products (not including medication) that may aid sleep such as lavender spray, 
eye masks, ear plugs, soothing music, hypnotherapy CDs or self-help books,  
 Taken specific actions that may aid sleep such as gone to bed early, taken a relaxing 
bath, meditated, read for a while, listened to music, relaxed, drank a warm, milky 
drink, stopped drinking caffeine after a certain time,  
 None of the above.  
 
If participants did not answer ‘none of the above’ they were also asked the following 
question “Please can you tell us which aspect of your sleep had the greatest influence on 
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your decision to take action to manage sleeping problems (please select one)” and 
selected their answer from a list of the five sleep aspects. These behaviours were taken in 
part from the physical and mental health studies reported in Chapter 3 and were adapted 
to include other known help-seeking behaviours specific to sleep problems such as those 
identified by Morin et al. (2006). 
Insomnia screening: As in the mental health study in Chapter 3, participants were 
screened for the presence of insomnia (acute or chronic) in order to investigate the 
accuracy of the help-seeking decisions. The questions below, adapted from Ellis, Perlis, et 
al. (2012) and following the DSM-V diagnostic criteria for insomnia, as outlined in Table 4.1, 
were asked to determine the presence and degree (acute or chronic) of insomnia in 
participants. A standardised insomnia screening measure was not used in this study as one 
that a) distinguished between acute and chronic insomnia and b) met the current DSM-V 
diagnostic criteria could not be found. At the time of developing the study questionnaire, 
the two most commonly used sleep disorder screening tools were the aforementioned 
PSQI and the Insomnia Severity Index (ISI, Bastien, Vallières, & Morin, 2001). However, the 
PSQI lacks specificity for insomnia (it is a general measure of sleep disturbance) and the ISI 
lacks specificity for acute insomnia and is based on DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. The ability to 
identify cases of acute insomnia was deemed important for the current study as 
participants classed as having acute insomnia may not meet the threshold for chronic 
insomnia but are still experiencing significant sleep disturbance warranting help-seeking. 
Therefore, these participants may be classified as not having insomnia by the ISI but their 
help seeking behaviour may be appropriate as they have acute insomnia. The diagnostic 
criteria have also changed considerably between DSM-IV and DSM-V bringing the validity of 
the ISI into question (Ellis, Gehrman, et al., 2012). These issues have been discussed in the 
literature and, when measuring both acute and chronic insomnia, Ellis, Perlis, et al. (2012) 
devised their own screening tool based on asking questions that relate to the DSM-V 
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diagnostic criteria. Their tool is not a standardised measure and so its reliability and validity 
have not been tested meaning that there is no way of knowing how accurate it is as a 
screening tool. However, the questions closely follow the DSM-V diagnostic criteria (they 
are set out to resemble a diagnostic interview using these criteria) and allow for the 
identification of both acute and chronic insomnia which is why they were used in the 
current study. The questions are as follows: 
1.  “Have you ever had a problem with getting off to sleep, staying asleep or waking up 
too early?” Yes/No answer. 
[If yes to the first question] 
2. “Is this an ongoing problem at the moment?” Yes/No answer. 
[If yes to the first and second questions] 
3. “For how long has this been going on?” Participants saw three boxes to input the 
number of weeks/months/years. This allows for discrimination between acute and 
chronic insomnia. 
4. “What is the nature of your sleep problem?” participants were asked to select all that 
apply from the following list: “Getting off to sleep”, “staying asleep”, “waking too 
early”. 
5. “Does your sleep problem result in significant distress or impairment in daytime 
functioning such as feeling fatigued or having low energy, feeling sleepy during the 
day, not being able to concentrate or remember things very well, disturbances in 
mood (e.g., irritability) or behaviour (e.g., aggression, impulsivity), impairment in 
functioning well at work or school, or impairment in social interaction?” Yes/No 
answer. 
6. “Is your sleep problem present for 3 nights of the week or more?” Yes/No answer. 
7. “Does your sleep problem occur despite adequate opportunity for you to sleep?” 
Yes/No answer. 
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8. “Is your sleep problem a side-effect of any substances you may be taking (e.g., 
medication or drugs?)” Yes/No answer. 
9. “Do you have any of the following as diagnosed by a health professional?” participants 
selected all that applied from a list of disorders stated by the DSM-V to be comorbid 
with insomnia: Anxiety, arthritis, bipolar disorder, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, coronary heart disease, depression, diabetes, fibromyalgia or any other 
chronic pain conditions. 
All of the questions apart from the insomnia screening questions were ordered into 
two blocks of independent (sleep experience, rank, and average questions) and dependent 
variables (general sleep perceptions, specific sleep perceptions, and help-seeking 
questions). The order that these blocks were presented in was counterbalanced so that half 
the participants saw the independent variable block followed by the dependent variable 
block and half saw the dependent variable block followed by the independent variable 
block. This presentation order was random. Within each block the presentation order of 
the three sets of questions comprising each block was also randomised. 
Following these two blocks, participants answered demographic questions (age, 
gender, level of education, ethnicity, income bracket and state in which they live), a 
question asking if they had a sleep disorder as diagnosed by a medical professional (and if 
so which one) and then completed the insomnia screening questionnaire.  
Results 
Initial data screening showed that the absolute and distance from the average 
duration and latency variables contained a number of outlying cases; see Figure 4.2 below. 
The duration and latency rank variables were not affected as participants’ answers were 
controlled through use of a slider scale. Similarly, as participants answered on how many of 
the last 90 days or nights they had experienced the three other sleep aspects and their 
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answers were limited to numbers less than or equal to 90, there were no outlying cases in 
any of the independent variables measuring these aspects.  
On inspection of the data it was decided that, for the duration variables, participants 
with a sleep duration and/or distance from the average duration value that was greater or 
less than ±3 standard deviations from the mean would be excluded from the analysis. This 
equated to sleep duration values less than 1.71 hours and greater than 11.73 hours and 
distance from the average duration values less than -4.72 hours and greater than 5.10 
hours. This resulted in eight exclusions: P31 (sleep duration = 1 hour), P13, P349, P480, 
P635 (sleep duration all = 12 hours), P460 (sleep duration = 23 hours; distance from the 
average = -16 hours), P108 (sleep duration = 24 hours) and P493 (distance from the average 
= 6 hours). Applying the same exclusion criteria to the latency data would have resulted in 
the exclusion of 31 participants and therefore it was decided to just remove the four most 
extreme cases. These were: P572 (sleep latency = 300 minutes), P495 (sleep latency = 480 
minutes; distance from the average = -435 minutes), P108 (already excluded because of 
their sleep duration; distance from the average = 380 minutes) and P44 (distance from the 
average = 403 minutes). Therefore, a total of 11 participants were excluded from all 
analyses.  
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Figure 4.2. Scatterplots of participants’ absolute (sleep duration and latency) and distance 
from the average values against their worry scores for each sleep aspect to depict outlying 
cases. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Scatterplots of participants’ absolute (sleep duration and latency) and distance 
from the average values against their worry scores for each sleep aspect after participant 
exclusion. 
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Figure 4.3 above shows the same scatterplots as Figure 4.2 after these participants 
were excluded. As suggested by Figure 4.3 and as shown in Table 4.2, correlations between 
the absolute and distance from the average variables and their corresponding dependent 
variables became stronger after the participants were excluded. Even though they were 
unaffected by outliers, the duration and latency rank variables are also included in Table 
4.2 to show the differences in the correlations between these variables and the outcomes 
when the participants were excluded. 
Table 4.2. 
Correlations between Participants’ Sleep Duration, Sleep Latency, the Distance of their Sleep 
Duration and Sleep Latency from their Believed Population Average Sleep Duration and Latency, the 
Rank of their Sleep Duration and Sleep Latency, and Outcome Variables Relating to these Measures, 
Before and After Participants were Excluded. 
 All Participants After Exclusion 
 
Worry About 
Duration 
Problem with 
Duration 
Worry About 
Duration 
Problem with 
Duration 
Sleep Duration -.400*** -.420*** -.548*** -.560*** 
Distance from the Average Duration -.445*** -.454*** -.518*** -.524*** 
Rank of Duration -.412*** -.423*** -.425*** -.434*** 
N 656 656 645 645 
 
Worry About 
Latency 
Problem with 
Latency 
Worry About 
Latency 
Problem with 
Latency 
Sleep Latency .539*** .572*** .607*** .634*** 
Distance from the Average Latency .421*** .462*** .576*** .608*** 
Rank of Latency .472*** .517*** .460*** .517*** 
N 656 656 645 645 
Note. ***p < .001 
This results section addresses each of the aims outlined in the introduction on pages 
151 and 152 in turn, although the use of rank or average-based comparison strategies (aim 
5) is discussed throughout. Correlations conducted prior to the main analyses showed 
generally that participants’ absolute experiences of the aspects correlated highly with the 
corresponding distance from the average variables (range: r = .721 to .908). However, 
tolerance values obtained through running multiple linear regression analyses confirmed 
that collinearity is not problematic in any of the models including absolute and distance 
from the average variables (range of tolerance values for absolute variables: .214 to .165, 
distance from the average variables: .218 to .469). To recap, the main independent 
variables measured were as follows: 
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Absolute experience of five sleep aspects: This was participants’ actual experiences 
of the five sleep aspects: 
1. The average number of hours sleep participants had over the last 90 days (sleep 
duration: M = 6.69, SD = 1.29),  
2. The average length of time in minutes it took participants to fall asleep over the last 90 
days (sleep latency: M = 32.31, SD = 31.94),  
3. The number of nights out of the last 90 that participants had trouble sleeping because 
of waking up in the middle of the night or early morning (sleep disturbance: M = 29.66, 
SD = 30.28),  
4. The number of nights out of the last 90 that participants had trouble staying awake 
during the day (daytime sleepiness: M = 19.45, SD = 25.00), and  
5. The number of nights out of the last 90 that participants had felt that their sleep was 
not refreshing and that they did not feel rested after sleeping (non-restorative sleep: 
M = 36.60, SD = 31.49). 
Relative rank of sleep experience: This was the number of people out of 100 who: 
1. Had more hours of actual sleep than the participant (duration rank: M = 49.36, SD = 
24.99),  
2. Took more time to get to sleep each night (latency rank: M = 51.94, SD = 27.02),  
3. Had trouble sleeping because of waking up in the middle of the night or early morning 
on more nights than them (disturbance rank: M = 49.59, SD = 25.81),  
4. Had trouble staying awake during the day on more days than them (daytime 
sleepiness rank: M = 49.06, SD = 27.72), and  
5. Felt that their sleep was not refreshing and that they did not feel rested after sleeping 
on more days than them (non-restorative sleep rank: M = 50.97, SD = 25.65) over the 
last 90 days. 
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Distance from the average sleep experience: Participants’ answers to the questions 
asking what they though the average experience of the five sleep aspects in people from 
the general population about their age was were deducted from their answers to the 
relevant questions asking about their absolute experience of these aspects. This gave a 
direct measure of how much participants’ experiences of the aspects differed from what 
they believed the average experience of others to be (duration distance from the average: 
M = -.024, SD = 1.46, latency distance from the average: M = 9.42, SD = 30.48, disturbance 
distance from the average: M = 6.11, SD = 31.06, daytime sleepiness distance from the 
average: M = -3.61, SD = 25.92, non-restorative sleep distance from the average: M =2.44, 
SD = 32.52). 
Aim 1 
 The first aim of the study was to investigate whether judgements about sleep are 
influenced by beliefs about how sleep compares to others and which specific aspects of 
sleep are compared. To recap, the judgements used to investigate this were 1) whether the 
participant thought they had a problem with their experience of the aspect, measured on a 
0 to 100 scale from “definitely not” to “definitely yes” and 2) how worried the participant 
was about their experience of the aspect, measured on a 0 to 100 scale from “not at all” to 
“a lot”. Table 4.3 below shows the means and their associated standard deviations of 
participants’ responses. 
Table 4.3. 
Descriptive Statistics of Participants’ Responses to Questions Asking Whether They Thought They Had 
a Problem With Any Sleep Aspect and How Worried They Were About Their Experience of Each 
Aspect 
 Problem Worry 
Aspect Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
Sleep Duration 45.34 34.37 36.69 31.75 
Sleep Latency 37.78 34.79 29.63 31.67 
Sleep Disturbance 42.29 34.09 35.78 32.79 
Daytime Sleepiness 30.60 31.33 28.32 31.71 
Non-restorative Sleep 49.11 34.29 44.80 34.61 
Note. N = 645. 
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Table 4.4. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Worry about Sleep Duration Ratings and Whether Participants think they have a Problem with their Sleep Duration from Age, 
Gender, Sleep Duration, Rank of Sleep Duration, and Distance from the Believed Average Sleep Duration of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa 
Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Worry  Sleep Problem 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .32***    <.001  .32***    <.001 
Constant  138.23 (124.79-152.02) 6.25  .001   147.04 (132.75-161.60) 7.20  .001 
Age  -0.31 (-0.47--0.15) 0.08 -.12 .001   -0.10 (-0.29-0.09) 0.09 -.04 .278 
Gender  1.17 (-3.77-6.24) 2.21 .02 .583   4.20 (0.05-8.40) 2.22 .06 .057 
Sleep Duration  -13.60 (-15.15--12.10) 0.85 -.55 .001   -14.95 (-16.92--13.11) 1.00 -.56 .001 
Step 2a .02***    <.001  .03***    <.001 
Constant  132.62 (119.53-145.95) 6.30  .001   140.56 (126.02-155.14) 7.28  .001 
Age  -0.30 (-0.44--0.14) 0.08 -.12 .001   -0.08 (-0.25-0.09) 0.09 -.03 .355 
Gender  1.85 (-2.88-6.64) 2.18 .03 .388   4.98 (0.72-9.03) 2.17 .07 .023 
Sleep Duration  -11.22 (-13.20--9.44) 1.02 -.46 .001   -12.20 (-14.40--10.10) 1.15 -.46 .001 
Rank  -0.23 (-0.33--0.12) 0.05 -.18 .001   -0.26 (-0.37--0.16) 0.06 -.19 .001 
Step 2b .01**    <.001  .01**    <.001 
Constant  109.28 (89.12-130.28) 10.30  .001   116.47 (92.67-139.46) 10.76  .001 
Age  -0.31 (-0.47--0.13) 0.08 -.12 .001   -0.10 (-0.27-0.08) 0.09 -.03 .278 
Gender  1.64 (-2.64-6.22) 2.13 .03 .447   4.70 (0.18-9.56) 2.28 .07 .048 
Sleep Duration  -9.48 (-12.28--6.93) 1.47 -.38 .001   -10.59 (-13.55--7.79) 1.57 -.40 .001 
Distance from the Average  -4.35 (-6.99--1.79) 1.24 -.20 .002   -4.60 (-6.92--1.96) 1.32 -.20 .003 
Note. N = 645, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 4.5. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Worry about Sleep Latency Ratings and Whether Participants think they have a Problem with their Sleep Latency from Age, 
Gender, Sleep Latency, Rank of Sleep Latency, and Distance from the Believed Average Sleep Latency of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa 
Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Worry  Sleep Problem 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .40***    <.001  .42***    <.001 
Constant  27.17 (21.42-32.29) 3.23  .001   30.64 (23.94-37.16) 3.74  .001 
Age  -0.43 (-0.58--0.28) 0.07 -.17 .001   -0.39 (-0.56--0.21) 0.08 -.14 .001 
Gender  -2.92 (-6.98-1.21) 1.99 -.05 .144   -1.94 (-6.19-2.51) 2.22 -.03 .397 
Sleep Latency  0.59 (0.52-0.69) 0.04 .60 .001   0.68 (0.59-0.79) 0.05 .63 .001 
Step 2a .05***    <.001  .07***    <.001 
Constant  14.25 (7.90-20.16) 3.35  .001   13.48 (6.86-19.72) 3.77  .002 
Age  -0.40 (-0.55--0.25) 0.07 -.16 .001   -0.35 (-0.51--0.18) 0.08 -.12 .001 
Gender  -2.06 (-6.00-2.09) 1.91 -.03 .273   -0.81 (-4.82-3.19) 2.09 -.01 .708 
Sleep Latency  0.49 (0.41-0.59) 0.04 .49 .001   0.54 (0.46-0.65) 0.05 .50 .001 
Rank  0.28 (0.21-0.36) 0.04 .24 .001   0.38 (0.29-0.46) 0.04 .29 .001 
Step 2b .01**    <.001  .01***    <.001 
Constant  30.95 (24.85-37.89) 3.45  .001   35.59 (26.62-45.65) 4.36  .001 
Age  -0.44 (-0.57--0.31) 0.07 -.17 .001   -0.41 (-0.57--0.24) 0.08 -.14 .001 
Gender  -2.61 (-6.53-1.43) 2.01 -.04 .209   -1.53 (-5.61-2.68) 2.15 -.02 .494 
Sleep Latency  0.43 (0.23-0.56) 0.08 .43 .001   0.46 (0.22-0.62) 0.11 .42 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.20 (0.08-0.39) 0.08 .19 .015   0.26 (0.09-0.57) 0.11 .23 .015 
Note. N = 645, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 4.6. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Worry about the Frequency of Sleep Disturbance Ratings and Whether Participants think they have a Problem with the 
Frequency of their Sleep Disturbance from Age, Gender, Frequency of Sleep Disturbance, Rank of the Frequency of Sleep Disturbance, and Distance from the Believed 
Average of the Frequency of Sleep Disturbance of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors 
Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Worry  Sleep Problem 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .39***    <.001  .52***    <.001 
Constant  22.68 (16.08-29.41) 3.29  .001   20.63(14.69-27.41) 3.02  .001 
Age  -0.19 (-0.36--0.01) 0.09 -.07 .034   -0.08 (-0.26-0.08) 0.09 -.03 .325 
Gender  -1.33 (-5.38-2.71) 2.11 -.02 .545   0.76 (-3.27-4.63) 1.97 .01 .710 
Sleep Disturbance  0.69 (0.62-0.750 0.03 .64 .001   0.82 (0.76-0.87) 0.03 .73 .001 
Step 2a .02***    <.001  .01***    <.001 
Constant  15.53 (8.53-22.34) 3.51  .001   13.64 (7.33-20.66) 3.12  .001 
Age  -0.19 (-0.36--0.01) 0.09 -.07 .024   -0.08 (-0.26-0.08) 0.09 -.03 .319 
Gender  -0.93 (-5.01-3.11) 2.10 -.01 .671   1.15 (-2.74-4.90) 1.94 .02 .579 
Sleep Disturbance  0.65 (0.58-0.72) 0.04 .60 .001   0.78 (0.72-0.84) 0.03 .70 .001 
Rank  0.16 (0.09-0.24) 0.04 .13 .001   0.16 (0.10-0.23) 0.04 .12 .001 
Step 2b .00    <.001  .00    <.001 
Constant  22.93 (15.94-30.46) 3.54  .001   21.49 (16.02-27.28) 2.98  .001 
Age  -0.19 (-0.37--0.02) 0.09 -.07 .048   -0.08 (-0.23-0.08) 0.08 -.03 .318 
Gender  -1.28 (-5.76-3.14) 2.09 -.02 .528   0.93 (-2.49-4.58) 1.91 .01 .639 
Sleep Disturbance  0.67 (0.54-0.80) 0.07 .62 .001   0.77 (0.65-0.87) 0.06 .68 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.02 (-0.10-0.14) 0.06 .02 .776   0.06 (-0.04-0.17) 0.06 .05 .292 
Note. N = 645, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p<.001 
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Table 4.7. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Worry about the Frequency of Daytime Sleepiness Ratings and Whether Participants think they have a Problem with the 
Frequency of their Daytime Sleepiness from Age, Gender, Frequency of Daytime Sleepiness, Rank of the Frequency of Daytime Sleepiness, and Distance from the Believed 
Average of the Frequency of Daytime Sleepiness of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors 
Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Worry  Sleep Problem 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .52***    <.001  .54***    <.001 
Constant  20.66 (15.23-25.89) 2.70  .001   20.91(15.49-26.40) 2.84  .001 
Age  -0.28 (-0.41--0.13) 0.07 -.11 .001   -0.23 (-0.36--0.08) 0.07 -.09 .003 
Gender  -0.02 (-3.49-3.68) 1.77 .00 .993   -0.03 (-3.41-3.43) 1.72 .00 .988 
Daytime Sleepiness  0.91 (0.83-0.98) 0.04 .71 .001   0.92 (0.84-0.99) 0.04 .73 .001 
Step 2a .02***    <.001  .01***    <.001 
Constant  14.63 (9.23-19.98) 2.65  .001   15.20 (9.48-21.16) 2.77  .001 
Age  -0.29 (-0.42--0.15) 0.07 -.11 .001   -0.24 (-0.38--0.09) 0.07 -.09 .001 
Gender  0.27 (-3.25-3.90) 1.74 .00 .869   0.24 (-3.12-3.68) 1.71 .00 .892 
Daytime Sleepiness  0.87 (0.79-0.96) 0.05 .69 .001   0.88 (0.80-0.96) 0.04 .71 .001 
Rank  0.14 (0.09-0.20) 0.03 .13 .001   0.14 (0.08-0.19) 0.03 .12 .001 
Step 2b .00    <.001  .00    <.001 
Constant  20.93 (15.38-26.73) 2.93  .001   20.99 (15.88-25.92) 2.96  .001 
Age  -0.28 (-0.42--0.14) 0.07 -.11 .002   -0.23 (-0.37--0.08) 0.07 -.09 .004 
Gender  0.00 (-3.39-3.69) 1.82 .00 .999   -0.03 (-3.45-3.61) 1.73 .00 .984 
Daytime Sleepiness  0.89 (0.75-1.04) 0.07 .71 .001   0.91 (0.80-1.03) 0.06 .73 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.01 (-0.10-0.13) 0.06 .01 .794   0.00 (-0.10-0.10) 0.05 .00 .932 
Note. N = 645, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p<.001 
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Table 4.8. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Worry about the Frequency of Non-Restorative Sleep Ratings and Whether Participants think they have a Problem with the 
Frequency of Non-Restorative Sleep from Age, Gender, Frequency of Non-Restorative Sleep, Rank of the Frequency of Non-Restorative Sleep, and Distance from the Believed 
Average of the Frequency of Non-Restorative Sleep of People Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors 
Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Worry  Sleep Problem 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .53***    <.001  .56***    <.001 
Constant  26.74 (20.63-33.63) 3.15  .001   31.48 (25.39-38.01) 3.03  .001 
Age  -0.30 (-0.44--0.18) 0.07 -.11 .001   -0.33 (-0.46--0.20) 0.07 -.12 .001 
Gender  0.14 (-3.84-3.96) 1.98 .00 .948   -0.42 (-3.73-3.03) 1.79 -.01 .817 
Non-Restorative Sleep   0.79 (0.73-0.84) 0.03 .71 .001   0.81 (0.75-0.86) 0.03 .74 .001 
Step 2a .01**    <.001  .01***     
Constant  21.07 (14.25-28.01) 3.45  .001   25.78 (19.34-32.72) 3.26  .001 
Age  -0.30 (-0.44--0.18) 0.07 -.11 .001   -0.32 (-0.46--0.20) 0.07 -.12 .001 
Gender  0.31 (-3.56-4.32) 1.96 .00 .877   -0.25 (-3.58-3.10) 1.77 .00 .899 
Non-Restorative Sleep  0.76 (0.69-0.82) 0.03 .69 .001   0.78 (0.72-0.83) 0.03 .71 .001 
Rank  0.13 (0.05-0.20) 0.04 .10 .002   0.13 (0.06-0.20) 0.03 .10 .001 
Step 2b .00    <.001  .00     
Constant  27.19 (20.67-33.55) 3.22  .001   31.75 (25.38-38.23) 3.36  .001 
Age  -0.30 (-0.44--0.16) 0.07 -.11 .001   -0.33 (-0.46--0.18) 0.07 -.12 .001 
Gender  0.23 (-3.31-3.85) 1.95 .00 .908   -0.36 (-4.29-3.39) 1.91 -.01 .826 
Non-Restorative Sleep  0.77 (0.68-0.86) 0.04 .70 .001   0.80 (0.70-0.89) 0.05 .73 .001 
Distance from the Average  0.02 (-0.08-0.11) 0.05 .02 .674   0.01 (-0.07-0.10) 0.04 .01 .784 
Note. N = 645, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Multiple linear regression was used to investigate whether the rank and distance 
from the average variables for each aspect predicted the corresponding judgements and 
these analyses are reported in Tables 4.4 to 4.8 above. These tables show the same pattern 
of results across the two judgements for each aspect in terms of the significance of the 
absolute, rank, and distance from the average variables. For all five aspects of sleep, 
participants’ absolute experience of the aspect6 and where they believed their experiences 
ranked in comparison to other people’s experiences of the aspects were significant 
predictors of both worry about their experience of the aspect and whether they thought 
their experience was problematic/abnormal. How much participants’ experiences of 
aspects differed from what they believed the average experience of the aspect in people 
their age from the general population to be significantly predicted worry and abnormality 
judgements for sleep duration and latency only. The sleep disturbance, daytime sleepiness 
and non-restorative sleep distance from the average variables did not predict worry or 
abnormality judgements about these aspects.  
There is also a very similar pattern across all aspects and judgements in the strength 
of the predictors in the models. Participants’ absolute experience of the sleep aspects is 
always the most important predictor of worry and abnormality judgements, in all of the 
model steps. The results reported in Chapter 3 showed a general trend across both studies 
whereby the effect of the absolute experience (symptom occurrence or duration) was 
considerably attenuated or, in some cases, removed when rank variables were entered into 
the models at step 2a. In the majority of cases, this lead to the rank variables being the 
most important predictors of the outcomes measured. This is not seen here. There is some 
attenuation of the effect of the absolute when rank is added but it is nowhere near the 
                                                          
6 i.e., the average number of hours sleep they got and time they took to get to sleep over the last 90 
days and the number of days in the last 90 that they had trouble sleeping because of waking up 
throughout the night, trouble staying awake during the day and felt that their sleep was not 
refreshing. 
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degree seen in the previous studies. Furthermore, in all of the models reported in the 
tables above, the absolute variables are much stronger predictors of the outcome than the 
rank variables (the absolute beta weights were significantly greater than the rank beta 
weights in all cases). This is also the case with the distance from the average variables; in 
the models where they are significant predictors of worry and abnormality judgements, 
they are significantly weaker predictors than the absolute variables.  
The step 1 models including age, gender and participants’ absolute experience of the 
sleep aspect account for, on average, 43% of the variance in aspect specific worry 
judgements and 47% of the variance in aspect specific abnormality judgements. The 
addition of the rank variables at step 2a always results in a significant increase in the 
amount of explained variance but the amount added is small; 2-3% on average for both 
judgements. When the distance from the average variables are entered into both duration 
and latency models at step 2b, the amount of explained variance increases significantly but 
by only 1% in all four models. Comparison of the predictive ability of the step 2a and 2b 
models showed that the step 2a models accounted for significantly more variance in 
latency, sleep disturbance and daytime sleepiness worry and abnormality judgements and 
non-restorative sleep abnormality judgements than the step 2b models7. There was no 
significant difference in the amount of variance in sleep duration worry and abnormality 
judgements or non-restorative sleep worry judgements accounted for by the step 2a and 
step 2b models, duration worry: t(642) = 1.05, p = .148, duration abnormality: t(642) = 1.23, 
p = .109, non-restorative worry: t(642) = 1.11, p = .134. 
In sum, the results provide evidence that participants compared their experience of 
all of the five aspects measured to other people’s experiences of these aspects when 
                                                          
7 Latency worry: t(642) = 3.09, p = .001, latency abnormality: t(642) = 4.00, p < .001, disturbance 
worry: t(642) = 2.19, p = .014, disturbance abnormality: t(642) = 2.08, p = .019, sleepiness worry: 
t(642) = 2.22, p = .013, sleepiness abnormality: t(642) = 2.36, p = .009, non-restorative abnormality: 
t(642) = 1.97, p = .025. 
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making judgements about how worried they were about their experience of each aspect 
and whether they thought their experience of the aspect was problematic. The results 
suggest that, for the majority of aspects (sleep latency, disturbance, daytime sleepiness and 
non-restorative sleep), participants compared using rank-based strategies; the results were 
inconclusive as to how participants compare to others when making judgements about 
their sleep duration. Comparison effects were small but significant, and the most important 
predictor of aspect specific judgements was participants’ absolute experience of the 
aspect. 
Aim 2 
As the above results have shown that participants’ beliefs about how aspects of their 
sleep compare to others influence their judgements about all five aspects measured, it is 
possible to explore whether overall worry and distress relating to sleep is associated with 
how people think their sleep compares to that of others using data from all five aspects. To 
recap, participants were asked how worried they had been about their sleep overall during 
the last 90 days (measured on a 0 to 100 scale from “not at all” to “a lot”, M = 38.04, SD = 
29.46) and how much distress sleeping problems had caused them during the last 90 days 
(measured on a 0 to 100 scale from “no distress” to “severe distress”, M = 28.55, SD = 
26.71). Participants’ answers to these questions were predicted from the absolute, rank, 
and distance from the average values of the aspect each participant stated that they had 
referred to the most when making these two judgements. In order to do this, new 
absolute, rank, and distance from the average variables were constructed using the 
following procedure: 
1. Participants’ absolute, rank, and distance from the average values for all five aspects 
were standardised (transformed into z scores) as the aspects were all measured using 
different scales (hours, minutes, days). This only affected the absolute and distance 
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from the average variables as rank was measured on a 0 to 100 scale for all aspects 
but, for consistency, all variables were standardised. 
2. Absolute, rank, and distance from the average values for the sleep duration aspect 
were inversed (i.e., multiplied by -1) so that, for all aspects, low absolute, rank, and 
distance from the average values indicated good sleep (e.g., long duration, short 
latency, few awakenings, etc.) and high values indicated bad sleep (e.g., short 
duration, long latency, numerous awakenings, etc.). 
3. For the following general outcomes: whether participants thought they had a sleep 
problem, sleep quality, worry about sleep, distress caused by sleep problems and help-
seeking, outcome specific absolute, rank and distance from the average variables were 
compiled. This was done using the transformed values from the aspect that each 
participant stated that they referred to the most when answering the question about 
that specific outcome. For example, one participant said that they had predominantly 
based their answer to the sleep quality question on the number of days that they felt 
refreshed after sleeping but had mainly based their answer to the worry about sleep 
question on the average number of hours of sleep they tend to get. In this case, their 
non-restorative sleep absolute, rank, and distance from the average answers would be 
used to predict their quality rating and their duration answers would be used to 
predict their worry rating. 
 As an aside, it was noted which were the most common aspects that participants 
stated that they referred to the most when making the judgements and decisions they 
were questioned about. Table 4.9 below shows that there was considerable variation in 
responses but that generally, sleep duration was the most important aspect considered 
when making judgements and decisions about sleep. Experiencing trouble staying awake 
during the day was the least important. 
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Table 4.9. 
The Number of Participants Stating Each Sleep Aspect as the Aspect they referred to the Most 
When Making Judgements About their Sleep. 
Judgement Duration Latency Disturbance 
Daytime 
Sleepiness 
Non-
restorative 
Sleep 
Worry 211 (32.7%) 99 (15.3%) 130 (20.2%) 70 (10.9%) 135 (20.9%) 
Distress 171 (26.5%) 100 (15.5%) 136 (21.1%) 84 (13.0%) 154 (23.9%) 
Sleep Problem 190 (29.5%) 114 (17.7%) 147 (22.8%) 50 (7.8%) 144 (22.3%) 
Sleep Quality 237 (36.7%) 62 (9.6%) 141 (21.9%) 41 (6.4%) 164 (25.4%) 
Help-seeking 101 (15.7%) 99 (15.3%) 106 (16.4%) 63 (9.8%) 104 (16.1%) 
Note. N = 645. 
Similar to previous results, Table 4.10 below shows that the most important 
predictor of participants’ worry about sleep and distress caused by sleeping problems was 
their absolute experience of the aspect they referred to the most when making these 
judgements. The step 1 models accounted for 34% of the variance in worry ratings and 31% 
of the variance in distress ratings. When rank is entered in step 2a, the amount of 
explained variance increases significantly, but by only 1% for both models and the absolute 
experience remains the most important predictor of the worry and distress ratings. When 
distance from the average is added in step 2b, the amount of explained variance only 
increases significantly in the distress model (by 1%) and again, the absolute experience 
remains the most important predictor. Model comparison showed that there was no 
significant difference in the amount of variance accounted for by the step 2a and 2b 
models in worry, t(642) = 1.29, p = .098, or distress ratings t(642) = 0.34, p = .366. These 
results suggest that social comparison may not be fuelling sleep-related worry and distress 
as much as originally hypothesised.
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Table 4.10. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Overall Worry about Sleep and Distress Caused by Sleeping Problems from Age, Gender, Absolute Experience of the Sleep 
Aspect they Based their Judgement On, Rank of this Sleep Aspect, and Distance from the Believed Average Experience of the Sleep Aspect in People Around the Same Age in 
the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Worry  Distress 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .34***    <.001  .31***    <.001 
Constant  45.67 (39.65-51.48) 3.14  .001   33.22 (27.40-39.34) 2.98  .001 
Age  -0.37 (-0.52--0.20) 0.08 -.15 .001   -0.27 (-0.43--0.12) 0.08 -.12 .001 
Gender  -1.75 (-5.23-1.90) 1.87 -.03 .347   0.82 (-2.60-4.19) 1.72 .02 .643 
Absolute Experience  14.79 (13.26-16.47) 0.87 .58 .001   12.88 (10.91-14.83) 0.94 .55 .001 
Step 2a .01***    <.001  .01*    <.001 
Constant  44.72 (38.65-50.81) 3.15  .001   32.72 (26.91-39.10) 2.98  .001 
Age  -0.35 (-0.51--0.19) 0.08 -.15 .001   -0.26 (-0.43--0.11) 0.08 -.12 .001 
Gender  -1.03 (-4.65-2.83) 1.89 -.02 .585   1.15 (-2.30-4.62) 1.74 .02 .517 
Absolute Experience  13.49 (11.83-15.31) 0.93 .53 .001   12.18 (10.26-14.19) 0.99 .52 .001 
Rank  3.60 (1.38-5.84) 1.08 .13 .001   2.08 (0.25-4.11) 0.96 .08 .035 
Step 2b .00    <.001  .01*    <.001 
Constant  45.22 (39.54-51.37) 3.07  .001   32.96 (27.06-38.95) 2.94  .001 
Age  -0.36 (-0.51--0.21) 0.08 -.15 .001   -0.27 (-0.42--0.12) 0.08 -.12 .002 
Gender  -1.47 (-5.09-2.35) 1.91 -.03 .453   1.18 (-2.39-4.86) 1.82 .02 .512 
Absolute Experience  12.17 (8.92-15.28) 1.63 .47 .001   9.62 (6.55-12.92) 1.54 .41 .001 
Distance from the Average  3.02 (-0.30-6.49) 1.62 .12 .067   3.78 (1.12-6.40) 1.46 .16 .014 
Note. N = 645, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. *p<.05, ***p<.001 
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Aim 3 
 In this section, participants judgements about whether they think they have a sleep 
problem (measured on a 0 to 100 scale from “definitely not” to “definitely yes”, M = 45.17, 
SD = 32.74), and ratings of their overall sleep quality (measured on a 0 to 100 scale from 
“very bad” to “very good”, M = 53.28, SD = 26.89) are predicted from the absolute, rank, 
and distance from the average values of the aspect each participant stated that they had 
referred to the most when making these two judgements. 
 Table 4.11 below shows a very similar pattern of results to those seen thus far. 
Participants’ absolute experience of the sleep aspect they referred to the most when 
judging whether they have a sleep problem and the overall quality of their sleep was the 
strongest predictor of these judgements in the step 1 models. These models account for 
39% of the variance in both judgements. When rank is entered in step 2a, the amount of 
explained variance increases significantly by 2% (sleep problem model) and 4% (quality 
model) but absolute experience remains the most important predictor of the judgements. 
Similarly, when distance from the average is added in step 2b, the amount of explained 
variance increases significantly by 1% in both models but the absolute experience remains 
the most important predictor. Model comparison showed that there was no significant 
difference in the amount of variance accounted for by the step 2a and 2b models in 
judgements of whether participants thought they had a sleep problem, t(642) = 1.50, p = 
.067, but model 2a accounted for significantly more variance in sleep quality judgements 
than model 2b, t(642) = 2.49, p = .007. 
 The results therefore suggest that participants did take into account how their sleep 
compared to that of others when judging whether they had a sleep problem and the 
overall quality of their sleep. The findings are inconclusive as to how they did so when 
judging whether they had a sleep problem but suggest that they compared using rank-
based strategies when judging the quality of their sleep.  
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Table 4.11. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants think they have a Sleep Problem and Overall Quality of Sleep Ratings from Age, Gender, Absolute 
Experience of the Sleep Aspect they Based their Judgement On, Rank of this Sleep Aspect, and Distance from the Believed Average Experience of the Sleep Aspect in People 
Around the Same Age in the General Population (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Sleep Problem  Sleep Quality 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .39***    <.001  .39***    <.001 
Constant  47.33 (40.38-54.11) 3.31  .001   50.25 (45.01-55.65) 2.67  .001 
Age  -0.27 (-0.41--0.12) 0.08 -.10 .003   0.19 (0.05-0.32) 0.07 .09 .005 
Gender  -0.10 (-4.21-3.82) 1.98 .00 .950   0.54 (-2.71-3.62) 1.65 .01 .760 
Absolute Experience   17.93 (16.16-19.81) 0.93 .62 .001   -14.91 (-16.46--13.51) 0.81 -.63 .001 
Step 2a .02***    <.001  .04***    <.001 
Constant  46.31 (39.59-52.79) 3.27  .001   50.80 (45.56-56.32) 2.58  .001 
Age  -0.25 (-0.39--0.10) 0.08 -.09 .002   0.17 (0.03-0.31) 0.07 .08 .008 
Gender  0.50 (-3.36-4.22) 1.95 .01 .798   0.11 (-2.95-3.14) 1.61 .00 .944 
Absolute Experience  16.14 (14.03-18.26) 1.03 .56 .001   -12.55 (-14.24--10.98) 0.91 -.53 .001 
Rank  4.55 (2.57-6.48) 1.06 .15 .001   -5.46 (-7.37--3.58) 0.90 -.21 .001 
Step 2b .01*    <.001  .01**    <.001 
Constant  46.66 (40.33-53.09) 3.16  .001   50.88 (45.54-56.09) 2.57  .001 
Age  -0.25 (-0.41--0.08) 0.08 -.09 .002   0.18 (0.05-0.32) 0.07 .08 .014 
Gender  0.16 (-3.58-3.66) 2.06 .00 .926   0.05 (-3.19-2.93) 1.60 .00 .973 
Absolute Experience  14.18 (10.53-17.93) 1.92 .49 .001   -11.41 (-14.65--8.75) 1.57 -.48 .001 
Distance from the Average  4.25 (0.72-7.75) 1.77 .15 .019   -4.03 (-7.10--0.66) 1.51 -.17 .008 
Note. N = 645, CI = confidence interval. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Aim 4 
 The fourth aim of the study was to investigate whether people compare to others 
when making decisions about help-seeking for sleep problems, either directly or indirectly 
through sleep-related worry or distress and/or general sleep perceptions. Participants were 
only asked which of the five sleep aspects had influenced their help-seeking decision the 
most if they had actually sought help. This meant that the help-seeking absolute, rank, and 
distance from the average variables calculated using the aspect each participant stated that 
they had referred to the most when making help-seeking decisions were not complete. This 
aim is consequently investigated in a slightly different manner to the two previous aims. 
New absolute, rank, and distance from the average variables were constructed by 
calculating the average absolute, rank, and distance from the average standardised values 
across all five sleep aspects. These are referred to as the “average” absolute, rank, and 
distance from the average variables. Direct associations will be explored first. Tables 4.12 
and 4.13 below show the results from regression analyses investigating predictors of: 
1. The number of help-seeking behaviours participants engaged in to manage sleeping 
problems (M = 1.99, SD = 1.86),  
2. Whether they had sought help at all for sleeping problems (73.6%),  
3. Whether they had consulted a professional about their sleeping problems (8.2%), and  
4. Whether they had taken medication for sleeping problems (30.7%). 
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Table 4.12. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting the Number of Sleep Help-seeking Behaviours Participants Engaged with and Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether 
Participants Sought Help for Sleep Problems from Age, Gender and the Average Absolute, Rank, and Distance from the Average Variables (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence 
Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Number of Help-seeking Behaviours   Whether Participants Sought Help 
Predictors 
∆R2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .21***    <.001  .17***    <.001  
Constant  2.37 (1.94-2.79) 0.19  .001    1.41 (0.77-2.08) 0.32 .001 4.10 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.01 -.08 .018   -0.04 0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .704 1.00 (0.98-1.01) 
Gender  0.05 (-0.21-0.29) 0.13 .01 .733   -0.05 -0.10 (-0.51-0.31) 0.20 .612 0.91 (0.62-1.33) 
Absolute Experience   1.23 (1.01-1.43) 0.10 .45 .001   0.99 1.44 (1.05-1.93) 0.20 .001 4.22 (2.93-6.09) 
Step 2a .01*    <.001  .00    <.001  
Constant  2.35 (1.93-2.75) 0.19  .001    1.42 (0.78-2.11) 0.32 .001 4.16 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.01 -.07 .018   -0.04 0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .702 1.00 (0.98-1.01) 
Gender  0.08 (-0.19-0.33) 0.13 .02 .566   -0.06 -0.12 (-0.53-0.29) 0.20 .538 0.89 (0.61-1.31) 
Absolute Experience  1.11 (0.88-1.34) 0.11 .41 .001   0.93 1.36 (0.91-1.87) 0.23 .001 3.89 (2.63-5.75) 
Rank  0.30 (0.06-0.52) 0.11 .10 .012   0.12 0.19 (-0.14-0.51) 0.17 .247 1.21 (0.87-1.69) 
Step 2b .00    <.001  .01    <.001  
Constant  2.36 (2.00-2.77) 0.19  .001    1.44 (0.76-2.16) 0.35 .001 4.23 
Age  -0.01 (-0.02-0.00) 0.01 -.08 .020   -0.04 0.00 (-0.02-0.01) 0.01 .655 1.00 (0.98-1.01) 
Gender  0.06 (-0.21-0.33) 0.14 .02 .625   -0.06 -0.13 (-0.54-0.26) 0.20 .513 0.88 (0.60-1.30) 
Absolute Experience  1.07 (0.72-1.47) 0.18 .40 .001   0.79 1.15 (0.59-1.78) 0.29 .001 3.15 (1.89-5.26) 
Distance from the Average  0.19 (-0.15-0.50) 0.18 .07 .307   0.26 0.38 (-0.07-0.87) 0.24 .105 1.47 (0.91-2.36) 
Note. N = 645, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2.  Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. *p<.05, 
***p<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1
8
5
 
Table 4.13. 
Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Whether Participants Sought Help from a Professional (Doctor, Nurse, Pharmacist, Counsellor, Psychologist or Any Other Professional) 
or Took Medication (Prescribed or Over-the-Counter) for Sleep Problems from Age, Gender and the Average Absolute, Rank, and Distance from the Average Variables (95% 
BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Sought Help from a Professional  Took Medication 
Predictors 
∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio  
(95% CI) 
 ∆RN2 B* B (95% CI) 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Odds Ratio  
(95% CI) 
Step 1 .20***    <.001   .17***    <.001  
Constant   -3.70 (-4.92--2.57) 0.60 .001 0.03    -1.36 (-1.94--0.78) 0.31 .001 0.26 
Age  0.29 0.02 (0.00-0.05) 0.01 .041 1.03 (1.00-1.05)   0.21 0.02 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .028 1.02 (1.00-1.03) 
Gender  -0.03 -0.06 (-0.72-0.57) 0.33 .849 0.94 (0.51-1.75)   -0.14 -0.29 (-0.68-0.11) 0.19 .119 0.75 (0.52-1.08) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.96 1.41 (1.02-1.90) 0.23 .001 4.09 (2.69-6.23)   0.75 1.10 (0.84-1.40) 0.14 .001 3.00 (2.28-3.95) 
Step 2a .05***    <.001   .01    <.001  
Constant   -3.95 (-5.15--2.78) 0.63 .001 0.02    -1.37 (-1.94--0.80) 0.31 .001 0.26 
Age  0.34 0.03 (0.00-0.05) 0.01 .021 1.03 (1.01-1.05)   0.22 0.02 (0.00-0.04) 0.01 .025 1.02 (1.00-1.03) 
Gender  -0.09 -0.18 (-0.84-0.42) 0.35 .594 0.83 (0.44-1.58)   -0.15 -0.31 (-0.72-0.09) 0.19 .099 0.73 (0.51-1.06) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.77 1.13 (0.65-1.72) 0.25 .001 3.09 (1.97-4.85)   0.69 1.01 (0.73-1.33) 0.15 .001 2.74 (2.04-3.68) 
Rank  0.67 1.08 (0.39-1.85) 0.34 .003 2.93 (1.67-5.15)   0.16 0.26 (-0.10-0.63) 0.17 .117 1.30 (0.94-1.80) 
Step 2b .01    <.001   .00    <.001  
Constant   -3.74 (-4.85--2.75) 0.58 .001 0.02    -1.35 (-1.91--0.78) 0.30 .001 0.26 
Age  0.32 0.03 (0.00-0.05) 0.01 .028 1.03 (1.00-1.05)   0.21 0.02 (0.00-0.03) 0.01 .021 1.02 (1.00-1.03) 
Gender  -0.06 -0.13 (-0.78-0.50) 0.33 .681 0.88 (0.47-1.65)   -0.15 -0.31 (-0.69-0.06) 0.19 .106 0.74 (0.51-1.06) 
Symptom Occurrence  0.59 0.86 (0.03-1.56) 0.39 .027 2.36 (1.08-5.19)   0.63 0.92 (0.45-1.36) 0.24 .001 2.52 (1.58-3.99) 
Distance from the Average  0.44 0.63 (-0.26-1.62) 0.45 .157 1.88 (0.87-4.09)   0.15 0.21 (-0.26-0.76) 0.25 .381 1.24 (0.79-1.95) 
Note. N = 645, CI = confidence interval, B* = semi-standardised coefficient, RN2 = Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2.  Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < 
.001. 
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 Total number of help-seeking behaviours: The step 1 model in Table 4.12 accounts 
for 21% of the variance in the total number of help-seeking behaviours participants 
engaged with in order to manage sleep problems. Consistent with previous results, the 
absolute variable was the strongest predictor in the step 1 model. When the rank variable 
was entered in step 2a, the amount of variance accounted for by the model increases 
slightly but significantly by 1%. Although participants’ average believed rank is a significant 
predictor of the total number of help-seeking behaviours engaged with, its effect is 
significantly smaller than that of participants’ average absolute experience of the five sleep 
aspects. No effect is seen when the distance from the average variable is added in step 2b. 
There was no significant difference in the amount of variance accounted for by the step 2a 
and 2b models, t(642) = 1.03, p = .152, confirming that the effect of rank is very small. 
 Whether sought help at all: Again, Table 4.12 shows that the absolute variable is the 
most important predictors of whether participants sought help at all in all steps of the 
model. The step 1 model accounts for 17% of the variance in this decision. This time when 
the rank variable is entered in step 2a, no effect is seen. Again, no effect is seen when the 
distance from the average variable is added in step 2b.  
 Whether sought help from a professional: A slightly stronger rank effect is seen in 
Table 4.13. The step 1 model accounts for 20% of the variance in decisions to seek help 
from a professional with the absolute variable being the most important predictor of this 
outcome. This amount of explained variance increases significantly by 5% when the rank 
variable is added in step 2a but the absolute variable remains the most important predictor 
in the model. Again, no effect is seen when the distance from the average variable is added 
in step 2b. Although the amount of explained variance increases by 1%, this is not a 
significant increase. This time there was strong evidence that the step 2a model fitted the 
data better than the step 2b model (differences in -2LL: -12.09). However, these results 
should be interpreted with caution as consulting a professional was rare (only 8% of 
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participants did so) meaning that the maximum likelihood estimation of the model is likely 
to suffer from small-sample bias (King & Zeng, 2001). Inspection of the classification tables 
showed that only three extra people were correctly classified when rank was added to the 
step 1 model; this resulted in just a 0.4% increase in overall classification accuracy. In 
general, the ability of the step 2a model to correctly classify participants who sought help 
from a professional was extremely low (9.4% correctly classified). 
 Whether took medication: As can be seen in Table 4.13, no comparison effects were 
seen at all for this outcome. The absolute variable was the most important predictor of 
whether participants took medication for sleep problems. The step one models accounted 
for 17% of the variance in these decisions.  
 In summary, the results provide little evidence of any association between beliefs 
about how one’s sleep compares to others and help-seeking. It therefore did not make 
sense to investigate any indirect effects as planned when there was so little support for the 
existence of direct effects. 
Aim 5 
The fifth aim of the study was to investigate how people compare to others when 
making sleep-related judgements and decisions about help-seeking, namely whether they 
use rank or average-based comparisons as consistent with DbS and ALT respectively. 
Overall, the results reported above suggest that when people compare to others to make 
these judgements and decisions they tend to do so using rank-based strategies. Out of the 
18 models reported above, rank was a significant predictor in 16 models whereas distance 
from the average was a significant predictor in only 7 (these 7 models were ones where 
rank was also a significant predictor; in the 4 models where rank was not a significant 
predictor distance from the average was not either). However, the rank effects were 
generally small - on average the rank variables, when significant, accounted for just 2.4% of 
explained variance in the outcomes measured (range: 1-7%). The rank effects were only 
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significantly greater than the effects of the distance from the average variables in 3 out of 
the 7 models where they were both significant predictors and 9 out of the 16 models 
where comparison effects were seen. However, the distance from the average effects were 
never stronger than the rank effects, there was simply no significant difference between 
the two. The distance from the average variables never accounted for any more than 1% of 
the variance in any of the outcomes measured. 
Aim 6  
As there was so little evidence of a relationship between participants’ beliefs about 
how their sleep compares to that of others and help-seeking, associations between these 
beliefs and help-seeking accuracy were not investigated.  
Discussion 
Overview 
 This study primarily investigated whether there was any association between 
people’s beliefs about how much their sleep differed from that of others and sleep-related 
worry and distress. Previous research has shown that dysfunctional beliefs play a role in the 
maintenance and exacerbation of sleep disorders, as they are part of the negative cognitive 
activity that causes heightened arousal and emotional distress that leads to sleep 
disturbance (Harvey, 2002). It was hypothesised that beliefs about how one’s sleep 
compares to that of others may be one type of dysfunctional belief involved in this process. 
This had not been investigated previously, possibly because a standardised measure of 
dysfunctional beliefs (the DBAS) has been used extensively in both research investigating 
dysfunctional beliefs and in therapy to identify and address such beliefs. This scale does not 
include items that specifically measure beliefs about how much one’s sleep differs from 
that of others, i.e., perceived sleep norms. However, the results reported here provided 
little evidence that such beliefs were associated with either worry related to specific 
aspects of sleep or overall worry about sleep and distress caused by sleep problems.  
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 Out of these outcomes, the largest comparison effects were seen when participants 
were asked about how worried they were about five specific aspects of their sleep. These 
were the average number of hours sleep they got (sleep duration) and time they took to 
get to sleep over the last 90 days (sleep latency) and the number of days in the last 90 that 
they had trouble sleeping because of waking up throughout the night (sleep disturbance), 
trouble staying awake during the day (daytime sleepiness) and felt that their sleep was not 
refreshing (non-restorative sleep). The rank comparison variable for each aspect (i.e., the 
percentage of people about the participant’s age in the general population that each 
participant believed slept for more hours, took less time to get to sleep and who had fewer 
days where they had trouble sleeping because of night awakenings, staying awake during 
the day and not feeling refreshed after sleep) accounted for 2%, 5%, 2%, 2% and 1% of the 
variance in judgements of how worried participants were about each of these aspects 
respectively. The distance from the average comparison variables (i.e., the difference 
between the participant’s absolute experience of each aspect and what they believed to be 
the average experience of each aspect in people about their age from the general 
population) accounted for 1% of the variance in worry about sleep duration and latency 
judgements and no significant amount of the variance in worry about sleep disturbance, 
daytime sleepiness and non-restorative sleep judgements. For sleep latency, disturbance, 
and daytime sleepiness the amount of variance in worry judgements accounted for by the 
rank variables was significantly greater than that accounted for by the distance from the 
average variables. These effects are small and suggest only a weak association between 
worry related to specific aspects of sleep and beliefs about how experiences of these sleep 
aspects compare to others - specifically, where participants believed their experience of 
the sleep aspect ranked in comparison to others. 
 The effects seen when participants’ rank and distance from the average values for 
the sleep aspect they referred to the most when making the overall worry and distress 
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judgements were used to predict these judgements were even smaller. The rank variables 
accounted for 1% of the variance in worry and distress judgements and the distance from 
the average variables accounted for no significant amount of the variance in worry 
judgements and 1% of the variance in distress judgements. When similar comparison 
variables were used to predict participants’ ratings of the overall quality of their sleep and 
their beliefs about whether they think have a sleep problem, the effects seen were again 
significant but small. The rank variables accounted for 2% and 4% of the variance in sleep 
problem and quality judgements respectively whereas the distance from the average 
variables accounted for only 1% of the variance in these judgements (the 3% difference in 
the amount of explained variance in quality ratings between the two comparison variables 
was significant). 
 This study also investigated whether there was any association between people’s 
beliefs about how their sleep compares to that of others and decisions regarding seeking 
help for sleep problems. Overall, there was very little evidence to suggest that such 
relationships existed. The distance from the average variable used in these analyses was 
not a significant predictor of any of the help-seeking outcomes (total number of help-
seeking behaviours, whether participants sought any kind of help, whether they consulted 
a professional and whether they took medication). The rank variable only significantly 
predicted the total number of help-seeking behaviours participants engaged in and 
whether they consulted a professional for sleep problems. This variable accounted for 1% 
and 5% of the variance in these decisions, however, the latter estimate is likely to be 
inaccurate due to small-sample bias. 
 Overall, these results were not as predicted and suggest that, of the independent 
variables measured, participants’ absolute sleep experience was the most important 
predictor of sleep-related worry and distress, quality ratings, beliefs about the presence of 
a sleep disorder and help-seeking. Participants’ beliefs about how this experience 
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compares to that of others played a very small role in their judgement and decision-
making. These findings suggest that inaccurate perceptions of how much one’s sleep differs 
from that of others may not be fruitful targets for CBT-I or education campaigns aiming to 
make people feel better and worry less about their sleep.  
Study Limitations 
 There were some limitations to the study that may have contributed to the findings. 
The main outcomes relating to judgements about sleep (the general worry, distress, 
quality, and sleep problem outcomes) were predicted using variables constructed from the 
absolute, rank, and distance from the average values relating to the sleep aspect that each 
participant stated that they referred to the most when making the judgements. The 
outcomes relating to decisions made about sleep-related help-seeking were predicted by 
participants’ average absolute, rank, and distance from the average values across all five 
aspects of sleep. It is possible that these variables do not accurately reflect what 
participants were actually thinking about when making judgements and decisions about 
their sleep because 1) participants may have taken into account more than one aspect but 
not all of the aspects when making the judgement/decision and 2) these aspects did not 
encompass all aspects of sleep. For example, in the context of sleep disturbance 
participants were asked only about the amount of times they had trouble sleeping because 
of waking up during the night. Sleep could have been disturbed by many other factors such 
as noise, difficulty breathing, pain, or being too hot or too cold although it could be argued 
that all of these factors may ultimately cause waking during the night. Instead of using 
these constructed variables, it may have been better to investigate general sleep-related 
judgements and decisions using general absolute, rank, and distance from the average 
measures. Such measures could have asked something like “on how many of the last 90 
nights have you had problems sleeping?”, “out of 100 people, how many do you think have 
had problems sleeping on more nights than you over the last 90 nights?” and “on average, 
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on how many of the last 90 nights do you think people had problems sleeping?”. These 
measures could have been included alongside the specific absolute, rank, and average 
measures. 
 However, these limitations apply to all of the main variables of interest – the 
absolute, rank, and distance from the average variables. If they had a large effect on the 
results then it would be expected that the effects of all three of these variables would be 
small and this was not what was observed. Consistently, across all models and outcomes, 
the effects of the absolute variables were large and significantly larger than any 
comparison effects. This suggests that the small comparison effects seen were not due to 
these methodological limitations and may simply reflect the actual size of these effects.  
Conclusions 
 To conclude, the results from this study provide very little evidence of an association 
between how people believe their sleep compares to that of others and sleep-related 
worry and distress, beliefs about having a sleep disorder, perceptions of sleep quality and 
help-seeking for sleep problems. This suggests that beliefs about how one’s sleep differs 
from that of others may not be fuelling the kind of affective responses that cause, 
exacerbate, and maintain sleep disorder as originally hypothesised.  
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Chapter 5: General Health 
Overview 
 General health is often measured in large-scale surveys by a single question asking 
respondents to rate their overall health on a five-point scale. Answers to these self-rated 
health questions are used extensively in research on population health, for policy making 
and resource allocation. However, research suggests that self-rated health (SRH) may not 
approximate actual health very well, with many studies showing that individuals frequently 
under- or overestimate their health when giving subjective health ratings. Although it has 
been suggested that this is due to people using different comparison samples when 
answering the question, exactly how the use of different comparison samples can lead to 
under- or overestimations has not previously been explained. Therefore, the main aims of 
this study are to investigate the extent to which people compare to others when making 
SRH judgements, whom they compare to, and how exactly they compare. Other aims of the 
study include investigating differences in participants’ beliefs about others and the impact 
they may have on both SRH judgements and measures, and investigating the extent to 
which people compare their health to their own previous health as well as that of others 
and investigating what aspects of their health people compare. 
Introduction 
Self-rated health (also referred to as self-perceived health or self-assessed health) is 
a measure of general health that is obtained by asking individuals to rate their overall 
health on a four- or five-point scale typically from “poor” to “excellent” or “very good”. The 
measure is deliberately vague; it allows people to use their own definition of ‘health’ when 
making the assessment (Snead, 2007) and therefore may capture elements of health that 
other, more detailed or specific questions would not (Au & Johnston, 2013). 
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Due to their brevity and inclusivity, SRH questions are often used in large-scale 
national and international surveys (such as the British Household Panel Survey in the UK, 
the National Health Interview Survey in the USA and the World Values Survey) to measure 
population health. Data from SRH questions obtained in such surveys are subsequently 
used (and recommended for use by the World Health Organisation [WHO, 1996] and the 
Euro-REVES 2 project [Robine, Jagger, & The Euro-REVES 2 Group, 2003]) to inform health-
related policy such as the planning and allocation of health care resources. SRH is the most 
commonly used health measure in economics research (Au & Johnston, 2013), having been 
used to investigate relationships between health and factors such as socioeconomic status 
(Contoyannis, Jones, & Rice, 2004; Smith, 1999), education (Johnson, 2010; Silles, 2009) 
and income (Ettner, 1996; Meer, Miller, & Rosen, 2003). SRH is also included in health 
measures such as the SF-36 health survey instrument (Ware & Gandek, 1998) which is one 
of the most widely used health measures in the world (Ware et al., 2008), and is frequently 
used as an outcome measure in clinical trials (Fayers & Sprangers, 2002).  
SRH has repeatedly been shown to predict morbidity and mortality (e.g., Benyamini 
& Idler, 1999; Ferraro, Farmer, & Wybraniec, 1997; Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Ford, Spallek, 
& Dobson, 2008; Jylhä, 2009), often more strongly than disease specific measures (e.g., 
Ferraro & Farmer 1999; Idler & Benyamini 1997; Idler & Kasl, 1991, Kaplan & Camacho, 
1983). SRH is also a strong predictor of subsequent disability (e.g., Idler & Kasl, 1995; 
Kaplan, Strawbridge, Camacho, & Cohen, 1993; Mansson & Rastam, 2001) and use of 
medical care (e.g., van Doorslaer, Jones, & Koolman, 2004; Pinquart, 2001), functional 
limitations (Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Idler, Russell, & Davis, 2000) and health-related 
behaviour (Cott, Gignac, & Badley, 1999; Manderbacka, 1998). 
However, despite its widespread use and predictive power, the validity of SRH as a 
measure of objective health continues to be questioned in the literature (e.g., Powdthavee, 
2009). Correlations between SRH and objective health measures such as physician 
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assessments or the number of chronic illnesses, disorders or symptoms a person has tend 
to be modest (rarely greater than .30: Suls, Marco, & Tobin, 1991; between .21 and .46: 
Singh-Manoux et al., 2006). The discordance in self-rated and physician-rated health has 
been reported to range from 32% to 78% of cases (e.g., DeSalvo & Muntner, 2011: 46%; 
Geest, Engberg, & Lauritzen, 2011: 32%; Kjvinen, Halonen, Eronen, & Nissinen, 1998: 64%; 
Mellner & Lundberg, 2003: 78%; Smith & Goldman, 2011: 63%; Undén & Elofsson, 2001: 
40%). Furthermore, using regression analyses with data from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel, Jürges (2008) shows that, when predicting mortality, the independent effects of 
covariates such as age, sex, marital status, and income are barely attenuated when SRH is 
added as a predictor variable to the model. Jürges (2008) argues that although SRH is a 
strong predictor of mortality in isolation, if it was a valid or unbiased measure of objective 
health then it should absorb many of the health risks related to these covariates therefore 
reducing their predictive power.   
In order to determine whether SRH is a good measure of objective health, 
discrepancies between subjective and objective health ratings (sometimes referred to as 
‘reporting behaviour’) have been examined in samples where the two can be compared. 
This research has repeatedly shown that individuals often under- or overestimate their 
health when giving subjective health ratings (e.g., Baron-Epel et al., 2005; Jylhä, Guralnik, 
Balfour, & Fried, 2001; Layes, Asada, & Kepart, 2012). It is commonly suggested that this is 
because individuals compare to others when making the SRH judgement and use different 
comparison or ‘reference’ groups when judging their health (e.g., Groot, 2000; 
Powdthavee, 2009; van der Zee, Buunk, & Sanderman, 1995). This has been referred to in 
the literature as ‘scale of reference bias’ (Groot, 2000), ‘adaptation bias’ (see Groot, 2000), 
‘cut-point shift’ and ‘index shift’ (Lindeboom & van Doorslaer, 2004), ‘state-dependent 
reporting bias’ (Kerkhofs & Lindeboom, 1995), ‘scale recalibration’ (Ubel, Jankovic, Smith, 
Langa, & Fagerlin, 2005) and ‘differential item functioning’ (Hays, Morales, & Reise, 2000). 
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 Whilst there has been much research on the role of social comparison when making 
SRH judgments, a number of important questions remain unanswered. How do people 
construct comparison groups and how exactly do they compare their health to that of 
others? A greater understanding of the cognitive processes underling SRH judgements may 
provide a more detailed explanation of why people over- and underestimate their health 
and how general health may be better measured. Therefore, the main aims of this study 
are to investigate the extent to which people compare to others when making SRH 
judgements, whom they compare to and how exactly they compare. Other aims of the 
study include investigating differences in participants’ beliefs about others and the impact 
they may have on both SRH judgements and measures, and investigating the extent to 
which people compare their health to their previous health as well as that of others and 
investigating what aspects of their health people compare.   
 The rest of this introduction is divided into two sections. The first concerns the use of 
social comparison when making SRH judgements (the main focus of the study) and the 
literature on this topic is briefly reviewed. An explanation is then given as to how the 
current research expands on the previous before the aims of the study relating to this issue 
are outlined. The second section briefly reviews previous research on the aspects of health 
that people use when making SRH judgements, explains how this is extended in the current 
study, and outlines the aims of the study in regard to this topic. 
Judging Self-Rated Health Using Social Comparison 
Research that has explored the role of social comparison when making SRH 
judgements has investigated whether and how much people compare to others, whom 
they compare to, the extent to which social comparisons influence SRH judgements and 
whether people make different SRH judgements when asked to compare to different 
comparison groups. For example, Kaplan and Baron-Epel (2003) asked participants if they 
compared themselves to others after making a SRH judgement and if so to whom. Nearly 
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80% of participants (n = 258) said that they used a comparison group to evaluate their 
subjective health and 52% of these individuals reported that people their age were the 
most influential comparison group when making the SRH judgement. Other groups used for 
comparison were friends/acquaintances (24%), sick people in general (8%), a specific 
acquaintance (5%), people with similar illnesses (3%), work colleagues (2%), people that 
live in the same district (2%), people in the same socioeconomic class (2%) and a particular 
sick person known to the participant (2%). Carrieri (2012) used data from over 128,000 
individuals in the Italian Health Conditions Survey to investigate the extent to which SRH 
judgements could be predicted by how an individual’s objective health (measured through 
the presence or absence of one or more chronic or disabling illnesses) compared to that of 
others in constructed comparison groups. He found substantial evidence that individuals’ 
SRH judgements were influenced by the health of similar others (those of the same age, 
socioeconomic status and who lived in the same area) and the health of people that they 
lived with and suggested that SRH judgements were made using the health of others as a 
benchmark. These effects remained when income and other socioeconomic and 
demographic variables were controlled for. 
Both Fayers, Langston, and Robertson (2007) and Ubel et al. (2005) showed how 
individuals with the same objective health give different health-related quality of life 
(HRQL) and SRH ratings respectively depending on the comparison group used when 
making the rating. Fayers et al. (2007) found that the comparison group patients chose 
when making a HRQL judgement was not related to illness severity but that there were 
significant differences in mean HRQL scores across comparison groups. Those who said 
they compared to themselves before they were ill had significantly higher (worse) HRQL 
scores than those who said they compared to healthy peers. Furthermore, the same finding 
was seen at three different time points throughout the study, despite some participants 
changing their comparison group over time. Ubel et al. (2005) gave participants (all older 
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adults) one of three versions of the SRH question: a standard version, one asking them to 
compare to people their own age and one asking them to compare to 20-year-olds. They 
found that although there were no significant differences in the number of reported 
illnesses or the number of reported limitations to daily living activities across groups, 
participants comparing their health to that of a 20-year-old reported significantly worse 
health (mean rating 66 of 100) than those answering the standard SRH and same-aged 
comparison questions (both mean rating 73 of 100). This is perhaps an extreme example, as 
it may be unlikely that older adults would compare to those so much younger, but 
nonetheless demonstrates the effect that using different comparison groups can have on 
SRH ratings. 
These studies provide evidence that SRH judgements are, in part, made through a 
comparison of one’s own health to others. However, the precise cognitive mechanisms 
through which these comparisons are made remain untested. Studies that have simply 
asked participants how they made a SRH judgement (e.g., Kaplan & Baron-Epel, 2003; 
Krause & Jay, 1994) have found that some participants compared their own health to 
others but do not go as far as asking the exact process used in this comparison and 
subsequent evaluation or the extent to which the judgement was based on the 
comparison. Studies using regression models to investigate whether group comparisons 
predict SRH (e.g., Powdthavee, 2009; Carrieri, 2012) assume that comparisons are made to 
the average health of the comparison group and use this in the models.  
As explained in the introduction chapter, the idea that we compare to the average is 
widely assumed but yet largely untested in the social comparison literature. Through 
applying ALT and DbS to SRH judgements, the actual mechanisms used in the comparison 
process can be tested for the first time. Applied to SRH judgements, ALT would suggest that 
people judge how well they are based on how their health compares to the average health 
of others in a comparison sample. DbS on the other hand would suggest that people judge 
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how well they are based on where their health ranks amongst the health of others in the 
comparison sample.  
Therefore, the main aims of the current study are: 
1. To measure the strength of the relationship between subjective and objective health, 
2. To investigate the extent to which people compare to others and to their previous 
health when making SRH judgements and to further investigate who they compare to, 
3. To understand how people make comparisons, i.e., whether they use rank or average-
based strategies, and 
4. To investigate how beliefs about others may differ and the impact this may have on 
both SRH judgements and measures. 
As mentioned earlier, although the main aim of the study is to investigate the extent 
to which people compare to others when making SRH judgements and how they make 
these comparisons, the aspects of health that people use when making SRH judgements 
are also investigated and this is explained in detail in the section below. 
Aspects of Health Used in Self-Rated Health Judgements 
Jylhä (2009) proposes a model that describes the process involved in evaluating 
one’s health and making the SRH judgement. The process involves three stages of 
evaluation. Firstly, the individual must decide what they consider “health” to be and what 
aspects of health (e.g., presence or absence of symptoms/conditions/illnesses, engagement 
with healthy and/or non-healthy behaviours, physical functioning etc.) they should use 
when making the SRH judgement. Once this is determined, the individual then considers 
how to take each aspect into account and how to amalgamate them in order to make an 
overall judgement about their health. Finally, the individual has to decide which of the 
given scale answers their health assessment matches best. Jylhä (2009) notes that all of the 
stages are influenced by contextual factors – individuals do not consider aspects of their 
health abstractly, they do so within different contexts such as how much their health 
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impacts on their daily living or how their health currently compares to their previous health 
or the health of others.  
Studies investigating which aspects of health are used to make the SRH judgment 
have directly asked people which aspects of their health they brought to mind whilst 
making the judgement (e.g., Kaplan & Baron-Epel, 2003; Krause & Jay, 1994) or by using 
regression analysis to see the extent to which certain aspects predict SRH (e.g., Au & 
Johnston, 2013; Mavaddat et al., 2011; Schüz, Wurm, Schöllgen, & Tesch-Römer, 2011). 
The latter is often done using standardised measures or subscales of measures (such as the 
SF-36) that measure particular aspects of health such as physical health, mental health, and 
physical functioning. These studies have shown that individuals use a wide range of health 
aspects when making the SRH judgement such as the presence or absence of physical 
health problems or illnesses, engagement with positive or negative health behaviours (such 
as taking regular exercise, eating healthily, smoking and drinking alcohol), physical 
functioning, general physical condition, mental health and well-being, and 
energy/tiredness.  
There is some debate as to which of these aspects is most frequently used or which 
is the most important aspect used when making the SRH judgment, but generally 
individuals refer to aspects of their physical health rather than their mental health. 
Functional status, vitality, and presence of illness or disease are most commonly used when 
making the judgement (Au & Johnston, 2013; Krause & Jay, 1994; Mavaddat et al., 2011; 
Powdthavee & van den Berg, 2011; Schüz, et al., 2011). Kaplan and Baron-Epel (2003) 
asked participants to rate how influential different aspects of health were when making the 
SRH judgement. The most influential factor across all participants was general feeling; pain 
and difficulty in performing certain activities were also important. Differences in the use of 
aspects have also been found across ages, education groups, and race and between those 
in good and bad health. Krause and Jay (1994) showed that younger people were more 
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likely than older people to refer to health behaviours when making the SRH judgement and 
older people were more likely than younger people to refer to health problems. 
Participants who went to university were less likely than those who did not to refer to 
health behaviours. They also found that Hispanic and Black people were more likely than 
White people to refer to health problems when judging their health and that White people 
were more likely than Hispanic and Black people to refer to their general physical 
functioning. There is also evidence that older people in poor health base their ratings on 
health problems or limitations whereas those in good health tend to base their ratings 
more on health behaviours (Benyamini, Idler, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 2000; Benyamini, 
Leventhal, & Leventhal, 1999; 2003). Using data from all their participants (both old and 
young), Kaplan and Baron-Epel (2003) found that participants in poor health rated pain, 
tiredness and current medication intake as being more influential than those in good health 
whereas those in good health rated difficulty in performing activities as being more 
influential. 
Whilst much is known about the aspects of health that people bring to mind when 
making the SRH judgement, less is known about how these aspects are actually taken into 
account (Jylhä, 2009), i.e., the second stage of Jylhä’ s (2009) model. As outlined above, it is 
hypothesised that people sometimes make SRH judgements using a comparative process 
and therefore it is hypothesised that aspects of health are brought to mind and then 
compared, either to other people’s experiences of the aspect or the individual’s previous 
experiences of the aspect. For example, an individual may judge how good their health is 
by considering the number of cigarettes they smoke and they may do this by comparing 
this number to the number that their friends and family smoke. Another individual may use 
the current state of a longstanding illness to make the judgement and may compare this to 
how they were 3 years ago in order to do so. Therefore, this study will also investigate 
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which aspects of their health individuals compare to others and their previous experiences. 
The aims of the second part of the study are as follows: 
5. To further understand what aspects of their health people base SRH judgements on 
and to explore any group differences, 
6. To understand what aspects of their health people use specifically to compare to 
others and to themselves previously, and 
7. To see whether people use different strategies when making the SRH judgement 
depending on which aspect of their health they use when doing so.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 643) were recruited through Amazon MTurk and had a mean age of 
37.1 years (SD = 12.7, range = 18-83 years), were predominantly White (72%, Asian = 9%, 
Black = 8%, Hispanic/Latino = 6%, other = 5%), and 57% were female. Participants were 
mainly university educated (64%, high school diploma = 33%, some high school = 2%, rather 
not say = 1%), were all resident in the U.S. and completed the study from 49 different 
states. Participants received $0.75 on completion of the study which took 15-20 minutes to 
complete. 
Design and procedure 
The questionnaire that participants completed in this study was designed and hosted 
using Qualtrics. Participants were asked the following: 
Self-rated health: SRH was measured through the following question: “In general, 
would you say your health is: excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor”. This version was 
taken from the SF-36 health survey instrument (Ware & Gandek, 1998). Participants 
answered using a slider scale that went from 0 to 100 and which was visibly divided into 5 
sections with “poor” encompassing an answer between 0 and 20, “fair” between 20 and 40 
and so on.  
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How they made the SRH judgement: Participants were then asked “in the form of a 
percentage where 0% is not at all and 100% is completely, when you answered the 
previous question about your general health, to what extent did you: A) Compare yourself 
to other people in order to answer the question? B) Compare your current health with your 
previous health in order to answer the question?  C) Base your answer on something else 
completely?”. The question was designed such that their answers to all parts needed to 
add up to 100%. 
Rank amongst comparison groups: Next, participants stated the percentage of 
people in nine different comparison groups (friends, family, work colleagues, same age ±3 
years, more than 3 years younger, more than 3 years older, people who live near, general 
population of the USA, people with similar health conditions) that were in better health 
than them. This was done using slider scales for each group that were labelled from 0 to 
100 with 0 labelled also as “none in better health than you” and 100 labelled also as “all in 
better health than you”. This gave a measure of each participant’s rank within the different 
comparison groups. 
Average health of comparison groups: Using the same slider design as the SRH 
question, participants were asked what they though the average health of people from 
each of the nine comparison groups was. The presentation order of these questions and 
the rank elicitation questions above was counterbalanced so that half of the participants 
saw the rank questions first and half saw the average questions first. 
At this stage, participants saw further questions regarding comparisons they had 
made when answering the SRH questions but only if they stated that they either compared 
to others and/or compared to themselves previously.  
If participants said that they compared to others then they were also asked about: 
1. Their most important comparison group: Participants were asked which of the nine 
comparison groups they compared to the most when answering the SRH question. 
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2. The extent to which they used each comparison group: Then participants were asked 
the extent to which (if at all) they compared their health to others in each of the nine 
comparison groups in order to answer the SRH question. This was answered using a 
slider scale that went from 0 to 100 which was visibly divided into 4 sections: “not at 
all” (0-25), “a little” (25-50), “some” (50-75), and “a lot” (75-100). 
3. The extent to which they compared aspects of their health to others: Using the same 
slider scale as above, participants were finally asked about the extent to which (if at 
all) they compared 13 different aspects of their health to other people’s experiences 
of these aspects when making the SRH judgement. These aspects were: Presence of 
health problems, absence of health problems, physical functioning, general physical 
condition, energy, engagement with healthy behaviours such as regular exercise, 
engagement with unhealthy behaviours such as smoking, mental health, general 
feeling, tiredness, pain, medication you are on, treatments you receive. This list was an 
amalgamation of aspects of health that Krause and Jay (1994) and Kaplan and Baron-
Epel (2003) had found important when evaluating SRH. 
If participants said that they compared to themselves previously when answering the 
SRH question then they were also asked about: 
1. The extent to which they compared aspects of their health to their previous health:  
Using the same slider scale as the two questions above, participants were asked the 
extent to which (if at all) they compared their current experience of the 13 different 
aspects of health outlined above to their previous experiences of these aspects. 
All participants were then asked about: 
Their most important health aspect: Participants were asked which of the 13 health 
aspects above was the most important when answering the SRH question.  
 Objective health: As it was not possible to access participants’ medical records or 
clinically examine participants, the self-reported number of symptoms/chronic 
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conditions/illnesses that participants had/were experiencing was used as a proxy measure 
of objective health. This follows the procedure used in other studies investigating the 
relationship between objective and subjective health (e.g., Groot, 2000; Powdthavee, 2009; 
Ubel et al., 2005; van der Zee & Buunk, 1995). Participants were asked both how many 
symptoms from a list of 25 they had experienced in the last six months (if any) and whether 
a medical professional had ever said that they had any of 17 illnesses/chronic conditions. 
The symptoms on the checklist were those shown by McAteer et al. (2011) to be the most 
commonly occurring within the general population: back pain, blood in stool, chest pain, 
cold or flu symptoms, constipation, cough, coughing up blood, diarrhoea, difficulty 
sleeping, dizziness, fainting, feeling depressed, feeling tired/run down, headaches, 
indigestion/heartburn, joint pain, loss of appetite, nausea/feeling sick, 
nervousness/anxiety, shortness of breath, sore throat, stomach/abdominal pain, 
unintentional weight loss, vomiting, and wheezy chest. The list of illnesses/chronic 
conditions was also obtained from McAteer et al. (2011) and included the following: 
anaemia, asthma, arthritis or rheumatism, bronchitis or emphysema, cancer, chronic liver 
trouble, diabetes, serious back trouble, heart trouble, high blood pressure, circulation 
problems, kidney or bladder problems, ulcers, allergies, multiple sclerosis, colitis, and high 
cholesterol.  
 It is possible that a self-report measure of objective health such as this will not be as 
accurate or reliable as “gold standard” measures such as information from medical records 
or clinical examinations. This is because the accuracy of self-reported illness can be 
affected by a number of factors including participants’ knowledge of the 
symptoms/conditions presented to them, their ability to recall whether they have been 
experienced in the period of time provided, and whether or not they are willing to report 
their experience (Goldman, Lin, Weinstein, & Lin, 2003). However, research has shown that 
for many of the symptoms/conditions listed above, agreement between self-report and 
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medical report (from medical records or physician diagnosis) tends to be very good (κ = 
0.80 to 1.00) or good (κ = 0.60 to 0.79) suggesting that inaccurate self-reporting in the 
current study may not be too problematic. For example, people tend to be very good at 
accurately reporting whether or not they have asthma (κ = 0.83, Baumeister, Kriston, 
Bengel, & Härter, 2010), cancer (κ = 0.92, Baumeister et al., 2010), colitis/Chrohn’s disease 
(κ = 0.96, Kelstrup, Juillerat, & Korzenik, 2014), and diabetes (κ = 0.90, Barber, Muller, 
Whitehurst, & Hay, 2010; κ = 0.87, Baumeister et al., 2010; κ = 0.85, Kriegsman, Penninx, 
van Eijk, Boeke, & Deeg, 1996; κ = 0.80, Muggah, Graves, Bennett, & Manuel, 2013; κ = 
0.76, Okura, Urban, Mahoney, Jacobsen, & Rodeheffer, 2004) and good at accurately 
reporting bronchitis (κ = 0.74, Baumeister et al., 2010) and high blood pressure (κ = 0.75, 
Okura et al., 2004; κ = 0.67, Barber et al., 2010; κ = 0.66, Muggah et al., 2013). People are 
moderately accurate at reporting the presence of arthritis (κ = 0.53, Baumeister et al., 
2010) and depression (κ = 0.62, Zimmerman, Coryell, Wilson, & Corenthal, 1986; κ = 0.50, 
Stuart, Pasco, Jacka, Brennan, Berk, & Williams, 2014). Although Barbara, Loeb, Dolovich, 
Brazil, and Russell (2012) found only poor to fair agreement between self-report and 
medical report of symptoms of respiratory illness (cough κ = 0.41, headache κ = 0.21, 
muscle ache κ = 0.21, sore throat κ = 0.19, fatigue κ = 0.13), total percentage agreement 
(positive and negative) ranged from 61% to 84% (cough = 72%, headache = 81%, muscle 
ache = 88%, sore throat = 61%, fatigue = 84%). 
 Demographic characteristics: Age, gender, level of education, ethnicity, income 
bracket and the state in which participants lived were also collected. 
Results 
In this section, the results are again reported in relation to each of the aims of the 
study. In cases where group differences were tested participants was split into three age 
groups: under 30 (n = 241), 30-40 (n = 163), and over 40 (n = 239). The groups were split in 
this manner to ensure the most even distribution of participants across groups. As 97% of 
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participants had either a high school diploma or a university education, differences across 
education groups were investigated between participants in these two groups only. As 72% 
of participants were White and the second largest ethnicity group comprised only 9% of 
participants, group differences were investigated between White and non-White 
participants only. Differences in reporting behaviour across SRH groups were also 
investigated. As previous studies had split participants into two SRH groups (good and bad), 
the same was done here. As there were only 33 participants who stated that their health 
was poor, participants were split into the following groups: Good health (those who 
responded either excellent, very good or good to the SRH question) and poor health (those 
who responded either fair or poor to the SRH question).  
Before any analysis took place, participants’ answers to the questions eliciting their 
rank within the comparison groups were inverted so that greater values indicated that they 
believed they were in better health than others. For example, if the participant stated that 
only 30% of friends were in better health than them then their rank value became 70. This 
was done so that the SRH, rank, and the average health of the comparison group variables 
were all on a scale that went from poor to excellent health. For all statistical tests, an alpha 
level of .05 was used. 
Aim 1 
The first aim was to measure the strength of the relationship between subjective and 
objective health. The number of symptoms experienced and the number of chronic 
illnesses that each individual had were added together to create an objective health 
measure that had greater variability and encompassed a wide variety of health aspects8. 
The resulting measure had a higher correlation with subjective health (measured from 
excellent to poor: r = .39, p < .001) than the number of symptoms (r = .36, p < .001) or 
                                                          
8 A similar objective health measure was calculated by transforming the number of symptoms and 
conditions to z-scores first and then adding the two together. The analyses for Aim 1 and 3 were 
conducted again using this measure and all of the results reported were exactly the same.  
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number of chronic illnesses (r = .30, p < .001) alone. These correlations are similar to the 
average correlation of r = .30 reported by Suls et al. (1991). They are also in line with the 
findings of Singh-Manoux et al. (2006), who report correlations of r = .28, r = .36 and r = .42 
between SRH and the number of longstanding illnesses, number of recurring health 
problems and the number of symptoms experienced in the last 14 days respectively. 
Interestingly, the correlation between SRH and objective health was significantly stronger 
for participants who stated that they did not compare to others when making the SRH 
judgement (r = .51, p < .001) than for those that did (r = .35, p < .001), z = 1.80, p = 0.036, 
although these groups were quite unequal in numbers (n = 102 and n = 541 respectively). 
Aim 2 
The second aim was to investigate the extent to which people compare to others and 
themselves previously when making SRH judgements and to further investigate who they 
compare to. When directly asking participants how they made the SRH judgement, 84% of 
participants (n = 541) said that they compared to others to some extent when making the 
judgement, 90% (n = 579) said that they compared their health now to how it was 
previously to some extent when making the judgement and 65% (n = 417) said they based 
their answer to some extent on something other than comparison to others or themselves 
previously. The amount of people that stated that they compared to others when making 
the SRH judgement (84%) is in line with previous findings by Kaplan and Baron-Epel (2003; 
80%). 
Across all participants, the average split of answers to the question asking how they 
had made the SRH judgement was as follows: by comparing their health to that of others: 
37% (SD = 26%), by comparing their current health to their previous health: 43% (SD = 
28%), by something other than the above: 20% (SD = 24%). On average, participants who 
stated that they used social comparison said they based 44% (SD = 22%) of the SRH 
judgement on how their health compared to that of others. Participants who stated that 
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they compared to their previous health stated that, on average, they based 47% (SD = 26%) 
of the SRH judgement on how their current health compared to their previous health.  
There were no significant differences in the extent to which participants based their 
SRH judgements on how their health compared to others across gender, t(536) = 1.48, p = 
.140 (two-tailed), or age groups, F(2,538) = 0.04, p = .961. However, the extent to which 
participants based the SRH judgement on how their current health compares to their 
previous health differed across gender, t(574) = 2.38, p = .018 (two-tailed), and age groups, 
F(2,576) = 4.28, p = .014. On average, women based a higher percentage of their SRH 
judgement on how their health currently compared to their previous health than men 
(women: M = 50%, SD = 28%; men: M = 44%, SD = 23%). LSD comparisons revealed that, on 
average, people who were over 40 based a higher percentage of their SRH judgement on 
how their health currently compared to it previously than those who were under 30 (over 
40: M = 51%, SD = 27%; under 30: M = 44%, SD = 25%). There were no significant 
differences between the under 30 and 30-40 age group or the 30-40 and over 40 age 
group. 
The comparison group that participants stated that they used the most when 
comparing to others in order to make the SRH judgement was friends (23.0%), followed by 
family (19.3%), people within 3 years of age (18.4%), the general population (13.8%), work 
colleagues (5.0%), people who live nearby (1.9%), people with similar health conditions 
(1.9%), people who were more than 3 years younger (0.6%), and people more than three 
years older (0.3%).  
Group differences in the comparison group used most were also examined using chi-
square tests and z-tests (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons) to examine 
differences in the proportions of group members selecting each comparison group as the 
one they compared to most when making the SRH judgement:  
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Gender: Gender was not significantly associated with choice of comparison group, χ2 
(8) = 10.34, p = .242.  
Age: Age group was significantly associated with choice of comparison group, χ2 (16) 
= 38.77, p = .001. There were significant differences between the youngest (<30) and oldest 
(>40) age groups in the proportion of participants selecting three of the comparison groups 
as their most important when making the SRH judgement. A significantly higher proportion 
of young people (28.1%) chose family as the group they compared to the most than of 
participants in the oldest age group (17.2%). The difference between the youngest and 
middle (30-40) and middle and older age groups was nonsignificant. In the opposite 
direction, a significantly greater proportion of participants in the oldest age group chose 
both people around their age and others with the same health conditions (28.6% and 
4.7%% respectively) as their most important comparison group than of participants in the 
youngest age group (16.2% and 0% respectively). The difference between the youngest and 
middle (30-40) and middle and older age groups was nonsignificant. 
Education: There was no significant association between education and choice of the 
most important comparison group. However, there were significant differences in the 
proportion of participants selecting two of the comparison groups as the ones they used 
most across education groups. A significantly greater proportion of participants who went 
to university (7.7%) chose people they work with as their most important comparison 
group than of participants who did not (2.9%). A significantly higher proportion of 
participants who did not go to university (4%) chose people who lived near them as their 
most important comparison groups than of those who did (1.1%).  
Ethnicity: There was no significant association between ethnicity and choice of the 
most important comparison group. However, there was a significant difference in 
importance across ethnicity groups present for one of the groups; a greater proportion 
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(19.4%) of White participants selected the general population as their most important 
comparison group than of non-White participants (9.4%). 
Income: Income group was significantly associated with choice of comparison group, 
χ2 (32) = 50.66, p = .019. The proportion of participants selecting work colleagues as their 
most important comparison group was significantly greater in the highest income group 
(>$65,000: 12.8%) than in the lowest income group (<$14,999: 1.1%). Although the 
differences between the remaining income groups were nonsignificant, there was a general 
trend such that as income increased so did the tendency to use the health of work 
colleagues as a benchmark to judge one’s own health. 
Self-rated health: Self-rated health group was significantly associated with choice of 
comparison group, χ2 (8) = 23.35, p = .003. A greater proportion of participants in good 
health selected family and work colleagues as their most important comparison group 
(24.5% and 6.8% respectively) than of participants in poor health (14.5% and 1.2% 
respectively). On the other hand, a greater proportion of participants in poor health chose 
people around their age and the general population as their most important comparison 
group (39.9% and 24.1% respectively) than of those in good health (19.4% and 15.1% 
respectively). These findings are in line with those reported by Kaplan and Baron-Epel 
(2003) who found that participants in good health tended to compare their health to 
friends whilst those in poor health compared to people their age. 
Aim 3 
The third aim was to investigate how people compare to others when judging their 
health - specifically whether they use rank- or average-based strategies. In order to do this, 
four different measures of social comparison (two rank-based and two average-based) 
were calculated and used in regression analyses predicting SRH judgements. The first set of 
social comparison variables, “Rank A” and “Average A”, were compiled using participants’ 
answers to the question asking 1) which comparison group they compared to the most 
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when answering the SRH question, 2) their believed ranked position within each of the 
comparison groups and 3) their believed average health of each of the comparison groups. 
Rank A is the participant’s believed rank within the comparison group they compared to 
the most when making the SRH judgement and Average A is the believed average health of 
the comparison group they compared to the most. The second set of social comparison 
variables, “Rank B” and “Average B”, were calculated as follows in order to include all of 
the available information on each participant’s comparison behaviours: 
Rank B = ∑ 𝑅𝑔 ∗ 𝐸𝑔9𝑔=1       (7) 
Average B = ∑ 𝐴𝑔 ∗ 𝐸𝑔9𝑔=1      (8) 
Where 𝑔 is the comparison group (of which there are nine), 𝑅𝑔 is the participant’s rank 
within the comparison group, 𝐸𝑔 is the extent to which the participant compares to the 
comparison group (percentage) when making the SRH judgement divided by the sum of the 
extent to which they compare to each comparison group, and 𝐴𝑔 is the average health of 
the comparison group9. 
Age and gender are included in the regression models in order to control for any 
effects these covariates may have. Objective health (the number of symptoms experienced 
plus the number of chronic illnesses that each participant had) is also included in order to 
ascertain how well the rank and average variables predict SRH in comparison to objective 
health. Table 5.1 below shows the correlations between the continuous variables used in 
the regression analyses using data only from participants who stated that they compared 
to others to some extent.  
  
                                                          
9 Note that as objective health and the average health of others in the comparison group were 
measured on different scales it was not possible to calculate how much participants’ objective 
health differed from that of the average health of others. Therefore, the average health of others is 
used in analyses instead. 
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Table 5.1. 
Pearson Correlations between Main Variables. 
 SRH Age 
Objective 
Health 
Rank A 
Average 
A 
Rank B 
Average 
B 
SRH 1 -.106* -.353*** .304*** .175*** .325*** .198*** 
Age -.106* 1 .065 .030 -.029 .005 -.003 
Objective Health -.353*** .065 1 -.220*** .018 -.268*** .041 
Rank A .304*** .030 -.220*** 1 -.381*** .879*** -.332*** 
Average  A .175*** -.029 .018 -.381*** 1 -.328*** .801*** 
Rank B .325*** .005 -.268*** .879*** -.328*** 1 -.388*** 
Average  B .198*** -.003 .041 -.332*** .801*** -.388*** 1 
Note. N = 541. *p < .05, two-tailed, ***p < .001, two tailed. 
 
Table 5.1 above shows that the comparison variables that incorporate information 
about all of the participants’ comparison behaviours (Rank B and Average B) correlate  
slightly more strongly with SRH than the comparison variables representing participants’ 
rank within the group they compare to most (Rank A) and the average health of the group 
they compare to most (Average A). However, these differences are not significant, rank: 
t(538) = 1.05, p = .148; average: t(538) = 0.86, p = .806. The correlation between Rank A 
and SRH is significantly stronger than the correlation between Average A and SRH, t(538) = 
2.82, p = .003, as is the correlation between Rank B and SRH compared to the one between 
SRH and Average B, t(538) = 2.81, p = .003. There are no significant differences in the 
correlations between SRH and the two rank variables and SRH and objective health, Rank A: 
t(538) = 0.99; p = .162; Rank B: t(538) = 0.58; p = .280. However, the correlation between 
SRH and objective health was significantly stronger than the correlations between SRH and 
both average variables, Average A: t(538) = 3.14; p = .001; Average B: t(538) = 2.78; p = 
.003. 
 Regression analyses (reported in Table 5.2 below) suggested firstly that people do 
compare to others when making SRH judgements: the two rank and the two average 
variables were significant predictors of SRH judgements. Comparison of the objective 
health, rank, and average beta coefficients reported in the step 2 models showed that the 
effects of both rank A and rank B were comparable to that of objective health – there was 
no significant difference between the objective health and rank beta coefficients in either 
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the A or B models. However, both the average variables were weaker predictors of SRH 
than objective health – the objective health beta coefficients are significantly larger than 
the average coefficients in both the A and B models. Finally, the predictive ability of the 
step two models was compared, using the Hotelling's t-test for dependent correlations. 
There were no significant differences in the variance in SRH judgements accounted for by 
the step 2a and 2b models when either the A or B variables were used, step two models 
including rank A and average A, t(538) = 0.82, p = .206, step two models including rank B 
and average B, t(538) = 0.36, p = .361.   
  
 
2
1
5
 
Table 5.2. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Self-rated Health from Age, Gender, Objective Health and Both Rank and Average Variables (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence 
Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Models with Rank A and Average A  Models with Rank B and Average B 
Predictors ΔR2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p  ΔR2 B (95% CI) Std. Error β p 
Step 1 .13***    < .001  .13***    < .001 
Constant  75.95 (70.07-81.48) 3.13  .001   75.95 (70.01-82.13) 3.06  .001 
Age  -0.13  (-0.28-0.02) 0.07 -.08 .072   -0.13  (-0.28-0.00) 0.08 -.08 .071 
Gender  0.62  (-2.67-4.02) 1.76 .01 .723   0.62 (-2.87-4.30) 1.79 .01 .705 
Objective Health   -1.39  (-1.68--1.09) 0.16 -.35 .001    -1.39 (-1.71--1.07) 0.16 -.35 .001 
Step 2a .06***    < .001  .06***    < .001 
Constant  65.14 (57.18-72.21) 3.78  .001   62.65 (55.31-70.15) 3.89  .001 
Age  -0.16  (-0.30--0.01) 0.07 -.09 .034   -0.15 (-0.29--0.02) 0.07 -.09 .041 
Gender  -0.03  (-3.38-3.24) 1.72 .00 .988   0.09 (-3.22-3.59) 1.75 .00 .954 
Objective Health  -1.19  (-1.52--0.86) 0.16 -.30 .001   -1.13  (-1.44--0.79) 0.16 -.28 .001 
Rank  0.21 (0.12-0.28) 0.04 .24 .001   0.24 (0.16-0.33) 0.04 .25 .001 
Step 2b .03***    < .001  .05***    < .001 
Constant  61.05 (51.78-70.27) 4.74  .001   54.39 (43.62-65.51) 5.56  .001 
Age  -0.12  (-0.25-0.01) 0.07 -.07 .093   -0.13 (-0.28-0.02) 0.07 -.07 .081 
Gender  1.54  (-1.55-5.19) 1.68 .04 .356   1.70 (-1.40-4.74) 1.69 .04 .315 
Objective Health  -1.39 (-1.73--1.02) 0.17 -.35 .001   -1.41 (-1.71--1.10) 0.15 -.35 .001 
Average  0.23 (0.12-0.33) 0.05 .18 .001   0.34 (0.21-0.47) 0.07 .22 .001 
Note. n = 541. Significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold. ***p < .001. 
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Although the results provide further evidence that people compare to others when 
making SRH judgements, they are inconclusive as to how they do so. The correlations 
between the rank variables and SRH were significantly stronger than the correlations 
between the average variables and SRH. Furthermore, rank performed as well as objective 
health when predicting SRH judgements but the average was a weaker predictor. However, 
the model comparison showed that there was no difference in the fit of the final rank and 
average models to the data. 
Aim 4 
Aim 4 was to investigate how beliefs about others may differ and the impact that 
such differences may have on both SRH judgements and measures. Individual differences in 
beliefs about others can be explored using data from questions asking about the average 
health of groups. Variation in the average health of comparison groups such as friends and 
family would be expected as the people that make up these groups (and their health) will 
differ from individual to individual. There should be less variation in groups that are 
common to individuals such as the general population that they belong to and people in 
that population who are of a similar age. However, Figure 5.1 below shows considerable 
variation in participants’ beliefs about the average health of the general population in the 
USA (M = 56.11, SD = 17.19, range = 0-99). Figure 5.1 also shows the variation in beliefs 
about the average health of other people around the same age that participants aged 32 
(the modal age, n = 29) displayed (M = 67.62, SD = 16.57, range = 40-100). The impact that 
these differing beliefs may have on both SRH judgements and measures are explained in 
the discussion. 
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Figure 5.1. Participants’ ratings of the average health of the general population in the USA 
(left: all participants) and of people around their age (right: participants aged 32). Scale is 
from poor (0) to excellent (100). 
 
Aim 5 
Aim 5 was to further understand what aspects of their health people base SRH 
judgements on and to explore any group differences. Participants reported that their 
general physical condition (28%) and the presence (23%) and absence (13%) of health 
problems were the most important health aspects used to evaluate their general health 
(see column 1 of Table 5.3 below for the full results and Figure 5.2). This is in line with 
previous findings (e.g., Kaplan & Baron-Epel, 2003; Krause & Jay, 1994). Also replicated is 
the previous finding that participants base SRH judgements on aspects of their physical 
health rather than their mental health - only 2% of participants stated that their mental 
health was the most important aspect when making the SRH judgement. Group differences 
in the most important health aspect chosen were also examined using chi-square tests and 
z-tests (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons). These examined differences in the 
proportions of group members selecting each health aspect as their most important when 
making the SRH judgement: 
Gender and income: Choice of health aspect was not significantly associated with 
gender, χ2 (12) = 13.60, p = .327, or income group, χ2 (48) = 50.88, p = .361. Krause and Jay 
 218 
 
(1994) also found no significant association between gender and the health aspect used to 
make the SRH judgement. 
Age: Age group was significantly associated with choice of health aspect, χ2 (24) = 
37.62, p = .038. There were significant differences between the youngest (<30) and oldest 
(>40) age groups in the proportion of participants selecting three of the aspects as their 
most important when making the SRH judgement. A significantly higher proportion of 
young people (10.4%) chose energy as their most important health aspect than of 
participants in the oldest age group (2.5%). The difference between the youngest and 
middle (30-40) and middle and older age groups was nonsignificant. In the opposite 
direction, a significantly greater proportion of participants in the oldest age group chose 
both general feeling and pain (10.5% and 6.3% respectively) as their most important health 
aspect than of participants in the youngest (4.6% and 1.7% respectively) age group. The 
difference between the youngest and middle (30-40) and middle and older age groups was 
nonsignificant. Krause and Jay’s (1994) findings that younger people were more likely than 
older people to make SRH judgements based on health behaviours and that older people 
were more likely than younger people to make them based on health problems were not 
replicated.  
Education: Education group was significantly associated with choice of health aspect, 
χ2 (12) = 32.00, p = .001. A significantly greater proportion of participants who went to 
university (15.4%) chose the absence of health problems as their most important health 
aspect than of participants who did not (8%). Significantly higher proportions of participants 
who did not go to university chose general feeling and pain as their most important health 
aspect (11.3% and 6.6% respectively) than those who did (5.4% and 2.9% respectively). 
Aside from this there were no significant differences across education groups in the 
proportion of participants selecting each health aspect as their most important when 
making the SRH judgement. 
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Ethnicity: There was no significant association between ethnicity and choice of the 
most important health aspect. However, there was a significant difference in importance 
across ethnicity groups present for one of the aspects: a greater proportion (28.6%) of non-
White participants selected presence of health problems as their most important aspect 
than of White participants (21.3%). This finding was also reported by Krause and Jay (1994). 
Self-rated health: Self-rated health group was significantly associated with choice of 
health aspect, χ2 (12) = 32.78, p = .001. A greater proportion of participants in good health 
selected general physical condition and the absence of health problems as their most 
important health aspect (30.1% and 13.7% respectively) than of participants in poor health 
(16.3% and 6.7% respectively). On the other hand, a greater proportion of participants in 
poor health (11.5%) chose pain as their most important health aspect when making the SRH 
judgement than of those in good health (2.8%). These findings are in line with those 
reported by Kaplan and Baron-Epel (2003) who found that participants in good health 
placed more importance on difficulty performing activities when making the SRH 
judgement whilst those in poor health focused more on pain and tiredness.  
Table 5.3. 
Use of Health Aspects when Making Self-rated Health Judgements and when Comparing to Others 
and to Previous Health. 
 Most important aspect when 
 
Making SRH Judgement Comparing to Others 
Comparing to Previous 
Health 
General Physical Condition 27.8% (179) 12.5% (51) 11.5% (52) 
Presence of Health Problems 23.3% (150) 5.6% (23) 8.9% (40) 
Absence of Health Problems 12.6% (81) 9.3% (38) 5.5% (25) 
Physical Functioning 9.0% (58) 6.1% (25) 7.8% (35) 
General Feeling 7.3% (47) 8.1% (33) 11.1% (50) 
Energy 6.5% (42) 11.2% (46) 9.8% (44) 
Pain 4.2% (27) 10.0% (41) 8.4% (38) 
Healthy Behaviours 3.6% (23) 12.0% (49) 8.0% (36) 
Mental Health 2.0% (13) 6.8% (28) 7.8% (35) 
Unhealthy Behaviours 1.3% (8) 5.9% (24) 8.4% (38) 
Tiredness 0.9% (6) 4.2% (17) 4.2% (19) 
Medication 0.9% (6) 3.4% (14) 4.0% (18) 
Treatments 0.5% (3) 4.9% (20) 4.7% (21) 
N 643 409 451 
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Figure 5.2. Graphical Representation of Use of Health Aspects when Making Self-rated 
Health Judgements and when Comparing to Others and to Previous Health. 
 
 
Aim 6 
Aim 6 was to understand what aspects of their health people use specifically when 
comparing to others or to their previous health experiences when judging their health. In 
order to do this, answers to the two questions asking about the extent to which 
participants 1) compared their current experience of the 13 different health aspects to 
other people’s experiences of these aspects and 2) compared their current experience of 
the 13 aspects to their previous experiences of these aspects when making the SRH 
judgement were examined. Note that only participants who stated that they did compare 
to others or their previous health when making the SRH judgement saw these questions. 
The aspect that each participant gave the greatest weight to (i.e., the aspect with the 
highest percentage answer) was extracted as the most important aspect used when 
comparing to others/previous self. The proportion (and number) of participants that gave 
the highest weight to each aspect is shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.3 and is displayed 
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in Figure 5.2. Participants who gave equal weights to two or more aspects (nothers = 132, nself 
= 128) are not included in these figures. 
When judging their general health, the health aspects that participants most 
commonly compared to others and to their previous health were very similar. The three 
aspects most commonly compared to others were general physical condition (12.5%), 
healthy behaviours (12%), and energy (11.2%), and to previous health were general physical 
condition (11.5%), general feeling (11.1%), and energy (9.8%). The three health aspects that 
participants least commonly compared to their previous health and others were the same. 
These were treatments (others: 4.9%, previous self: 4.7%), tiredness (others and previous 
self: 4.2%), and medication (others: 3.4%, previous self: 4%). It would appear that when the 
aspects are listed in rank order of the proportion of participants selecting each aspect as 
the most important when comparing to both others and to their previous health that there 
is little difference in this rank ordering between comparison type.  
Aim 7 
Aim 7 was to see whether people use different strategies when making the SRH 
judgement depending on which aspect of their health they use when doing so. Using 
participants’ answers to the question asking the extent to which they had compared to 
others, compared to themselves previously or based their answer on something else 
completely when answering the SRH question, each participant’s main answering strategy 
was elicited (i.e., the one with the highest percentage answer). Where participants gave 
equal weighting to two or all of the strategies (n = 105) they were excluded from the 
following analysis. 
Although a chi-square test showed no association between the most important 
health aspect used and the main strategy used when making the SRH judgement, z-tests 
(Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons) showed significant differences in the 
proportion of participants using comparison strategies when two specific health aspects 
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were used to make the SRH judgement. When using engagement with healthy behaviours 
to judge their health, a significantly greater proportion of participants (6.8%) used 
comparison to others as their main strategy for making the SRH judgement than used 
comparison to previous self (1.4%). Of the 19 participants who used engagement with 
healthy behaviours to judge their health, 14 did so by comparing to others, 3 did so by 
comparing to themselves previously and 2 did so using some other strategy. In the opposite 
direction, when using pain to judge their health, a significantly greater proportion of 
participants (6.3%) used comparison to previous self as their main strategy for making the 
SRH judgement than used comparison to others (1.4%). Of the 23 participants who used 
pain to judge their health, 14 did so by comparing to others, 3 did so by comparing to 
themselves previously and 6 did so using some other strategy. 
Discussion 
Social Comparison Effects 
 This study primarily investigated the extent to which people make judgements about 
their general health through comparing their health to that of other people and the exact 
cognitive mechanisms used in this comparison process. The vast majority of participants 
(84%) said that they compared to others (mainly friends, family, and people around their 
age) to some extent when answering a self-rated health (SRH) question. On average, 
participants who compared to others said that the comparison contributed 44% to the 
judgement. Regression analyses indicated that social comparisons accounted for 3-6% of 
the variance in SRH judgements but were inconclusive as to how people compare to others 
when making this judgement. Beliefs about the health of others in comparison groups that 
were shared across participants varied considerably. The correlation between objective 
health and SRH was significantly stronger for participants who stated that they did not 
compare to others than for those that did suggesting that SRH is a better proxy for actual 
health when people do not use social comparison to make the SRH judgement. 
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Main Implications  
 Taken together, these findings have a number of implications regarding our 
understanding of how people make inaccurate judgements about their health, the 
measurement of SRH, and future investigations of comparison effects. As discussed in the 
introduction of this chapter, previous research has shown that people often over- or 
underestimate their actual health when answering SRH questions. This finding has 
previously been explained as being the result of people comparing to others when making 
the SRH judgement and using different comparison groups when doing so. The findings 
reported here would support this hypothesis: people tend to compare to people that are 
around them – friends, family and people their age – and so the people that make up the 
comparison group (and their health) will be different for everyone.  
 However, previous research has never fully explained precisely why the use of 
different comparison groups may lead to over and under-estimations of health. It is 
proposed here that over or under-estimation of health occurs when the health of people in 
the comparison group is not representative of the health of people in the general 
population. Therefore, it is not so much that people make inaccurate judgements about 
their health because they use different comparison groups; it is more about how 
representative these comparison groups are. For example, the distribution of health in one 
person’s comparison group may be very similar to the distribution of health in the general 
population and so that person may make an accurate judgement about their own health 
when comparing it to the health of the people in their sample. However, another person 
may have a comparison group comprised of people who are very ill and who are therefore 
not representative of the whole distribution of health in the general population but rather 
just the extreme tail of it. If that person is also in poor health but is not as bad as their 
comparison sample they may judge that they are much better off than they actually are, 
regardless of how they make this comparison (i.e., whether they use rank or average-based 
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strategies). This person will have come to an overestimation of their health because they 
have based the estimation on how their health compares to others who are not 
representative of the general population. Underestimation can occur similarly when a 
person who is in good health compares to others who are in exceptionally good health 
because, compared to these others, their health status ranks quite low/they are far below 
average but compared to the general population their health status actually ranks quite 
high/is above average.  
 One may think then that a way to reduce inaccurate health judgements would be to 
ask people to compare to the general population (or possibly people their age in the 
general population as health and age are strongly related) when making SRH judgements so 
that they do not use non-representative comparison samples. This is certainly what some 
surveys have done. For example, the British Household Panel Survey asks “compared to 
people of your own age, would you say that your health has on the whole been: excellent, 
good, fair, poor or very poor?”. However, the rationale behind this question wording comes 
from the research suggesting that it is simply the use of different comparison samples that 
leads to inaccurate judgements. Therefore, it is assumed that people will make more 
accurate judgements about the actual state of their health by asking them to compare to a 
comparison group that is shared amongst all respondents such as the general population or 
shared amongst groups of respondents such as people of the same age (and not, for 
example, friends and family which differs from person to person). However, just as the 
distributions of health in people’s individually constructed comparison samples can vary 
and either be representative of the actual distribution of health in the general population 
or not, so can people’s beliefs about this actual distribution of health, possibly because they 
are using their individual samples to generalise. Figure 5.1 shows exactly this - participants’ 
beliefs about the average health of both the general population and people their age varied 
widely meaning that many participants had inaccurate perceptions about the actual 
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distribution of health in these groups. It is therefore possible that people will still come to 
inaccurate judgements about their health status when they are asked specifically to 
compare to a more global sample, such as the general population or people their own age, 
because their beliefs about the distribution of health in these groups are incorrect. For 
example, if two people are in identical health to each other but one believes that 20% of 
people their age are in better health than them whilst the other believes that 80% are in 
better health they are likely to come to completely different subjective health judgements. 
Whilst one of them may be right in their estimation and accurately report their health, the 
other may not be and this could lead to over- or underestimating. It is therefore not enough 
to ask people to compare to a comparison group that is shared amongst all respondents 
when making the SRH judgement. Surveys also need to ask respondents about their beliefs 
about the distribution of health in this comparison group so that their answers may be 
adjusted for varying beliefs. Alternatively, information about the actual distribution of 
health in the comparison group could be provided alongside the SRH question. This could 
be tested in future research to see whether controlling for both comparison group and 
varying beliefs about others produces SRH judgements that more accurately reflect 
objective health. 
 The current findings also have implications for researchers investigating comparison 
effects using large datasets. Firstly, it should not be assumed that people compare their 
health to the average health of others in the comparison group as has been done previously 
because it is possible that people base their SRH judgement on their ranked position within 
the comparison group. Secondly, although data from large-scale studies can be used to 
construct comparison groups, the distribution of health in these groups may vary 
considerably from people’s believed distribution, which is the one they would use to base 
the judgement about their own health on. Therefore, studies may be missing comparison 
effects or underestimating their strength through using this methodology. 
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 This study also investigated group differences in comparison groups used when 
making the SRH judgement, the extent to which people compare their current health to 
their previous health when making SRH judgements and the aspects of health that people 
use to both make the SRH judgement and when making comparisons. These findings will be 
discussed next. 
Group Differences in Chosen Comparison Group 
 There were significant differences across some of the demographic groups in the use 
of three of the most common comparison groups used when making the SRH judgement: 
family, people around the same age and the general population. A greater proportion of 
participants under 30 chose family as their most important comparison group than of 
participants over 40, whereas a greater proportion of participants over 40 chose people 
their age as their most important comparison group than of participants under 30. A 
greater proportion of healthy participants chose family as their most important comparison 
group than of participants in poor health whereas a greater proportion of participants in 
poor health chose people their age and the general population as their most important 
comparison group than of healthy participants. A greater proportion of White participants 
also chose the general population as their most important comparison group than of non-
White participants.  
 Group differences in the choice of comparison group have largely been unexplored in 
the previous literature with the exception of Kaplan and Baron-Epel (2003) who found that 
participants in good health tended to compare their health to friends whilst those in poor 
health compared to people their age as is found here. Findings from the current study 
confirm that people use different comparison groups when evaluating their health and that 
there are systematic differences in the choice of comparison group. 
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Comparisons to Previous Health 
 The majority of participants (90%) said that they compared their current health to 
their previous health to some extent when answering the SRH question. On average, 
participants who compared to their previous health said that the comparison contributed 
47% to the judgement. Women and participants over 40 based a higher percentage of their 
SRH judgement on how their current health compared to their previous health than men 
and participants under 30 respectively. These findings provide evidence of further context 
effects that may affect SRH judgements. 
Health Aspects Used in Judgement 
 General physical condition was the health aspect that was used the most when 
making SRH judgements and comparing current health to both others and previous health. 
There were significant differences across some of the demographic groups in the use of the 
three most common health aspects when making the SRH judgement: general physical 
condition, the presence of health problems and the absence of health problems. A greater 
proportion of university educated participants chose the absence of health problems as the 
most important aspect used when making the SRH judgement than of non-university 
educated participants. A greater proportion of non-White participants chose the presence 
of health problems as their most important aspect than of White participants (also found by 
Krause & Jay, 1994). A greater proportion of healthy participants chose general physical 
condition and the absence of health problems as their most important aspect than of 
participants in poor health. The data suggested that the health aspects that participants 
most commonly compared to others and to their previous health when judging their 
general health were very similar. In most cases, participants were no more likely to use one 
comparison type (others vs previous health) over the other when using a specific health 
aspect to make the SRH judgement. However, participants who used pain to judge their 
health were more likely to do so by comparing their current experience of pain to their 
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previous experiences than by comparing their experience to others. On the other hand, 
participants who used engagement with healthy behaviours to judge their health were 
more likely to do so by comparing to others than they were to their previous engagement 
with such behaviours. However, the number of participants using these two aspects to 
judge their health was very small (pain: n = 23, healthy behaviours: n = 19) and so these 
results should be interpreted with caution. 
Study Limitations 
 There were some limitations of the current study. Firstly, quite a basic measure of 
objective health was used (the number of symptoms recently experienced and the number 
of chronic conditions experienced) which only encompassed one aspect of health – illness. 
This measure has been used in a number of previous studies to investigate the relationship 
between subjective and objective health and to explore comparison effects. However, 
other, possibly standardised measures (such as the SF-36 or the Health Utilities Index Mark 
3, HUI: Feeny, Furlong, Boyle, & Torrance, 1995) that encompass other aspects of health 
such as physical functioning, general physical condition and engagement with healthy and 
unhealthy behaviours could have been used instead of or alongside the objective health 
measure used in this study. Secondly, because objective health and the average health of 
others were measured using different scales, the distance of each participant’s health from 
their believed average health of others could not be calculated and used in the analyses 
investigating how people compare to others as in previous studies reported in this thesis. 
However, this was mainly an issue for calculating the correlations which were not the main 
analyses; the main findings from the regression models would not have been as affected as 
both objective health and the average health of others were included in the model. 
Conclusions 
 To conclude, this study provides evidence that the majority of people compare to 
others when judging their health and base their judgement partly on this comparison. The 
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findings suggest that self-rated health may not approximate actual health well when judged 
through a comparison to others because doing so may lead to over-and underestimations 
of health when the health of the comparison sample selected is skewed or beliefs about 
others are not accurate. As SRH is widely used in economics research, policy making and as 
an outcome measure in clinical trials, this could lead to a number of issues such as a 
reduced ability to compare health ratings across groups and to distinguish healthy from ill 
people. Comparison effects may be controlled for by both asking people to compare to a 
shared comparison group, such as the general population, and eliciting beliefs about the 
health of others so that health ratings can be adjusted in line with the same underlying 
scale. However, where there is room in surveys for longer health measures it is perhaps 
advisable to use more objective measures such as the number of symptoms and/or chronic 
conditions experienced (possibly also taking into account severity) or standardised 
measures such as the SF-36 or HUI.  
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Chapter 6: Social Support 
Overview 
The two studies reported in this Chapter were planned just as the other studies 
reported in this thesis were in that the main aim of these studies was to explore whether 
participants compared to others when making specific judgements. However, other findings 
that did not relate to the core aims of the study but which had important implications for 
the measurement of received support were found during data analysis. As comparison 
effects were not found in either study, the data was used to publish the other, unrelated 
findings instead. This overview gives a detailed account of the original rationale behind the 
studies, the exploration of comparison effects that was undertaken, and the new unrelated 
findings that were uncovered. This is followed by the published manuscript of the paper 
explaining the new findings. 
Social support has been studied intensively across disciplines for over fifty years. 
Despite this, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms underlying social support 
processes and in particular their link to health (Sarason, Sarason, & Gurung, 2001; Thoits, 
2011). Studies have consistently shown weak to moderate correlations between the 
amount of support a person receives and their perceptions of this support - specifically 
their beliefs about the availability of support and their satisfaction with support (for a 
review see Haber, Cohen, Lucas, & Baltes, 2007). Furthermore, although there is a strong 
and well documented association between social support and both physical and mental 
health, research has shown that only support perceptions (and not the amount of support 
received) are consistently associated with positive health outcomes (e.g., Barrera, 2000; 
Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & Layton, 2010; Uchino, 2004; 2009; Uchino, Bowen, Carlisle, & 
Birmingham, 2012).  
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Despite these findings, it seems intuitive that people’s perceptions of the support 
that they receive should be strongly related to that support and that if perceived support is 
associated with health then received support should be too. It was hypothesised that 
stronger associations between received support and both perceived support and health 
existed but that the way previous studies had investigated them had led to the full extent 
of these relationships not being seen. In the majority of these studies, received support was 
measured simply as the number of supportive behaviours received. Factors that may affect 
the received-perceived support relationship and possibly also the relationship between 
received support and health (such as the need for support, how the amount of support 
received compares to the amount other people receive and the quality of the support) had 
not been taken into account previously. Therefore, the initial aim of the social support 
studies was to investigate whether the relationships between received support and both 
perceived support and health were stronger when these factors were taken into account, 
with the specific aim of investigating any social comparison effects. It was hypothesised 
that it is not simply the absolute amount of support received that may influence support 
perceptions and health but how this amount compares to the amount of support that other 
people are believed to receive. If true, this could, for example, explain why the correlation 
between received and perceived support is weaker than expected as an individual may 
receive a lot of support but they could still not be satisfied with it because they think that 
other people receive more than them. Similarly, an individual may receive little support but 
still be satisfied with it because they think that they receive more than others. 
In Study 1, participants were asked how many times in a typical month they received 
two types of support (absolute received support measure) and answered questions eliciting 
their beliefs about the distribution of how frequently people in the general population 
receive the support types. Each participant’s rank amongst their believed distribution and 
how much the amount of support they received differed from the mean of this distribution 
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was then calculated using their answers to these questions (this distribution elicitation 
methodology is explained in detail in Chapter 2). Participants also completed five perceived 
support measures and one measure of their physical and mental health. Regression analysis 
was carried out as in previous chapters: models including age, gender, absolute and rank 
and age, gender, absolute and distance from the mean variables predicting the seven 
outcome variables were calculated. Unfortunately the vast majority of the models (76%: 22 
out of 28) were not significant, i.e., the regression model including the independent 
variables did not predict the outcomes any better than the baseline model. Of the six 
significant models, the only significant predictor was the absolute amount of support 
received but generally the variance accounted for by these models was low (R2 = .048-.067). 
Overall, the results replicated previous findings but provided no support for the hypotheses 
being tested. 
However, when planning Study 1 it seemed intuitive that receiving support when it 
was not needed could be unbeneficial and have negative rather than positive 
consequences. Along with the number of times participants received support they were 
also asked on how many times they had actually needed it and those who stated that they 
did not need support were excluded from the analysis. However, this did not control for 
participants who needed support but received more support than they needed whom, 
under the above assumption, may also find extra, unneeded support unbeneficial. The data 
from Study 1 was re-analysed to investigate whether taking the need for support into 
account and also excluding participants who received more support than they needed, had 
any effect on the correlations between received and perceived support. A measure of the 
proportion of times support was received when needed was calculated by dividing the 
number of times participants stated they received support by the number of times they 
stated that it was needed. Participants who received more support than they needed, i.e., 
those with proportion values over 1 were then excluded. On average, the correlations 
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between received and perceived support doubled when the proportion measure was used 
as the measure of received support compared to when received support was measured 
solely as the number of supportive behaviours received. If receiving more support than is 
needed is associated with negative support perceptions, then received and perceived 
support will only be positively correlated up to the point where support needs are met. 
Therefore, if the received-perceived support relationship is affected by the need for 
support, as is suggested here, then this relationship will be quadratic and not linear. This 
can explain why previous studies investigating the received-perceived support relationship 
have found such low correlations. These studies are likely to include people whose support 
needs are met, people who receive less support than they need (under-supply) and people 
who receive more support than they need (over-supply). However, as previously stated, the 
majority of these studies used measures of received support that only measure the amount 
of support received and do not take the need for support into account. Without controlling 
for the need for support, the negative perceptions experienced by people receiving an 
over-supply of support will effectively cancel out the positive correlation between received 
and perceived support expected in the remainder of the participants.  
It was not possible to investigate whether controlling for the need of support had any 
effect on the relationships between the social comparison variables and perceived support 
and health using the data from Study 1. This was because, unlike received support where 
participants had been asked about both the number of times support was needed and 
received, the distribution elicitation questions simply asked about the number of times 
different percentiles of the population received support and not received support when 
they needed it. The decision was made to run a second study using questions that were 
more tailored to measuring support received when needed to see whether 1) controlling 
for participants’ support needs had any effect on the relationships between the social 
comparison variables and perceived support and health and 2) whether the increase in the 
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strength of the received-perceived relationship resulting from controlling for participants’ 
support needs could be replicated. 
Unfortunately, the absolute, rank, and distance from the mean variables for both 
support types were so highly correlated in Study 2 that it was not possible to carry out the 
regression analyses to investigate the hypotheses concerning social comparison effects. 
However, as in Study 1, the results showed that the strength of the received-perceived 
support relationship was much stronger when the need for support was controlled. As this 
was a novel finding, it was written as a separate paper (published in Personality and 
Individual Differences) which is printed below. This gives full details of the two studies 
undertaken. Table numbers have been changed to align with the other table numbers in 
this thesis. 
When is Received Social Support Related to Perceived Support 
and Well-Being? When it is Needed 
Abstract 
How do perceptions of being supported relate to the amount of social support received? 
Received and perceived support have generally been found to be only moderately related. 
Previous research has however focused on the amount of support received regardless of 
whether it was needed. We hypothesized that a measure of support received when needed 
would predict perceived support and well-being better than would an unqualified measure 
of received support. Study 1 found that correlations between received support and 
perceived support measures were, on average, twice as high when received support was 
measured as the proportion of times support was received when needed (average r=.54) 
than when it was measured as the number of times support was received (average r=.28). 
Similar results were found for correlations between received support and mental health 
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which rose from r=.04 to r=.31 when need for support was considered. Study 2 replicated 
the strong relationship between support received when needed and both perceived 
support and mental health. Received support measures should be adapted to take the need 
for support into consideration in future investigation of these relationships. Social support 
interventions may only be beneficial if the recipient’s support needs are not already being 
met. 
Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the relationship between received and perceived 
support and with the relationship between both received and perceived support and well-
being. We operationalise received and perceived support as they are most commonly 
measured: received support as the quantity of supportive behaviours received by an 
individual (Haber, Cohen, Lucas, & Baltes, 2007) and perceived support as both the 
satisfaction with support and the availability of it (Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990). 
There has been much interest in the relationship between received and perceived 
support because of the strong and well documented link between social support and 
health; people who are more socially integrated tend to be healthier, both physically and 
mentally, than those who are more socially isolated (Barrera, 1986; House, Landis, & 
Umberson, 1988; Uchino, 2009). A number of theories have been put forward to account 
for this, the most dominant being stress buffering theory (cf. Barrera, 1986; Cohen & Wills, 
1985; Cutrona & Russell, 1990; Thoits, 1986). The theory proposes that social support acts 
as a buffer that protects people against the physical and mental effects of stress caused 
from experiences such as illness or other life events. It suggests that the relationship 
between received and perceived support should be relatively strong and that both positive 
perceptions of support and receipt of support should lead to stress-buffering effects (Haber 
et al., 2007, Lakey & Cohen, 2000). However, the relationship between received and 
perceived support, although significant, has been consistently found to be relatively mild. 
 236 
 
For example, a meta-analysis of 23 studies found the average correlation between 
perceived and received support to be r = .35, p < .001 (Haber et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
whereas perceived support is consistently associated with positive health outcomes (e.g., 
Barrera, 2000; Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & Layton, 2010; Uchino, 2004; 2009; Uchino, Bowen, 
Carlisle, & Birmingham, 2012), the relationship between received support and health has 
been shown to be very inconsistent with nonsignificant and even negative associations 
often being found (Bolger & Amarel, 2007; Uchino, 2009). It is therefore unsurprising that 
interventions that have been developed based on this theory, under the assumption that 
increasing received support will lead to better health, have provided mixed results (Barrera, 
Glasgow, McKay, Boles, & Feil, 2002).  
Many studies and evaluations of the relationships between received support, 
perceived support and health use measures of received support such as the Inventory of 
Socially Supportive Behaviors (ISSB; Barrera, Sandler, & Ramsey, 1981), which is the most 
widely used and well-validated measure of received support (Haber et al., 2007; Gottlieb & 
Bergen, 2010), but which only measures the amount of support received. This has meant 
that factors relating to the support received that may affect this relationship (such as 
whether it was needed or the quality of it) have been largely unexplored. Here we propose 
and test the hypothesis that the relationship between received and perceived support is 
affected by the need for support. Specifically, we hypothesize that people’s perceptions of 
the support they receive are based not on the number of times they receive support but on 
the number of times they have received it relative to the number of times they have 
needed it. We also hypothesize that received and perceived support will be positively 
correlated only up until the point where support needs are met. Beyond this (i.e., when 
people experience an oversupply of support), we expect that the relationship may break 
down (i.e., become absent or even negative) and we therefore propose that previous tests 
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of the strength of the received-perceived support relationship may be inaccurate if the 
need for support has not been controlled for. 
Although these hypotheses appear not to have been tested in the context of the 
received-perceived support relationship, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
relationship between received support and health may be stronger when the need for 
support is taken into account for the reasons outlined above. Studies have shown that both 
an under- (Jou & Fukada, 2002) and over-supply (Reynolds & Perrin, 2004) of support can 
lead to negative health outcomes. Therefore, analyses that fail to take the need for support 
into account may produce weaker correlations between received support and health 
because any positive effects of receiving additional support when it is needed may be 
counteracted by reduced, absent or even negative effects of receiving support when it is 
not. Wolff, Schmiedek, Brose and Lindenberger (2013) found support for this hypothesis 
and demonstrated how taking the need for support into account improved the strength of 
the relationship between received support and health. They found no significant 
relationship between the amount of support received and either physical health or 
emotional well-being, but obtained a significant, quadratic relationship between these two 
outcomes and the balance of received and needed support (i.e., the difference in the 
number of times support is needed and actually received).  
The primary aim of the current study is therefore to investigate whether the 
received-perceived support relationship is stronger when the need for support is taken into 
account as appears to be the case with regard to the relationship between received support 
and health. It is possible that previous findings of weak relationships between received 
support and both perceived support and health have been due to a common cause – 
namely the way received support has been measured. We also aim to provide more 
evidence that the relationship between received support and health is also stronger when 
the need for support is considered. 
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Study 1 
In Study 1 we directly compare the relationships between received support, support 
received when needed, perceived support and health. Based on previous findings we 
hypothesized that there would be a significant but mild correlation between received and 
perceived support and that this relationship would strengthen when the need for support is 
taken into account. Due to previous inconsistent findings we were unsure as to whether or 
not a significant correlation between received support and health would be found but we 
expected a significant, positive correlation between these constructs when the need for 
support is taken into account. We further investigated differences in the strength of the 
relationships between received support, support received when needed, perceived support 
and health using regression analyses. This allowed for us to determine whether our 
measure of support received when needed (described below) predicted perceived support 
and health outcomes over and above received support alone. We hypothesized that our 
measure of support received when needed would be a much stronger predictor of 
perceived support and health outcome measures than received support. 
Method 
 Participants: The 198 participants had a mean age of 32.4 years (SD = 12.8, range: 
18-65 years), were predominantly White (76%) and 47.5% were male. Participants were 
mainly college educated (69%), were all resident in the U.S., and completed the study from 
41 different states. Sample size calculations were based on detecting the weakest effect, 
i.e., the correlation between received and perceived support, which a meta-analysis 
identified to be r = .35 on average (Haber et al., 2007). Calculations showed that at least 
121 participants would be needed to have a 99% chance of detecting a correlation of .35 
and that for multiple regressions with 4 predictor variables at least 174 participants would 
be needed to have a 99% chance of detecting a medium sized effect (a correlation of .35 
indicates a medium sized effect; Cohen, 1988). 
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 Procedure: Participants were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(www.mturk.com) – an online crowdsourcing platform where “workers” choose tasks to 
complete in exchange for money or Amazon vouchers. Mechanical Turk workers have been 
shown to produce high quality data in psychological experiments (Buhrmester, Kwany & 
Gosling, 2011) and to be more representative of the U.S. population than university 
undergraduates typically used in psychological research as well as other internet samples in 
general (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Mechanical Turk has also been found to be a 
reliable source of experimental data specifically in the area of judgment and decision 
making (Paolacci et al., 2010). Participants were asked to complete an online questionnaire 
that comprised questions on needed support, received support, perceived support, mental 
and physical health and demographic questions (age, gender, level of education and 
ethnicity). They received $1.00 on completion of the study which took 15-20 minutes to 
complete; this payment was in line with typical Mechanical Turk payments. As no 
standardised measures of support received when needed could be found, two specific 
supportive behaviours (having someone listen to you talk about your private feelings and 
having someone pitch in to help you do something) each representing a different type of 
support (emotional support and tangible assistance respectively) were chosen from the 
ISSB as the focus of the study. Participants were asked the following: 
Needed and received support: Participants were asked the following questions about 
their need and receipt of emotional support: “In a typical month, how many times [do you 
need]/[does] someone to listen to you talk about your private feelings?”, and tangible 
support: “In a typical month, how many times [do you need]/[does] someone to pitch in to 
help you do something that needs to be done?”.  
Perceived support: As we had asked participants about their receipt of two specific 
supportive behaviours we also asked about their perceptions relating specifically to these 
behaviours. We asked participants to rate on six-point scales how satisfied they were with 
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the support they received from people who listen them talk about their private feelings and 
from people who pitch in to help them do something that needs to be done right away, 
how available these people were to them and how satisfied they were with the availability 
of these people. Perceived support was also measured using two standardised but non-
support type specific scales; the Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support 
(MSPSS; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988, see Appendix 3) and the satisfaction 
subscale of the Arizona Social Support Interview Schedule (ASSIS-S; Barrera, 1981, see 
Appendix 4). The 12 item MSPSS measures the current availability of social support from 
family, friends and significant others rated on a seven point scale from (1) very strongly 
disagree to (7) very strongly agree. High total scores on this measure indicate high levels of 
perceived social support. The MSPSS has been found to have strong internal (multiple tests 
show Cronbach’s alpha values ranging from .84 to .92; Zimet et al., 1988, Zimet, Powell, 
Farley, Werkman, & Berkoff, 1990) and test-retest reliability (Cronbach’s α = .85; Zimet et 
al., 1988) and moderate construct validity (demonstrated by a significant, negative 
relationship between the scale and depression symptoms: r = -.25, p <.01; Zimet et al., 
1988). The ASSIS-S is a six item measure of satisfaction with support received in given 
situations during the past month rated on seven point scale from (1) very dissatisfied to (7) 
very satisfied. High total scores on this measure also reflect high levels of perceived social 
support. This satisfaction subscale has been shown to have moderate test-retest reliability 
(r = .69, p < .001; Barrera, 1981). 
Health: Health was measured using the Short Form-36v2 Health Survey (SF-36v2; 
Ware, Kosinski, Bjorner, Turner-Bowker, Gandek, & Maruish, 2008, see Appendix 5) which is 
a generic measure of both physical and mental health status and the most widely used 
health survey in the world (Ware et al., 2008). The 36 items evaluate four areas of physical 
health: physical functioning, role-physical, bodily pain and general health and four areas of 
mental health: vitality, social functioning, role-emotional and mental health. Test scoring 
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produces separate scores for physical (physical component summary: PCS) and mental 
health (mental component summary: MCS) and scores range from 0 (“poorest” health 
status) to 100 (“best” health status). The SF-36 Health Survey has had extensive reliability 
and validity testing (for a comprehensive review see Ware & Gandek, 1998). Reliability 
estimates (Cronbach’s alpha) for the physical and mental component summaries usually 
exceed .90 (Ware, Kosinski, & Keller, 1994); exact numbers given in the user guide are .95 
for the PCS and .93 for the MCS (Ware et al., 2008).  
Statistical analysis: We first predict that using a measure of received support that 
takes the need for support into account will produce stronger correlations with perceived 
support and health and will predict these outcomes over and above traditional measures of 
received support. We calculated such a measure – the proportion of times support is 
received when needed – by dividing the number of times participants stated they received 
support by the number of times they stated that it was needed. We used a relative 
measure as opposed to an absolute one as we hypothesise that people receiving support, 
for example, 50% of the time they need it will have the same perceptions of this support 
regardless of the absolute numbers of times they receive and need support. Use of this 
measure meant that participants who stated that they didn’t typically need support 
(nemotional = 14, ntangible = 13) needed to be excluded from the study as accurate proportions 
could not be calculated for these participants. Secondly, we predict a positive, linear 
relationship between support received when needed and both perceived support and 
health such that perceptions of support become more positive and wellness increases as 
the proportion of times support needs are met increases to 1 (i.e., support received = 
support needed). Due to the use of multiple analyses a conservative alpha level of .01 was 
used for all statistical tests. 
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Results and Brief Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics: For ease of comparison we provide a summary of the means 
and standard deviations of participants’ responses to variables included in both Study 1 and 
Study 2 in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1. 
Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Responses to All Social Support and Health 
Variables in Study 1 and Study 2. 
  Study 1   Study 2 
  Emotional Tangible   Emotional Tangible 
Received Support 6.12 (8.04) 5.71 (7.38)  31.39 (15.77) 28.76 (15.23) 
Satisfaction 4.60 (1.14) 4.38 (1.18)  4.46 (1.21) 4.29 (1.24) 
Availability 4.32 (1.20) 4.09 (1.15)  4.28 (1.06) 3.97 (1.06) 
Satisfaction with Availability 4.42 (1.35) 4.15 (1.35)  4.32 (1.30) 4.12 (1.33) 
MSPSS Average Item Score 5.08 (1.22)  5.08 (1.22) 
ASSIS-S Scores 31.37 (6.62)  30.98 (6.33) 
Physical Health 54.40 (7.57)  53.71 (8.90) 
Mental Health 43.41 (11.36)  45.65 (11.03) 
n 198   202 
Note. In Study 1 received support was measured as the number of times in a typical month support is 
received but in Study 2 it was measured as the number of times support was received on the last 50 
occasions it was needed. Support satisfaction, availability and satisfaction with availability were all 
measured on six-point scales where high scores represent high levels of these constructs. MSPSS = 
Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support, ASSIS-S = Arizona Social Support Inventory 
Schedule – Satisfaction subscale, physical health is measured by the SF-36v2 Health Survey Physical 
Component Summary and mental health is measured by the SF-36v2 Health Survey Mental 
Component Summary. For perceived support scales higher scores represent higher levels of support 
and for health scales higher scores represent better health.   
 
It is not possible to compare the amount of support received by participants in Study 
1 and 2 directly, as support was measured over different periods (see Study 2 below). In 
Study 1 we asked participants about the number of times they received support in a typical 
month and in Study 2 we asked about the number of times they had received support on 
the last 50 occasions when they had needed it. It is somewhat difficult to ascertain whether 
the amount of support received by our internet samples is typical of the amount of support 
received by the general population. This is because the scale that we took our received 
support questions from (the ISSB) asks respondents to rate the frequency with which they 
have received the support type in the last four weeks on a five point scale (1 = “not at all”, 2 
= “once or twice”, 3 = “about once a week”, 4 = “several times a week”, 5 = “about every 
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day”) rather than specifically asking for the number of times support is received as we have 
done in Study 1. In their paper discussing the development of the ISSB, Barrera et al. (1981) 
state that the average rating given to the emotional support item used in the present study 
was 2.72 (SD = 1.23, n = 71) and to the tangible support item was 2.32 (SD = 0.97, n = 71). 
This suggests that their participants received these two types of support somewhere 
between 1 and 4 times in the last 4 weeks which is slightly lower than our participants’ 
receipt of this support (Memotional = 6.12, Mtangible = 5.71). 
There were only small differences across studies in the average responses given on 
the five perceived support measures. As we created three of the measures ourselves (the 
satisfaction, availability and satisfaction with availability questions) we are unable to 
compare these responses to those from a general population sample. However, during 
development of the MSPSS, Zimet et al. (1988) found the average item score of their 
sample (n = 275) to be 5.60 (SD = 0.86) which is very similar to ours (Memotional = 5.08, 
Mtangible = 5.08). Average scores on the ASSIS-S were not reported in papers describing the 
development of the scale (Barrera, 1980; Sandler & Barrera, 1984) and so it is not possible 
to compare scores on this measure across populations. 
There was also very little difference in the physical and mental health of participants 
across our two studies. The mental and physical component summaries of the SF-36v2 
were each designed to have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10 (Ware & Gandek, 
1998); our participants were slightly better than average in terms of their physical health 
(MStudy1 = 54.40, MStudy2 = 53.71) but were poorer than average in their mental health 
(MStudy1 = 43.41, MStudy2 = 45.65). 
Correlations: Correlations (Spearman for ordinal outcome variables and Pearson for 
continuous) were undertaken between all variables for each type of support (see Table 
6.2).  
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Table 6.2. 
Correlations between Received Support, Proportion of Times Support is Received when Needed and All Outcome Variables for Each Support Type. 
 Emotional Support  Tangible Support 
 
Support 
Received 
(all) 
Support 
Received (after 
exclusion) 
Support 
Proportion (all) 
Support 
Proportion 
(after 
exclusion) 
 
Support 
Received 
(all) 
Support 
Received (after 
exclusion) 
Support 
Proportion (all) 
Support 
Proportion 
(after 
exclusion) 
Satisfaction .25* .33** .29** .48**  .21* .20* .45** .49** 
Availability .42** .48** .48** .60**  .29** .28** .47** .53** 
Satisfaction with 
Availability 
.35** .43** .45** .56**  .27* .28** .49** .59** 
MSPSS Scores .15 .29** .28** .54**  .17 .12 .21* .50** 
ASSIS-S Scores .13 .24* .20* .56**  .22* .16 .18 .50** 
Physical Health -.07 .05 .00 .07  .02 .00 -.11 .02 
Mental Health .00 .04 .18 .36**  .08 .03 .08 .26* 
n 184 154 184 154  185 168 185 168 
Note. MSPSS = Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support, ASSIS-S = Arizona Social Support Inventory Schedule – Satisfaction subscale, physical health is measured 
by the SF-36v2 Health Survey Physical Component Summary and mental health is measured by the SF-36v2 Health Survey Mental Component Summary. For perceived 
support scales higher scores represent higher levels of support and for health scales higher scores represent better health.  *p<.01, **p<.001 (two-tailed). 
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Perceived support: Correlations using all our participants (except those who stated 
that they do not need support) showed that, as hypothesized, both received emotional and 
tangible support correlate weakly with our five measures of perceived support (average: 
emotional: r = .26, tangible: r = .23).  All correlations were significant apart from the 
correlation between received emotional support and ASSIS-S scores and the correlations 
between both types of received support and MSPSS scores. These findings follow the 
pattern of results previously seen in the literature investigating the received-perceived 
support relationship. As predicted, these correlations improved when need for support was 
taken into consideration. The average correlation between the proportion of times support 
is received when needed and our perceived support measures was r = .34 for emotional 
support and r = .36 for tangible support. Although improved, these correlations are still 
weak. We hypothesize that this is because received and perceived support are strongly and 
positively correlated up until the point where support needs are met. Beyond this (i.e., 
when people are over-supplied with support) we hypothesise that the received-perceived 
support relationship breaks down in some way; it perhaps becomes weaker, absent or even 
negative. We investigate this by removing the participants who stated that they receive 
more support than they need (nemotional = 30, ntangible = 17) from the analysis. When we do 
this the correlations between received support and perceived support measures remain 
largely unchanged for tangible support (average: r = .21) and increase only slightly for 
emotional support (average: r = .35). However, the correlations between the proportion of 
times support is received when needed and our measures of perceived support increase 
considerably (average: emotional: r = .55, tangible: r = .52). Taken together these findings 
suggest that the strength of the relationship between received and perceived support is 
affected by whether or not the support received is needed.  
Health: Contrary to our perceived support findings we found no significant 
correlations between scores on the physical component summary of the SF36v2 health 
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survey and either received support or the proportion of times support is received when 
needed. Excluding participants who received an over-supply of support did not change 
these findings. These results are in line with other studies that have shown no association 
between received support and physical health but contradict findings of Wolff et al. (2013) 
who showed a significant relationship between physical health complaints and the balance 
of needed and received support. We suspect that these findings may be due to the 
different way physical health was measured in the two studies and this possibility is 
discussed in the general discussion. 
The correlations between scores on the mental component summary of the SF36v2 
health survey and both received support and the proportion of times support is received 
when needed were also not significant. When participants who received an oversupply of 
support were excluded there was no difference in the correlations between received 
support and mental health scores. However, the correlations between the proportion of 
times support is received when needed and mental health scores increased substantially 
following this exclusion (for emotional support, from r = .18 to r = .36 and tangible, from r = 
.08 to r = .26), supporting our hypotheses and in line with Wolff et al.’s (2013) findings. 
Regressions: Excluding participants who received more support than they needed, 
we used multiple linear regression (using the enter method) to predict all seven outcomes 
from age, gender, received support and the proportion of times support is received when 
needed. The number of remaining participants exceeded the minimum number required to 
have a 95% chance of detecting an effect (n = 129). The primary aim of these analyses was 
to investigate whether the proportion of times support is received when needed predicted 
the outcomes over and above support received. We also control for age and gender by 
adding these variables to the model as it is possible that they could be factors that 
moderate the relationships between received support and both perceived support and 
health (Haber et al., 2007; Wolff et al., 2013). 
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For the three ordinal outcome variables (satisfaction with support, availability of 
support and satisfaction with availability of support) we also conducted ordinal regression 
analyses (using the polytomous universal model and logit function). The findings were the 
same as the linear models in terms of whether the overall model and predictors in the 
model were significant and so, for ease of interpretation, we only report the linear 
regression analyses here. Table 6.3 shows 14 two-step models, one for each outcome and 
support type. In the first step age, gender and received support were included in the model 
and in the second step the proportion of times support is received when needed was added 
to the model. For brevity we do not include the constant, age or gender coefficients in the 
table. Neither age nor gender were significant predictors of our outcomes in any of the 
models or steps. The constant was significant in all models and steps.  Tolerance values for 
all independent variables were above 0.10 suggesting that collinearity is not problematic. 
Perceived support: For emotional support we see a general trend such that the 
variables entered into the model at Step 1 significantly predict the perceived support 
outcomes over and above the baseline model and that received support is the only 
significant predictor in the model (all outcomes apart from satisfaction with emotional 
support where there are no significant predictors). These models account, on average, for 
9% of the variance (range: 5-13%). When the proportion of times support is received when 
needed is added to the model in Step 2, the effect of received support is removed, the 
variance accounted for by the model increases, on average, by 25% (range: 19-30%) and 
proportion becomes the sole predictor of the perceived support outcome measure. For 
tangible support all of the five models predicting perceived support outcomes only reach 
significance when proportion is added to the model in Step 2. Proportion is the sole 
significant predictor in all of these models which account for, on average, 32% of the 
variance (range: 26-42%). These results provide evidence of a much stronger relationship 
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between the proportion of times support is received when needed and perceived support 
than the number of times it is received. 
Health: For both emotional and tangible support, none of the variables entered into 
the model at either step significantly predicted physical health scores but the proportion of 
times support is received when needed significantly predicted mental health scores. These 
models accounted for 13% (emotional support) and 8% (tangible support) of the variance.  
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Table 6.3. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Satisfaction with Support, Availability of Support, Satisfaction with Availability of Support, Scores on the Multidimensional 
Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS), Scores on the Arizona Social Support Interview Schedule – Satisfaction Subscale (ASSIS-S) and Scores on the SF-36v2 Health Survey 
Physical and Mental Component Summaries (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples). 
 Emotional Support  Tangible Support 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) β p  ∆R2 B (95% CI) β p 
Satisfaction          
Step 1 .05     .041   .03     .174 
Received Support  0.04 (-0.01-0.10) .21 .060   0.02 (0.00-0.05) .11 .060 
Step 2 .19**   <.001  .27**   <.001 
Received Support  0.01 (-0.04-0.06) .05 .707   0.00 (-0.02-0.02) .01 .881 
Proportion of Support  1.67 (1.02-2.32) .47 .001   2.08 (1.42-2.77) .53 .001 
Availability          
Step 1 .13**     <.001   .03    .135 
Received Support  0.08 (0.05-0.12) .35 <.001   0.02 (0.00-0.07) .13 .112 
Step 2 .30**   <.001  .32**   <.001 
Received Support  0.03 (0.01-0.07) .15 .033   0.00 (-0.02-0.04) .02 .833 
Proportion of Support  2.14 (1.53-2.69) .58 .001   2.18 (1.69-2.67) .58 .001 
Satisfaction with Availability         
Step 1 .12**    <.001   .03    .160 
Received Support  0.09 (0.05-0.13) .34 <.001   0.03 (0.00-0.09) .14 .137 
Step 2 .28**   <.001  .39**   <.001 
Received Support  0.04 (0.00-0.07) .14 .028   0.00 (-0.02-0.04) .01 .878 
Proportion of Support  2.45 (1.82-3.13) .57 .001   2.89 (2.29-3.45) .64 .001 
MSPSS          
Step 1 .10*     .001   0.03    .210 
Received Support  0.74 (0.33-1.19) .28 <.001   0.25 (-0.05-0.59) .12 .060 
Step 2 .23**   <.001  .24**   <.001 
Received Support  0.27 (-0.11-0.65) .10 .152   0.04 (-0.31-0.32) .02 .774 
Proportion of Support  22.37 (15.16-29.96) .51 .001   23.82 (16.34-31.64) .50 .001 
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Table 6.3. Continued. 
ASSIS-S          
Step 1 .06     .027   .03    .218 
Received Support  0.30 (0.09-0.55) .24 .006   0.16 (0.03-0.34) .16 .019 
Step 2 .26**   <.001  .23**   <.001 
Received Support  0.07 (-0.11-0.27) .06 .429   0.06 (-0.07-0.18) .06 .294 
Proportion of Support  11.32 (7.74-14.68) .54 .001   10.78 (7.77-14.00) .49 .001 
Physical Health          
Step 1 .02     .307   .03     .191 
Received Support  0.09 (-0.11-0.28) .06 .380   -0.01 (-0.15-0.13) -.01 .890 
Step 2 .00   .409  .00   .308 
Received Support  0.06 (-0.18-0.30) .04 .581   -0.01 (-0.16-0.12) -.01 .835 
Proportion of Support  1.24 (-2.99-5.42) .05 .517   0.55 (-3.81-5.08) .02 .800 
Mental Health          
Step 1 .00      .904   .01    .650 
Received Support  0.09 (-0.27-0.51) .04 .632   0.04 (-0.23-0.32) .03 .627 
Step 2 .13**   <.001  .07*   .011 
Received Support  -0.20 (-0.52-0.18) -.09 .259   -0.05 (-0.33-0.22) -.03 .622 
Proportion of Support  14.01 (7.58-21.20) .39 .001   10.39 (4.79-15.90) .26 .001 
Note. nemotional = 154, ntangible = 168, CI = confidence interval, significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold.*p<.01, **p<.001 
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Study 2 
We aimed to replicate our findings of a strong relationship between the proportion of 
times support is received when needed and perceived support from Study 1 in Study 2. We 
also further investigated the relationship between support received when needed and 
health.  
Method 
Participants: The 202 participants had a mean age of 34.8 years (SD = 13.2, range: 18-
73 years), were predominantly White (85%), and 47% were male. Participants were mainly 
college educated (75%), were all resident in the U.S., and completed the study from 40 
different states. There was no significant difference in the average ages of participants in 
Study 1 (M = 32.37, SD = 12.81) and Study 2 (M = 34.77, SD = 13.22), t(398) = -1.84, p = .066. 
There was also no significant association between study and participants’ gender (χ2(1, N = 
400) = 0.04, p = .920) or between study and participants’ education level (χ2(2, N = 400) = 
1.95, p = .577). This suggests that participants from Study 1 and Study 2 did not differ in 
age, gender and education level. 
Procedure: Participants were again recruited using Amazon Turk, using the same 
procedure and compensation as in Study 1. Participants followed the same procedure as in 
Study 1 apart from being asked the following questions instead of being asked how many 
occasions in a typical month they needed and received emotional and tangible support: 
“Consider 50 occasions that you have needed someone to listen to you talk about your 
private feelings. On how many of these occasions did someone provide this support?” and 
“consider 50 occasions that you have needed someone to pitch in to help you do something 
that needs to be done. On how many of these occasions did someone provide this 
support?”. The questions were framed this way so that participants who do not need 
support on a monthly basis would not have to be excluded (as in Study 1) as we would have 
valid proportion measurements for all participants. Of course, it was not expected that 
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participants would be able to recall 50 specific occasions. Rather, our use of this wording 
was designed to encourage participants to respond in terms of the proportion of occasions 
on which they had received support when it was needed. 
Results 
All participants were included in the analysis as none stated that they received 
support on more occasions than they needed it (i.e., none answered the above questions 
with a figure over 50) as would be expected with how the question was worded. Again, an 
alpha level of .01 was used for all statistical tests. 
 Correlations: Correlations (Spearman for ordinal outcome variables and Pearson for 
continuous) were undertaken between all variables for each type of support. Table 6.4 
shows a comparison of the correlations between the proportion of times support is 
received when needed and our perceived support and health outcomes from Studies 1 and 
2. As can be seen, the correlations are very similar to, and replicate the findings from, Study 
1.  
Regressions: We carried out ordinal and multiple linear regression analyses as in 
Study 1 using age, gender and the proportion of times support is received when needed as 
predictors in the models. For brevity, we include the age and gender coefficients only for 
models where they are significant predictors. The constant was significant in all models. 
Tolerance values for all independent variables were above 0.10 suggesting that collinearity 
is not problematic. 
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Table 6.4. 
Correlations between Proportion of Times Support is Received when Needed and All Outcome Variables for Each Support Type from Study 1 and 2. 
  Satisfaction  Availability  Satisfaction with Availability MSPSS Scores ASSIS-S Scores Physical Health  Mental Health  
Emotional Support Proportion Study 1 .48** .60** .56** .54** .56** .07 .36** 
Emotional Support Proportion Study 2 .56** .61** .59** .56** .56** -0.02 .37** 
Tangible Support Proportion Study 1 .49** .53** .59** .50** .50** .02 .26** 
Tangible Support Proportion Study 2 .43** .49** .46** .56** .55** -0.04 .37** 
Note. Study 1:  nemotional = 154, ntangible = 168, Study 2: N = 202. MSPSS = Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support, ASSIS-S = Arizona Social Support Inventory 
Schedule – Satisfaction subscale, physical health is measured by the SF-36v2 Health Survey Physical Component Summary and mental health is measured by the SF-36v2 
Health Survey Mental Component Summary. For perceived support scales higher scores represent higher levels of support and for health scales higher scores represent 
better health. **p<.001 (two-tailed). 
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Table 6.5. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analyses Predicting Satisfaction with Support, Availability of Support, Satisfaction with Availability of Support, Scores on the Multidimensional 
Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS), Scores on the Arizona Social Support Interview Schedule – Satisfaction Subscale (ASSIS-S) and Scores on the SF-36v2 Health Survey 
Physical and Mental Component Summaries (95% BCa Bootstrap Confidence Intervals and Standard Errors Based on 1000 Samples).  
 Emotional Support  Tangible Support 
Predictors ∆R2 B (95% CI) β p   ∆R2 B (95% CI) β p 
Satisfaction          
Model .28**   < .001  .22**   < .001 
Proportion of Support  1.95 (1.46-2.47) .51 < .001   1.90 (1.25-2.51) .47 < .001 
Availability          
Model .34**   < .001  .25**   < .001 
Proportion of Support  1.96 (1.53-2.34) .58 < .001   1.74 (1.17-2.30) .50 < .001 
Satisfaction with Availability         
Model .33**   < .001  .20**   < .001 
Proportion of Support  2.37 (1.81-2.93) .57 < .001   1.98 (1.27-2.58) .45 < .001 
MSPSS          
Model .32**   < .001  .31**   < .001 
Proportion of Support  25.06 (18.38-31.79) .55 < .001   25.80 (19.11-32.47) .55 < .001 
ASSIS-S          
Model .32**   < .001  .31**   < .001 
Proportion of Support  11.08 (8.51-13.55) .55 < .001   11.33 (8.62-13.97) .55 < .001 
Physical Health          
Model  .06*   .01  .06*   .01 
Age  -0.17 (-0.28--0.06) -.25 < .001   -0.17 (-0.27--0.07) -.25 < .001 
Gender  0.03 (-2.51-2.46) .00 .98   -0.07 (-2.53-2.54) .00 .94 
Proportion of Support  -0.90 (-4.68-3.39) -.03 .68   -1.64 (-5.80-2.42) -.06 .48 
Mental Health          
Model .23**   < .001  .23**   < .001 
Age  0.22 (0.11-0.33) .26 < .001   0.21 (0.11-0.31) .25 < .001 
Gender  3.99 (1.33-6.75) .18 .01   4.50 (1.92-7.17) .20 < .001 
Proportion of Support  14.32 (9.77-18.48) .41 < .001   14.95 (10.29-19.69) .41 < .001 
Note. N = 202, CI = confidence interval, significant models and predictors are highlighted in bold.*p<.01, **p<.001. 
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Perceived support: As Table 6.5 above shows, all of the models predicting measures 
of perceived support were significant with proportion of times support is received when 
needed being the only significant predictor in all the models. This is the same pattern of 
results as seen in Study 1 and the variance accounted for by the models is comparable to 
that of the Step 2 models in Study 1. For emotional support, the average R2 of the Step 2 
models predicting perceived support outcomes in Study 1 was .34; in Study 2 it is .32. For 
tangible support, the average R2 of the Step 2 models in Study 1 was .32; in Study 2 it is .26. 
Health: Table 6.5 shows that, as in Study 1, the proportion of times support is 
received when needed is a significant predictor of mental but not physical health. In 
contrast to Study 1, age was a significant predictor of physical health but the regression 
models were not significant. In the two models predicting mental health scores all 
predictors apart from gender in the emotional support model were significant but the 
proportion of times support is received when needed made a greater contribution to both 
models than age and gender (emotional: βage = .26, βgender = .18, βproportion = .41; tangible: βage 
= .25, βgender = .20, βproportion = .41).  
General Discussion 
This research investigated whether the relationships between received and perceived 
support and received support and health were stronger when the need for support was 
taken into account. Study 1 showed that using a measure of received support that 
considers the need for support - the proportion of times support is received when needed - 
resulted in stronger correlations between received support and both perceived support 
and mental health measures than when received support was measured simply as the 
number of supportive behaviours received. Furthermore, the correlations between the 
proportion of times support is received when needed and both perceived support and 
mental health were even stronger when participants experiencing an oversupply of needed 
support were excluded from the analysis. This suggests that the positive relationship 
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between received support and both perceived support and mental health may break down 
in some way (i.e., become weaker, absent or even negative) when people receive more 
support than they need. Regression analyses supported these findings and a second study 
replicated the strength of the relationship between the proportion of times support is 
received when needed, perceived support and mental health.  
Little evidence of a relationship between physical health and both received support 
and support received when needed was found but this may have been due to the way 
physical health was measured. Here we used the SF-36v2 physical component summary 
which is a general measure of functional health, i.e., the extent to which individuals 
perform regular, daily activities without limitations due to health problems. Previous 
studies investigating the relationship between social support and health have mainly 
looked at the association between social support and morbidity of or risk of mortality from 
specific chronic diseases (see Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010 for a review). Wolff et al. (2013) 
show a significant relationship between the balance of received and needed support and 
the experience of health complaints (e.g., headaches, upper respiratory complaints, muscle 
tension etc.). Our mental health measure was similar to this; unlike the physical component 
summary of the SF-36v2, the mental component summary comprised items asking about 
experiences of specific symptoms (e.g., feeling tired, low, nervous etc.) and we see much 
stronger effects with this measure than we do with physical health. It is likely that our 
results would have supported our hypotheses and the findings of Wolff et al. (2013) if we 
had measured morbidity of physical illness instead of functional health. 
Furthermore, when we correlate scores from our two standardised measures of 
perceived support (MSPSS and ASSIS-S) with physical and mental health we find the same 
pattern of results from both studies, with the correlations between perceived support and 
physical health being weak and nonsignificant (Study 1: MSPSS: r = .12, ASSIS-S r = .13, 
Study 2: MSPSS: r = .03, ASSIS-S r = .08) but those between perceived support and mental 
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health being significant and much stronger (Study 1: MSPSS: r = .50, ASSIS-S r = .52, Study 2: 
MSPSS: r = .43, ASSIS-S r = .41). The strong relationship between perceived support and 
physical health has been well replicated further suggesting that the discrepancy in physical 
and mental health findings may have been due to the way physical health was measured.  
Implications 
 Our findings suggest that measures such as the ISSB that are being used to 
investigate the relationship between received social support, perceived support and health 
need to ask not just about the amount of support received but about the amount of 
support received relative to the amount of times it is needed. Question wording such as 
that used in our second study where participants were asked to think about the last 50 
occasions that they needed support and to state how many times they had actually 
received it may be more appropriate when investigating these relationships. 
 The findings may also have implications for stress buffering theory and interventions 
that have been developed based on this theory. Social support interventions are delivered 
in the same manner to all recipients. Our results suggest that increasing support may only 
have a beneficial effect on health when the recipient has identified a need for the support. 
Giving support when it is not needed or unwanted may have the opposite effect and may 
explain why interventions increasing support in an attempt to improve health have had 
mixed effects. Therefore, these interventions need to be individually tailored depending on 
support needs. Research investigating the efficacy of such interventions should control for 
the degree to which support needs were met prior to the intervention. 
Limitations 
 Our study was limited in that we only looked at two different types of support 
(emotional and tangible) instead of all four identified by Barrera and Ainlay (1983). We 
could have taken items from the ISSB that measured directive guidance and positive social 
interactions as well. We chose to study only emotional and tangible support as we believed 
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that these types of support would be commonly received by all participants. Studies that 
have compared types of support typically only look at emotional and tangible support and 
some that have included directive guidance have found that this type of support was 
received infrequently by participants (e.g., Friedman & King, 1994). 
Conclusions 
 The relationship between received and perceived support is affected by the need for 
support – people’s perceptions relating to the support they receive are based not on the 
number of times they receive support but specifically on the number of times they have 
received it relative to the number of times they have needed it. The same is true for the 
relationship between received support and mental health. We have shown that 
perceptions of support become more positive and mental well-being increases as the 
percentage of times support needs are met increases to 100%. These relationships may 
break down beyond this, i.e., when people are given more support than they need. 
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
Overview 
 The studies presented in this thesis investigated the extent to which people compare 
to others when making a range of health-related judgements and decisions and aimed to 
identify the exact cognitive mechanisms used in this comparison process. All of the findings 
relating to these and other aims are discussed in the sections below along with the 
theoretical and applied implications of these results and potential areas for future 
research.  
Main Findings 
The Role of Social Comparison in Health-Related Judgement and Decision Making 
 One of the main aims of this thesis was to investigate whether social comparison 
effects could account for errors in health-related judgement and decision making such as 
inaccurate appraisals of symptoms, general health, sleep and social support and inaccurate 
health help-seeking decisions. In order for this to be ascertained, whether individuals 
actually compare to others when making such judgements and decisions needed to be 
established first. This was done by investigating whether measures of social comparison 
predicted the judgements and decisions of interest using regression analyses. 
  The results showed significant effects of how participants believed their experience 
of mental and physical health symptoms compared to other people’s experiences of these 
symptoms. These beliefs were associated with judgements of: 1) symptom severity, 2) 
worry about symptoms, and 3) the presence of an underlying disorder, and decisions 
regarding: 1) whether to seek help for symptoms at all, 2) the number of help-seeking 
behaviours engaged with, 3) whether to consult a professional about symptoms and 4) 
whether to take medication for symptoms. Social comparison accounted for, on average, 
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15.4% (range: 6-28%) and 5.1%10 (range: 1-11%) of the variance in these judgements and 
decisions respectively. Further analyses showed that the relationships between how 
participants believed their symptoms compared to others and decisions regarding whether 
to seek help for symptoms were mediated by judgements of symptom severity, worry 
about symptoms, and beliefs about an underlying disorder being present. 
 Participants’ beliefs about how well they were generally in comparison to others 
accounted for around 6% of the variance in self-rated health (SRH) judgements. Even 
though the comparison effects seen in the study were small, when people were explicitly 
asked if they compared to others when making the judgement the vast majority of 
participants (84%) said that they did to some extent and, on average, participants who 
compared to others said that the comparison contributed 44% to the judgement. 
 Significant but much smaller social comparison effects were seen in the sleep study. 
Participants’ beliefs about how their sleep compared to that of others accounted for only 
1% of the variance in sleep-related worry and distress judgements and 2% and 4% of the 
variance in judgements of whether participants thought they had a sleep problem and 
sleep quality judgements respectively. There was little evidence of any associations 
between participants’ beliefs about how their sleep compared to that of others and 
decisions regarding help-seeking.  
 No social comparison effects were seen at all in the first social support study; 
participants’ beliefs about how the amount of support they received compared to the 
amount of support received by others did not significantly predict any of the five perceived 
support measures (measuring satisfaction with support, availability of support and 
satisfaction with the availability of support). Unfortunately, the independent variables were 
                                                          
10 These and all of the other variance values described in this section are from the analyses using the 
rank comparison variables as they were much stronger predictors of the outcomes than the distance 
from the average comparison variables, as will be explained in the next section. 
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so highly correlated in the second study that social comparison effects could not be 
investigated.  
 In sum, the results provide evidence that social comparison plays a role both in 
general health and symptom appraisal and in help-seeking decision making for physical and 
mental health symptoms. Social comparison plays little role in the appraisal of sleep or 
making decisions about seeking help for sleep problems and there is no evidence that 
people compare to others when making judgements about the support they receive. 
Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Social Comparison 
 Another central aim of this thesis was to investigate how people compare to others 
when making health-related judgements and decisions as it is widely assumed (but 
untested) in the social comparison literature that people compare to the average of the 
comparison sample. Two measures of social comparison were used in all of the studies in 
order to ascertain whether people do compare to the sample average when making health-
related judgements and decisions or whether they base these judgements and decisions on 
where they rank amongst the sample. The former is consistent with adaptation level theory 
(ALT) and the latter with decision by sampling (DbS).  
 Where the strongest comparison effects were seen, i.e., in the physical and mental 
health studies, there was overwhelming evidence that people compared to others using 
rank-based strategies and not by comparing to the sample average. The rank comparison 
variables (where participants believed their experience of symptoms ranked in comparison 
to other people’s experiences of these symptoms) were significant predictors of all of the 
outcomes measured across all six symptoms - a total of 38 models. The average amount of 
variance accounted for by these variables was 9.1% (range: 1-28%). In contrast, the 
distance from the average variables (how much each participant’s experience of the 
symptom differed from what they believe the average symptom experience of others to 
be) were only significant predictors in 12 out of the 38 models (32%) and accounted for, on 
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average, only 1.2% (range: 0-1%) of explained variance in these 12 models. In 37 out of the 
38 full models, the step 2a models (including rank of symptom experience) either 
accounted for significantly more variance in the outcomes or there was very good evidence 
that the model fitted the data better than the step 2b models (including distance from the 
average symptom experience). Furthermore, in 31 out of the 38 step 2b models, rank was 
the strongest predictor of the outcomes, over and above participant’s absolute experience 
of the symptom. When rank variables were added to the step 1 models that included age, 
gender, and the absolute experience, rank always either attenuated or removed the effect 
of the absolute experience.  
 The results from the general health study were inconclusive as to how participants 
compared to others when making SRH judgements. The correlations between the rank 
variables and SRH were significantly stronger than the correlations between the average 
variables. Furthermore, SRH and rank performed as well as objective health when 
predicting SRH judgements while the average was a weaker predictor. However, the model 
comparison showed that there was no difference in the fit of the step 2a and 2b models to 
the data. Although the social comparison effects in the sleep study were small, where there 
were significant differences in the fit of the step 2a and 2b models (9 out of 18 cases), it 
was the 2a rank model that fit the data better than the 2b distance from the average 
model. 
 In sum, the results generally suggest that people compare to others using rank-based 
strategies rather than comparing to the average of the sample when using social 
comparison to make health-related judgements and decisions. 
Individual Differences in Beliefs about Others  
 In the studies where social comparison effects were consistently seen (mental 
health, physical health, and general health), further investigation into participants’ beliefs 
about others was undertaken in order to examine whether social comparison effects may 
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explain inaccurate judgement and decision making. It was hypothesised that inaccurate 
judgements and decisions could be the result of people comparing to others when making 
the judgement/decision and using a comparison sample that was not representative of the 
actual state of the world. For example, a person who feels depressed 20 days a month 
could come to the decision that they do not need help if they make this decision by 
comparing their symptom occurrence to that of others who feel depressed more frequently 
than them. This is because, compared to these people, their symptom occurrence ranks 
low within the sample making it appear that they are better off than the majority of others. 
However, if that person had compared their symptom occurrence to the actual distribution 
of symptom occurrence in the general population then they may have concluded that they 
are in fact worse off than the majority of others and may have made the accurate decision 
to seek help. Similarly, inaccurate judgements/decisions may be made if an individual does 
compare to the general population but their beliefs about the distribution of what they are 
comparing are incorrect.  
The results from all three health studies showed considerable variation in 
participants’ beliefs about the general health of others and the occurrence and duration of 
various symptoms in the general population. This was examined through looking at the 
distributions of participants’ answers to questions asking: 
1. What they thought the average health of both people in their country and people their 
age was (general health study), 
2. What they thought the average number of days in the last month (mental health 
study) or three months (physical health study) that people in the general population 
experienced feeling depressed and anxious (mental health study) and tired or run 
down and muscle, joint or back pain (physical health study) was and,  
3. What they thought the average length of time that people in the general population 
experience headaches and colds for was (physical health study).  
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This variation indicates that many participants had incorrect beliefs about the 
general health of others and the frequency and duration with which people experience 
symptoms. Unsurprisingly, given these findings, there was also considerable variation in 
participants’ beliefs about where their own symptom occurrence and duration ranked in 
comparison to others among participants who experienced the same symptom occurrence 
or duration. This indicates that many participants misestimated their rank. This could 
affect the accuracy of health-related judgements and decisions if participants base these 
judgements and decisions on their beliefs about how their symptoms compare to those of 
others. Interestingly, the correlation between the objective and self-rated health measures 
in the general health study was significantly stronger among participants who stated that 
they did not compare to others than among those that stated that they did. This suggests 
that participants who did not compare their health to others made more accurate 
judgements about their health than those who did. 
When help-seeking accuracy could be examined in the mental health study, the 
findings showed that participants unlikely to have depression or anxiety were around four 
times more likely to seek help if they thought they experienced depression/anxiety 
symptoms more frequently than others. Participants likely to have clinical levels of 
depression or anxiety were two to three times more likely to not seek help if they thought 
they experienced symptoms less frequently than others. 
Effect Sizes 
The size of the comparison effects seen (based on the effects of the rank comparison 
variables) generally fell between the small and medium categories (average Cohen’s f2 = 
0.09, range = 0.01-0.39). The largest effects were seen when judgements of headache and 
cold severity and worry about headache and cold duration were predicted by believed rank 
of headache and cold duration respectively (for headaches these were large effects and for 
colds they were medium effects). 
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 As explained in Chapter 2, inclusion of participants’ absolute experiences of the 
constructs measured (e.g., the number of days a month they felt depressed, the number of 
hours they slept, etc.) in the regression analyses provided a benchmark on which to 
compare the strength of the comparison effects. In the general health study, rank effects 
were similar to those of the absolute (the number of symptoms and conditions participants 
experienced). However, in the mental and physical health studies the rank variables were 
the strongest predictors of outcomes in the majority of the regression models (31 out of 
38) and always either attenuated or removed the effect of the absolute variables (symptom 
occurrence/duration) when entered into the model. In the sleep study, the effects of the 
absolute variables (based on objective experiences of the five sleep aspects measured) 
were significantly larger than any comparison effects seen. 
Implications of Main Findings and Areas for Future Research 
 These findings have a number of important implications, which are outlined below 
along with suggestions for future research directions. 
Models of Symptom Appraisal and Help-seeking 
 The symptom appraisal process is complex and influenced by many person-related 
factors such as previous experience, beliefs and other cognitions, emotion, knowledge, 
personality, co-morbidity, and demographics (Scott, Walter, Webster, Sutton, & Emery, 
2013; Whitaker et al., 2015). There is a consensus among symptom appraisal models that 
the appraisal process starts with the detection of bodily changes that are then interpreted 
and responded to (Whitaker et al., 2015). The interpretation process may involve labelling, 
categorising and evaluating the bodily change (e.g., symptom) such as judging whether it is 
severe or whether it maps to a known illness schema (Scott et al., 2013; Whitaker et al., 
2015). The mental and physical health studies showed, for the first time, how social 
comparison might play an important role in the interpretation and appraisal of symptoms. 
Participants were found to appraise their symptoms using social comparison – their beliefs 
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about how their symptoms compared to others significantly predicted appraisals of 
symptom severity, worry about symptoms, and whether symptoms represented the 
presence of an underlying disorder. This provides a greater understanding of both the 
beliefs that influence symptom appraisal and the processes (i.e., rank-based comparison) 
involved in the evaluation of symptoms. This could be incorporated into existing models, 
for example, the common sense model of illness self-regulation (CSM; Leventhal, Meyer, & 
Nerenz, 1980). This model proposes that symptoms are appraised using heuristics such as 
the age-illness rule (the attribution of bodily changes to ageing rather than illness: 
Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1996) and the rate of change rule (sudden or worsening/ 
increasing/ unstable symptoms indicate illness and the need for care: Nyawata & Topping, 
2006). Social comparison could be classed as such a heuristic in this model – judgement of 
a symptom experience to be worse/better than how the majority of others are believed to 
experience the symptom indicates the need to seek/not seek help. This proposition is 
supported by the work of Mussweiler and colleagues who have shown how quick and 
efficient comparative information processing can be. This has lead them to propose that 
social comparison is regularly used as a heuristic in judgement and decision-making (e.g., 
Mussweiler & Epstude, 2009; Mussweiler & Posten, 2012). 
 As previously mentioned, symptom appraisal models acknowledge that the 
interpretation process is followed by a response which might be the decision to take action, 
such as deciding to seek help from a professional, or to not act at all (Whitaker et al., 2015). 
Indeed, much research has shown that symptom appraisal plays a key role in help-seeking 
decision-making (Scott et al., 2013) and health beliefs/appraisals have long been 
recognised as influencers of behaviour in more general models of health behaviour (e.g., 
the theory of planned behaviour, Ajzen, 1988; the health belief model, Becker, 1974; 
protection motivation theory, Rogers, 1983). The current studies provide further evidence 
of the association between symptom appraisals and help seeking. Appraisals of symptom 
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severity, worry about symptoms, and whether symptoms represented the presence of an 
underlying disorder were all associated with whether or not participants sought help for 
symptoms. Furthermore, participants’ beliefs about how their symptoms compared to 
others significantly predicted help seeking both directly and indirectly through these 
appraisals. The studies have therefore also identified another type of belief – how health is 
believed to compare to others – which influences help-seeking behaviour. However, 
perhaps the most important implication of these findings is that they can provide an 
understanding of how people might make inaccurate help seeking decisions. 
 In the context of help-seeking, inaccurate decisions are made when people either fail 
to seek help when they need to or seek help when they do not need to. As previously 
discussed, the majority of research in this area has focused on when and why the former 
occurs. The general model of total patient delay (Andersen et al., 1995; Safer et al., 1979) 
proposes that delay can occur at five time points between detecting abnormal sensations 
and beginning treatment for an illness. These are the periods between detecting sensations 
and evaluating whether they represent illness (appraisal delay), between making this 
judgement and deciding whether professional care is needed (illness delay), between 
making the decision to seek care and acting on it (behavioural delay), between acting and 
actually going to the clinic or service (scheduling delay), and between the first appointment 
with a professional and starting treatment (treatment delay). When these stages have been 
compared, appraisal delay has been found to contribute the most to the total delay time 
(e.g., Andersen et al., 1995; Ristvedt & Trinkaus, 2005; Walter, Webster, Scott, & Emery, 
2011). This suggests that one of the main reasons why people are not seeking help when 
they need to is because they are making incorrect appraisals about their symptoms, for 
example, not judging them to be severe enough to warrant medical attention when in fact 
they are. Indeed, research has shown that errors in symptom appraisal such as 
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misattribution and failure to recognise the seriousness of symptoms contribute significantly 
to delays in help seeking (e.g., Evans, Ziebland, & McPherson, 2007).  
 Findings from the mental and physical health studies suggest that incorrect 
appraisals and help-seeking decisions may also be made when people’s beliefs about how 
their symptoms compare to others are incorrect. For example, a person may judge that 
their symptoms are not severe enough to seek help if they believe that other people 
experience them more frequently than they do. Indeed, the studies showed an association 
between beliefs about how symptoms compare to others and help-seeking accuracy such 
that participants were more likely to have not sought help when they possibly needed to if 
they believed that they experienced symptoms less frequently than others. Similarly, 
participants were much more likely to seek help when they possibly did not need to if they 
believed that they experienced symptoms more frequently than others. Therefore, 
inaccurate health help-seeking decisions may be made if an individual bases their decision 
on how they believe their health compares to that of others but their beliefs about others 
are not representative of the actual state of the world.  
 The current studies may be the first to show the importance of social comparison in 
symptom appraisal and help-seeking. However, more research is needed to explore the 
role of social comparison further, using a wider variety of symptoms, aspects of symptom 
experience and other types of symptom appraisals, especially those known to affect help-
seeking. The greater understanding of the beliefs and processes involved in symptom 
evaluation and appraisal that these studies have provided can also help to explain why 
people may make inaccurate judgements and decisions about their health and how such 
inaccuracies may be prevented (discussed in the next section). Inaccurate judgements and 
decisions may be made when people have inaccurate beliefs about the health of others. 
The studies showed that such inaccurate beliefs were prevalent but it is unknown as to 
whether certain people (i.e., those from a specific demographic group or with certain 
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personality types) may be more susceptible to holding inaccurate beliefs than others. For 
example, studies have shown that health-anxious individuals have different (i.e., more 
dysfunctional) assumptions and beliefs about health and illness compared to those with 
low levels of health anxiety (see Marcus, Gurley, Marchi, & Bauer, 2007 for a meta-
analysis). Therefore, individuals high in health anxiety may be particularly likely to hold 
inaccurate beliefs about how their symptoms compare to others. Understanding whether 
there are any specific groups of people that may be more susceptible to holding inaccurate 
beliefs about others could help to identify those more likely to make inaccurate 
judgements and decisions about their health and therefore those who may be most 
effectively targeted with interventions to trying to improve accuracy in judgement and 
decision making. This could be a worthwhile area for future research. 
Preventing Inaccuracy in Health-Related Judgement and Decision Making 
 As explained earlier, the results suggested that inaccurate judgements and decisions 
may be made if an individual bases their judgement/decision on how they believe their 
health compares to that of others but their beliefs about others are not representative of 
the actual state of the world. Such incorrect beliefs were prevalent in all three health 
studies and have been shown in other studies such as those investigating perceptions of 
health-related social norms and cognitive biases (e.g., the false consensus effect, pluralistic 
ignorance and unrealistic optimism) in these perceptions (see Suls, 2011, for a review).  
Given that such inaccurate beliefs about others may be quite prevalent, interventions that 
aim to recalibrate inaccurate beliefs may be effective in both encouraging people who need 
help to seek it and people that do not need help to refrain from seeking it. It has been 
suggested that providing people with the information needed to make accurate symptom 
appraisals via public health messages and education campaigns could improve help-seeking 
accuracy (Henshaw & Freedman-Doan, 2009). The results reported here suggest that such 
interventions could provide information about the actual distribution of aspects of 
 270 
 
symptoms such as their occurrence and duration in order to encourage more accurate 
comparisons and hopefully more accurate decisions. Alternatively, objective information 
about symptom experiences (such as telling people to seek help if they have experienced a 
symptom for more than a certain number of days) could be provided in order to discourage 
social comparison and the errors in judgement that may occur because of it. Developing 
and testing the efficacy of such interventions could be a worthwhile area for future 
research. 
 Similar steps could be taken to help people make more accurate self-rated health 
judgements when they are answering these questions as part of population surveys or as 
clinical outcome measures. Previous research has shown that people often over- or 
underestimate their actual health when answering SRH questions. This finding has 
previously been explained as being the result of people comparing to others when making 
the SRH judgement and using different comparison groups when doing so. However, 
findings from the general health study suggest that people may still make inaccurate 
judgements about their health when using the same comparison sample (such as the 
general population) if their beliefs about the distribution of health in this sample are 
incorrect. It is not so much that people make inaccurate judgements about their health 
because they use different comparison groups; it is more about how representative these 
comparison groups are of the actual state of the world. It is therefore not enough to ask 
people to compare to a comparison group that is shared amongst all respondents when 
making the SRH judgement (which some surveys, such as BHPS, have done in an attempt to 
limit comparison effects). Surveys also need to ask respondents about their beliefs about 
the distribution of health in this comparison group so that their answers may be adjusted 
for varying beliefs. Alternatively, information about the actual distribution of health in the 
comparison group could be provided alongside the SRH question. This could be tested in 
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future research to see whether controlling for both comparison group and varying beliefs 
about others produces SRH judgements that more accurately reflect objective health. 
Social Comparison Theory and Interventions 
 As explained in Chapter 1, although there has been a great deal of research on social 
comparison over the last sixty years it appears that the underlying mechanisms of the 
comparison process, i.e., how people actually compare to others, have received little 
attention in the literature to date. The results suggest that when people compare to others 
to make judgements and decisions about their health that they do so using rank-based 
strategies and not by comparing to the average of the sample as has previously been 
widely assumed. As hypothesised, this finding provides further support for the DbS model 
but not ALT and has a number of implications. 
 Firstly, this finding has implications for the development of social norm-based 
interventions and education campaigns which tend to supply people with information 
about how they compare to the average of a sample in the hope that people will modify 
their behaviour in response. The results suggest that these interventions may be more 
effective when rank-based information is supplied rather than information on how one 
differs from the average, particularly if the behaviour trying to be changed is health-
related. Future research could investigate this further along with whether people compare 
to others using rank or average-based strategies when making self-assessments about 
other behaviours that are commonly targeted by social-norms based interventions such as 
recycling and energy consumption. 
 Secondly, this finding has implications for researchers investigating comparison 
effects by using large datasets to construct comparison groups. It should not be assumed 
that people compare to the average of others in the comparison group as has been done 
previously in such investigations (e.g., Powdthavee, 2009; Carrieri, 2012), as the individual’s 
ranked position within the comparison group may be more influential. It should also be 
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noted that although data from large-scale studies can be used to construct comparison 
groups, the distribution of health in these groups might vary considerably from what 
people believe the distribution to be, which is what they would use to base the judgement 
about themselves on. Therefore, these studies may be missing comparison effects or 
underestimating their strength through using this methodology. 
 The physical and mental health studies showed social comparison effects that, to my 
knowledge, had not been explored before. Although it had previously been suggested that 
people might compare their experience of symptoms to that of others in order to make 
help-seeking decisions (Suls et al., 1997), it appears that this hypothesis has not been 
formally tested. Previous research on the use of social comparison in health-related 
decision-making has focused largely on the use of the lay referral structure for health 
advice with inaccuracy in help-seeking being explained as occurring due to receipt of 
inaccurate advice. The physical and mental health studies suggest that social comparison 
plays a much more pivotal role, not only affecting help-seeking decisions but also 
influencing symptom evaluation and appraisal. 
 Social comparison effects were also investigated, for what is believed to be the first 
time, in the domains of sleep and social support. Unfortunately, the comparison effects 
were so small in the sleep study that it was concluded that people rarely compared their 
sleep to that of others when appraising their sleep and making decisions regarding seeking 
help for sleep problems. Although there were some methodological limitations to the study 
(see Chapter 4), it was concluded that these probably had little effect on the estimations of 
the comparison effects. It is therefore possible that people simply do not compare their 
sleep that much to that of others when making sleep-related judgements and decisions. 
The general health study reported in Chapter 5 showed that people often compared to 
their previous health when making judgements about their current state of health. Perhaps 
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then, if people base judgements and decisions about their sleep on a comparison, it is to 
their previous sleep experiences rather than other people’s sleep experiences.  
 No comparison effects were found in the first social support study suggesting that 
participants’ perceptions of the support they receive are not associated with how they 
believe the amount of support they receives compares to others. Unfortunately, this could 
not be investigated in the second study, which utilised a better methodology that 
controlled for the need for support, as the independent variables were so highly correlated. 
It would have been interesting to see if any comparison effects would have been present if 
the new, direct rank and distance from the average comparison measures had been used in 
those studies. Overall, the findings from the sleep and social support studies suggest that 
these are not fruitful areas for social comparison research or interventions.  
Other Findings 
 There were a number of other findings from the general health and social support 
studies that were not directly related to the central aims of the thesis and these are 
summarised briefly next. 
Individual Differences in the use of Health Aspects and Comparison 
The general health study also investigated what aspects of their health participants 
used when making the SRH judgement and when making comparisons to others and their 
previous health, the extent to which participants based their SRH judgement on both how 
their health compares to that of others and to their own previous health, and which 
comparison groups participants used when making SRH judgements. 
 General physical condition was the health aspect that was used the most when 
making SRH judgements (27.8%) and when comparing current health to both others 
(12.5%) and previous health (11.5%). The second and third most important aspects 
considered when making the SRH judgement were the presence (23.3%) and absence 
(12.6%) of health problems. The second and third most important aspects considered when 
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comparing to others were engagement with healthy behaviours (12%) and energy (11.2%) 
and when comparing to previous health were general feeling (11.1%) and energy (9.8%). 
The data suggested that the health aspects that participants most commonly compared to 
others and to their previous health when judging their general health were very similar. In 
the majority of cases, participants were no more likely to use one comparison type (others 
vs previous health) over the other when using a specific health aspect to make the SRH 
judgement.  
 When asked explicitly, the majority of participants said that they compared their 
current health to that of others (84%) and/or their previous health (90%) to some extent 
when answering the SRH question. On average, participants said that the comparison to 
others contributed 44% to the judgement and the comparison to previous health 
contributed 47%. Women and participants over 40 based a higher percentage of their SRH 
judgement on how their current health compared to their previous health than men and 
participants under 30 respectively. These findings provide evidence of further context 
effects that may affect SRH judgements. 
 When making the SRH judgement, participants tended to compare to people that 
were around them: friends (23%), family (19.3%) and people around their age (18.4%), 
although quite a few referred to the health of the general population (13.8%). Differences 
in the choice of comparison group have largely been unexplored in the previous literature 
and were therefore investigated here. Both younger and healthy participants were more 
likely than older participants and those in poor health to compare to family members. 
Older participants were more likely than younger to compare to people their age and 
participants in poor health were more likely than healthy to compare to people their age 
and the general population. These findings confirm that people use different comparison 
groups when evaluating their health and that there are systematic differences in the use of 
comparison group. 
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Measurement of Received Support 
 As reported in Chapter 6, when undertaking the social support studies a novel finding 
was uncovered: the relationship between the amount of support a person receives 
(received support) and their perceptions of this support (perceived support) is affected by 
whether the person actually needed the support they received. When the need for support 
was taken into consideration, correlations between received and perceived support 
increased substantially. This finding explained why such low correlations between these 
two constructs had been found previously, despite theoretical accounts suggesting that 
there should be a strong relationship between the two. One measure of received support 
had been consistently used in the investigation of the received-perceived support 
relationship and this did not control for the need for support. Therefore, the main 
implication of this finding was that measures of received support need to ask about both 
the amount of support received and whether it was needed. 
General Limitations 
 In addition to the limitations exclusive to each study (outlined in the general 
discussions of each chapter), there were a number of general limitations to the research 
presented in this thesis. Ideally, objective health, the presence of clinical levels of 
depression, anxiety and insomnia and help seeking behaviours undertaken for these 
disorders (particularly whether participants had consulted a professional or taken 
medication) would have been ascertained through methods that may have been more 
reliable and valid than self-report, such as clinical interviews or medical record screening. 
However, this was not possible due to the large number of participants required for each 
study. Recruiting and medically screening thousands of participants would not have been 
feasible due to time and monetary constraints. Whilst collecting information on symptom 
presence and help-seeking from participants is much easier and cheaper, this information 
can be inaccurate due to factors such as willingness to report, recall timeframe, frequency 
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of help seeking, questionnaire design, participants’ knowledge/understanding of what they 
are being asked to report and recall ability (Goldman et al., 2003; Bhandari & Wagner, 
2006). However, the design of the questionnaires may have helped to reduce the likelihood 
of these factors affecting the reliability and validity of the self-reported measures. For 
example, the questionnaires were all online surveys (i.e., no face-to-face or telephone 
contact with the experimenter), no identifiable information was requested and participants 
were told that their responses were confidential. This may have made participants more 
willing to report symptoms that they may be embarrassed about or feel are stigmatised 
and may have encouraged them not to under-report help seeking. The longer the recall 
timeframe provided, the worse recall accuracy becomes. Bhandari and Wagner (2006) 
recommend avoiding recall timeframes greater than 12 months which was adhered to in 
the current studies (timeframes were mainly three and six months). Recall accuracy is also 
affected by the number of times people engage in the help seeking behaviour (Bhandari & 
Wagner, 2006). However, this is largely concerned with recalling the frequency of 
engagement – for example, the more frequently people visit their doctor the more likely 
they are to under-report the number of doctor visits simply because they forget some. The 
questionnaires asked only whether participants engaged in each type of help-seeking 
behaviour and not how many times they did so and so this is not likely to be an issue in the 
current studies. The questionnaires were worded as clearly as possible to avoid any 
misunderstanding of what was being asked. For example, participants were not just asked 
whether they had consulted a professional, they were specifically asked whether they had 
consulted a doctor, nurse, pharmacist, or therapist. As explained in Chapter 5, research 
comparing self-report and medical report of symptoms has shown that people tend to be 
good at accurately reporting whether or not they have many of the symptoms/illnesses 
presented in the measure of objective health in the general health study. The depression 
and anxiety screening measures (PHQ-9 and GAD-7) were standardised measures validated 
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for use within the general population with sensitivity and specificity of over 80%. Although 
the self-report insomnia screening measure was developed for the sleep study (as no 
standardised measure reflecting the current diagnostic criteria for insomnia was available 
at the time), this was not used in any analyses. 
 A second limitation of the research is that no conclusions can be made about the 
causal relationships between variables, as all of the studies were correlational in design. 
However, these were exploratory studies - one of the main aims of the research was to see 
whether the relationships studied actually existed, which was not the case in some 
circumstances (i.e., the sleep and social support studies). Where relationships between 
social comparison variables and outcomes have been shown to exist, a natural next step for 
this research is to examine causality using an experimental design. Rank has previously 
been manipulated experimentally using a between subjects design and by presenting 
participants with one of two distributions of values, for example, the number of days a 
month 11 people in the general population feel depressed (Melrose et al., 2013). The two 
distributions have the same mean and end points and three common values in addition to 
the end points, for example: distribution 1: 3, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 29 days, 
distribution 2: 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 16, 22, 24, 26, 28, and 29 days. The common value of 16 (the 
mean) is ranked 6th in both distributions but the other two common values (10 and 22) 
appear at different ranked positions within the two distributions – 10 is ranked lower in 
distribution 1 than in distribution 2 (2nd compared to 5th) and 22 is ranked higher in 
distribution 1 than in distribution 2 (10th compared to 7th). Participants are asked to make a 
judgement about the values, such as how severe they think the symptom occurrence is on 
a given scale. Studies utilising this paradigm such as Melrose et al. (2013) tend to show that 
there is no significant difference in the average rating given by participants in the two 
groups to the value which is ranked the same in both distributions (i.e., the value of 16 in 
the above example). However, the average ratings given to the other two common values 
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do differ significantly between the groups. In the above example, participants given 
distribution 2 rated the occurrence of 10 days a month to be more severe than participants 
given distribution 1. The opposite was true for the occurrence of 22 days. This suggests that 
the ranked position of the number of days affected how severe it was perceived to be by 
the participants. 
 Thirdly, as with any questionnaire based study there is the possibility that item order 
effects may have occurred. However, care was taken to overcome any potential effects 
through counterbalancing the presentation order of items. In all of the studies apart from 
the general health study, questions were split into two blocks of independent variable 
questions (absolute experience, rank, and average questions) and dependent variable 
questions (all other questions such as help seeking, severity, and worry questions). Half of 
the participants in each study saw the independent variable question block first and the 
other half saw the dependent variable question block first. In addition, where the order of 
the independent variable questions was not imperative to being able to answer the 
questions (i.e., in all but the mental health study where the average questions had to 
follow the rank questions because of the way they were worded), the presentation order of 
the absolute, rank and average questions was randomised within the question block. For 
the sleep study, the presentation order of questions within the dependent variable block 
was also randomised (later studies had more sophisticated counterbalancing as the online 
survey software developed and improved over time). For the general health study, all 
participants answered the self-rated health question first and then the presentation order 
of the rank and average questions was counterbalanced so that half of the participants saw 
the rank questions first and half saw the average questions first. The presentation order of 
the remaining questions was the same for all participants. This was because all the other 
questions related to how participants answered the self-rated health question and 
therefore they had to follow on from this question. 
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 Finally, as explained in Chapter 1, people compare to others when faced with 
uncertainty (Festinger, 1954; Schachter & Singer, 1962). Therefore, the use of social 
comparison in health-related judgement and decision-making may be dependent on how 
uncertain the person is about the judgement/decision they are making. For example, a 
person who has suffered from depression for many years will know to seek help if they 
start to experience an episode. It is unlikely that they will compare their symptoms to those 
of others in order to make this decision because they are likely to recognise how they are 
feeling from past experience and be quite certain in how they should address their 
symptoms. However, a person experiencing depression for the first time may be quite 
uncertain about how they feel and whether they should seek help and therefore more 
likely to use social comparison to help make this decision. It is therefore likely that the 
extent to which each participant used social comparison when making the judgements and 
decisions studied differed according to their uncertainty. However, this was not captured in 
the analyses, which show an average comparison effect across all participants. In future 
studies it would be interesting to measure judgement/decision making uncertainty and 
investigate whether social comparison effects are stronger in participants who are more 
uncertain and weaker in those who are more certain as is hypothesised. 
Conclusions 
The studies presented in this thesis showed that participants compared to others 
when making judgements and decisions regarding their general health and both somatic 
and psychological symptoms but not their sleep nor the support they receive from others. 
When participants compared to others in order to make health-related judgements and 
decisions they did so using their rank within the comparison sample and not their distance 
from the sample mean, which has often been assumed in previous social comparison 
research. Participants’ beliefs about the distributions of general health, symptom 
occurrence, and symptom duration in the general population varied considerably, 
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indicating that many participants had incorrect beliefs about the health and symptom 
experience of others.  
When such inaccurate beliefs about others are used to make judgements and 
decisions about one’s own health through social comparison, it is likely that these 
judgements and decisions will also be inaccurate. The physical and mental health studies 
provided evidence of this. Estimates of where their symptom occurrence and duration 
ranked in comparison to others given by participants who experienced the same symptom 
occurrence or duration varied substantially, indicating that many participants 
misestimated their rank. Given that the studies showed an association between believed 
rank of symptom experience and help-seeking, it is likely that such misestimations may 
have led to inaccurate help-seeking decisions. Indeed, help-seeking inaccuracy was 
associated with beliefs about how symptoms compared to others. Participants unlikely to 
have depression or anxiety were around four times more likely to seek help if they thought 
they experienced depression/anxiety symptoms more frequently than others (i.e., ranked 
high within the comparison sample). Participants likely to have clinical levels of depression 
or anxiety were two to three times more likely not to seek help if they thought they 
experienced symptoms less frequently than others (i.e., ranked low within the comparison 
sample). 
These findings provide a better understanding of how people evaluate their general 
health and symptoms and make judgements and decisions about them. They suggest that 
inaccurate health help-seeking behaviours (and possibly other inaccurate health-related 
judgements and decisions) may be targeted effectively by interventions that aim to 
recalibrate incorrect beliefs about other people’s health experiences, for example, by 
providing information about the actual distribution of symptom experience, so that people 
can make more accurate self-evaluations. Future research could test whether such 
interventions are effective in encouraging people to seek help for symptoms or disorders 
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that research has shown people often do not seek help for when they need to (such as 
mental health disorders) and seek help when they do not need to (such as cold and flu 
symptoms). 
This research investigated social comparison effects in new contexts and the 
suggestion that people may compare to others using rank-based strategies has 
implications for social comparison theory, research and interventions. More research is 
needed to ascertain whether people use rank-based strategies globally in social 
comparison or whether this is specific to health comparisons. Research is also needed to 
investigate whether people use rank-based strategies when making self-assessments 
about behaviours commonly targeted by social-norms based interventions. The effects of 
such interventions may have been underestimated previously because these interventions 
have given feedback based on how the individual compares to the average of the 
comparison sample and not where they rank within the sample. 
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Appendix 1: The Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by the following problems? 
 
Little interest or pleasure in doing things 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Feeling tired or having little energy 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Poor appetite or overeating 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Feeling bad about yourself —or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family 
down 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Moving or speaking so slowly that other people could have noticed? Or the opposite —
being so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than usual 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Thoughts that you would be better off dead or of hurting yourself in some way 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
 
(Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002)  
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Appendix 2: The Generalised Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by the following problems? 
 
Feeling nervous, anxious or on edge 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Not being able to stop or control worrying 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Worrying too much about different things 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Trouble relaxing 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Being so restless that it is hard to sit still 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Becoming easily annoyed or irritable 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
Feeling afraid as if something awful might happen 
Not at all □   Several days □  More than half the days □ Nearly every day □ 
 
 
(Spitzer et al., 2006) 
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Appendix 3: The Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
There is a special person around when I am in need 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
There is a special person with whom I can share my joys and sorrows 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
My family really tries to help me 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
I get the emotional help and support I need from my family 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
I have a special person who is a real source of comfort to me 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
My friends really try to help me 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
I can count on my friends when things go wrong 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
I can talk about my problems with my family 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
I have friends with whom I can share my joys and sorrows 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
There is a special person in my life who cares about my feelings 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
My family is willing to help me make decisions 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
 
I can talk about my problems with my friends 
Very Strongly Disagree □  Strongly Disagree □  Mildly Disagree □  Neutral □  Mildly Agree □ 
Strongly Agree □  Very Strongly Agree □ 
(Zimet et al., 1988)  
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Appendix 4: The Arizona Social Support Interview Schedule – Satisfaction 
Subscale (ASSIS-S) 
How would you rate your satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the times you talked to people 
about your personal and private feelings during the past month? 
Very dissatisfied □  Moderately dissatisfied □  Slightly dissatisfied □  Neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied □  Slightly satisfied □  Moderately satisfied □  Very satisfied □ 
 
During the past month, how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the things that people 
loaned or gave to you? 
Very dissatisfied □  Moderately dissatisfied □  Slightly dissatisfied □  Neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied □  Slightly satisfied □  Moderately satisfied □  Very satisfied □ 
 
During the past month, how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with advice that you were 
given? 
Very dissatisfied □  Moderately dissatisfied □  Slightly dissatisfied □  Neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied □  Slightly satisfied □  Moderately satisfied □  Very satisfied □ 
 
During the past month, how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the times that people 
told you that they liked your ideas or the things that you did? 
Very dissatisfied □  Moderately dissatisfied □  Slightly dissatisfied □  Neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied □  Slightly satisfied □  Moderately satisfied □  Very satisfied □ 
 
During the past month, how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the help you received in 
doing things that you needed to do? 
Very dissatisfied □  Moderately dissatisfied □  Slightly dissatisfied □  Neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied □  Slightly satisfied □  Moderately satisfied □  Very satisfied □ 
 
During the past month how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the times that you got 
together with people just to have fun and relax? 
Very dissatisfied □  Moderately dissatisfied □  Slightly dissatisfied □  Neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied □  Slightly satisfied □  Moderately satisfied □  Very satisfied □ 
 
 
(Barrera, 1981) 
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Appendix 5. The Short Form-36v2 Health Survey (SF-36v2) 
For each of the following questions, please select the one box that best describes your 
answer. 
 
In general, would you say your health is: 
Excellent □  Very good □  Good □  Fair □  Poor □ 
 
Compared to one year ago, how would you rate your health in general now? 
Much better now than one year ago □ 
Somewhat better now than one year ago □ 
About the same as one year ago □ 
Somewhat worse now than one year ago □ 
Much worse now than one year ago □ 
 
 
The following questions are about activities you might do during a typical day. Does your 
health now limit you in these activities? If so, how much? 
 
Vigorous activities, such as running, lifting heavy objects, participating in strenuous sports 
Yes, limited a lot □ Yes, limited a little □ No, not limited at all □ 
 
Moderate activities, such as moving a table, pushing a vacuum cleaner, bowling, or playing 
golf 
Yes, limited a lot □ Yes, limited a little □ No, not limited at all □ 
 
Lifting or carrying groceries 
Yes, limited a lot □ Yes, limited a little □ No, not limited at all □ 
 
Climbing several flights of stairs 
Yes, limited a lot □ Yes, limited a little □ No, not limited at all □ 
 
Climbing one flight of stairs 
Yes, limited a lot □ Yes, limited a little □ No, not limited at all □ 
 
Bending, kneeling, or stooping 
Yes, limited a lot □ Yes, limited a little □ No, not limited at all □ 
 
Walking more than a mile 
Yes, limited a lot □ Yes, limited a little □ No, not limited at all □ 
 
Walking several hundred yards 
Yes, limited a lot □ Yes, limited a little □ No, not limited at all □ 
 
Walking one hundred yards 
Yes, limited a lot □ Yes, limited a little □ No, not limited at all □ 
 
Bathing or dressing yourself 
Yes, limited a lot □ Yes, limited a little □ No, not limited at all □ 
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During the past 4 weeks, how much of the time have you had any of the following 
problems with your work or other regular daily activities as a result of your physical health? 
 
Cut down on the amount of time you spent on work or other activities 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Accomplished less than you would like 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Were limited in the kind of work or other activities 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Had difficulty performing the work or other activities (for example, it took extra effort) 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
 
During the past 4 weeks, how much of the time have you had any of the following 
problems with your work or other regular daily activities as a result of any emotional 
problems (such as feeling depressed or anxious)? 
 
Cut down on the amount of time you spent on work or other activities 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Accomplished less than you would like 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Did work or other activities less carefully than usual 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
 
During the past 4 weeks, to what extent has your physical health or emotional problems 
interfered with your normal social activities with family, friends, neighbours, or groups? 
Not at all □  Slightly □  Moderately □  Quite a bit □  Extremely □ 
 
How much bodily pain have you had during the past 4 weeks? 
None □  Very mild □  Mild □  Moderate □  Severe □  Very severe □ 
 
During the past 4 weeks, how much did pain interfere with your normal work (including 
both work outside the home and housework)? 
Not at all □  A little bit □  Moderately □  Quite a bit □  Extremely □ 
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These questions are about how you feel and how things have been with you during the 
past 4 weeks.  For each question, please give the one answer that comes closest to the way 
you have been feeling.  How much of the time during the past 4 weeks… 
 
Did you feel full of life? 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Have you been very nervous? 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Have you felt so down in the dumps that nothing could cheer you up?  
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Have you felt calm and peaceful?  
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Did you have a lot of energy? 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Have you felt downhearted and low? 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Did you feel worn out? 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Have you been happy? 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
Did you feel tired? 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
 
During the past 4 weeks, how much of the time has your physical health or emotional 
problems interfered with your social activities (like visiting with friends, relatives, etc.)? 
All of the time □  Most of the time □  Some of the time □  A little of the time □ None of the 
time □ 
 
 
How TRUE or FALSE is each of the following statements for you? 
 
I seem to get ill more easily than other people 
Definitely true □  Mostly true □  Don't know □  Mostly false □  Definitely false □ 
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I am as healthy as anybody I know  
Definitely true □  Mostly true □  Don't know □  Mostly false □  Definitely false □ 
 
I expect my health to get worse  
Definitely true □  Mostly true □  Don't know □  Mostly false □  Definitely false □ 
 
My health is excellent 
Definitely true □  Mostly true □  Don't know □  Mostly false □  Definitely false □ 
 
 
(Ware et al., 2008) 
 
